تخصیص سود از تولید برق مستقل بر اساس نظریه ی بازی مشارکتی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|7118||2003||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, Volume 25, Issue 8, October 2003, Pages 633–641
With the development of deregulation, the retail market is being formed. The independent power producers (IPPs) can contact the customers and sell electric power to them directly to obtain the profits because IPPs can provide electricity at cheaper prices to the customers than the utilities can. If IPP can obtain further more profit through collaborating with other ones in some coalition, it will prefer to collaborate to form this coalition rather than participating individually. In coalition, also the problem of how to allocate profit rationally for each IPP should also be solved. In this paper, we discuss the cooperation of IPPs in retail market and give a formulation about the calculation of IPPs profits. After that, based on Game theory, we propose a scheme to decide the profit allocation of each IPP in the coalitions rationally and impartially.
Electric utilities have experienced a period of rapid changes especially in market structure and regulatory issues in many parts of the world. Because of the emergence of independent power producers (IPPs) as well as the changing structure of the electricity supply industry, the electric power industry has entered an increasingly competitive environment under which it becomes more realistic to improve economics and reliability of power systems by enlisting market forces , ,  and . For example, to maximize his payoffs, a player (e.g. a utility) seeks to displace expensive generation by importing power from neighboring players with lower cost energy. Likewise, a player (e.g. a IPP) with excess generation capacity can choose to export power and receive an immediate return on its investment , ,  and . Up to now, a considerable number of literature addressing the competition and deregulation issues has been published , , , , , ,  and , however, the studies on cooperation of IPPs in retail market have not been carried out. In the retail market, IPPs can contact with the customers and sell electric power to them directly to obtain the profits because IPPs can provide cheaper electricity prices to the customers than the utilities can. For the reason of driving for maximum profits as much as possible for the IPPs, the following case can be considered, that is: if IPP can obtain further more profit through collaborating with other ones to form a coalition, it will prefer to collaborate to form this coalition rather than participating individually. Different IPPs will obtain different profits in various coalitions. Though one IPP can obtain the best solution in a coalition, other ones in the same coalition must not obtain their best solutions. How to obtain an equilibrium strategy is considered as a cooperative game problem of coalition form (or normal form) in Game theory  and . In this paper, we discuss the cooperation of IPPs, and propose a method to decide the formation of coalition. Based on Game theory, we get the rational and impartial profit allocation of each IPP in the coalition.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The possibility of the cooperation of IPPs in the retail market is discussed and an approach to calculate the allocation of their profits based on Game theory is proposed in this paper. Through comparing the results between noncooperative game and cooperative game on the test system, that the cooperation among the IPPs will bring more profits than the competition with each other is verified. The calculated result of Shapley value give the IPP clear and definite information that it can obtain more profits by making a coalition with others than join the market by itself, and the calculated result of the nucleolus assure the IPP to obtain its satisfactory and rational profit allocated from the coalition. Through comparing the results between noncooperative game and cooperative game on a test system, the principle that cooperation is better than competition for IPPs is verified and the feasibility of the proposed method is demonstrated.