مزایای بالقوه برای همکاری پیمانکاران فرعی بر اساس تئوری بازی تعاونی

Formwork subcontractors that hire open shop workers, rather than union workers can win more contracts and earn more profits from general contractors because of greater agility and lower costs. A subcontractor may earn even more profit if it collaborates with others in a coalition. Payoff functions for individual subcontractors and a group of subcontractors in a coalition are formulated. Profit can also be reasonably allocated to each subcontractor in a coalition using the Shapley value and nucleolus.

The construction labor market has had a gradual, yet significant, change in the last few decades [1]. Construction labor unions had dominated the labor markets by providing high-quality skilled workers and being involved in systematic labor training for industries for a long time [2]. The high costs and the lack of communication with general contractors of the union workers, however, have jeopardized their relationships with general contractors [3]. On the other hand, open shop workers, with their agility and cost competitiveness are taking over a larger and larger share of the construction labor market [4]. As a result, many skilled workers have left unions and become self-employed open shop workers or employees of specialty subcontractors [5]. Little, however, has been discussed about the size, contracting capacity and corresponding differences in the costs of subcontractors that hire open shop workers. Electric power supply markets shared a similar historical change path with the construction labor market [6]. Public utilities had been the sole sources supplying electricity in many nations for a long time [7]. Due to lower costs, many independent power producers are taking over more and more power supply market shares from the public utilities [8]. Research reveals that joining of independent power producers in a coalition can reduce costs even more, and improve profits [9]. Lessons learned in the power supply market changes and from the co-operative strategy of independent power producers may be useful for strategic planning in improving profitability for independent subcontractors that hire open shop workers. In-depth interviews are presented herein to identify the business model of formwork subcontractors, as well as, to explore changes in the unit cost of formwork with respect to daily production rates of each subcontractor. Game theory is then applied to investigate the possibility of optimizing unit cost and improving profitability by joining several independent subcontractors in a coalition. Nucleous and Shapley Value are also suggested for allocating profits among the coalition.

A three-step procedure is presented in this research to demonstrate the potential benefits for formwork subcontractors collaborating in a coalition. First, the unit production cost, with respect to daily production volume, for each subcontractor, can be formulated, based on corresponding historical production data. Second, a job dispatching method is proposed to distribute job volume within a coalition in a cost effective manner. Finally, both the Shapley value and nucleolus approaches are suggested for examining profit allocation schemes among a coalition. The case study reveals an attractive profit increase for formwork subcontractors joining a coalition. The daily job dispatching may require an extra management effort or negotiation costs. These in conjunction with more policy implications deserve further study. Similar methods may also be useful in setting up a construction joint venture.