مکانیسم قطعی رفتار شهروندی سازمانی در صنعت هتل - استفاده از تئوری بازی اقتصادی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|7633||2012||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Hospitality Management, Volume 31, Issue 4, December 2012, Pages 1244–1253
This paper applies an economic game theory model to explain the decisive mechanism of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). The Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) indicates that an employee's unique motivation of OCB is to maximize his or her own performance outcome. The findings also suggest that workload, importance of work to performance outcomes and cost of OCB jointly determine the amount of OCB that each individual employee exhibits. An empirical test utilizing frontline hotel employees was performed (N = 175). Using a partial related test and logistical model, the results supported three propositions, suggesting that the amount of OCB exhibited by each employee is jointly influenced by the workload, cost of OCBs and OCBs performed by coworkers.
1.1. Background of the study This paper focuses on the perfect information dynamics of an economic game theory model considering 2-stage in which organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) enters the employee's performance outcome function. A game model is proposed to answer the questions of why and how OCB influences an individual's performance outcome. Additionally, the question of what are the real determinants of the amount of OCB is asked. The theoretical model was tested in the context of China's hotel industry. This paper proposes a new theoretical model of OCB based on classic game theory in modern microeconomics. Specifically, the model is used to characterize the real situation and interactive processes among employees, customers and the organization. A dynamic two-stage perfect information game was adopted to monitor how employees maximize their OCBs. The formal method used to solve this kind of game model was originated from Rubinsein (1982), who carried out a classical solution structure of perfect information dynamic game through a bargaining model. A unique contribution of the model is taking the cost of OCB (Bergeron, 2007 and Vigoda-Gadot and Angert, 2007) into consideration. As suggested by Bergeron (2007), a zero-sum relationship exists when any change in time allocated to OCB is at the cost of task performance. This is also consistent with the rationale of Time Allocation Theory (Becher, 1965). However, most previous studies indicated that there is a strong positive correlation between OCB and task performance (William and Anderson, 1991, Conway, 1999, Johnson, 2001 and Turnley et al., 2003). One possible explanation for the controversial results, as suggested by Bergeron (2007), is that research that found positive correlations between OCB and task performance did not control the amount of hours spent in working. In the present framework, OCB we considered as a substitution to in-role task performance based on the Time Allocation Theory, as well as extra-role performance, which directly contributes to the agent's performance (an hotel employee in this case). In this way, it allows for both types of performance (in-role task performance and OCB) to make a positive contribution to job outcomes, as well as considering the cost of OCB. 1.2. Suitability of using game theory in OCB studies The antecedents and consequences of OCB have been commonly researched for almost three decades (Bateman and Organ, 1983, Organ, 1988 and Torlak and Koc, 2007). Researchers have attempted to explain the motivational mechanisms of OCB from various perspectives, such as social exchange (Organ, 1990, Zellars and Tepper, 2003 and Ma and Qu, 2011), impression management (Bolino and Turnley, 1999 and Rioux and Penner, 2001) and personality traits (Borman and Motowidlo, 1993 and Morgeson et al., 2005). However, very few studies examined OCB motivation from the economic theory perspectives, for example the classic game theory perspective. Several important considerations warrant the analysis of OCB using game theory. First of all, game theory in modern economy is the best tool to tackle interactive processes with interdependent players (Nolan and Adam, 2007 and Song, 2008). OCB is the type of behavior that falls into this category, as employees who perform OCB are interdependent and interactive with his or her co-workers, customers and the organization (Lambert, 2000 and Bell and Mengüç, 2002). The dimensionality of OCB also indicates this feature. For example, according to Organ's Five-dimensional Framework of OCB (1988), both courtesy and sportsmanship involve interactions between the employee and his or her co-workers (Morrison, 1994), while civic virtue represents the interaction between an individual employee and the organization (Podsakoff et al., 2000). Second, recent studies revealed that OCBs can be viewed as reflective behaviors. This is due to the fact that employees’ OCB performance reflects the degree of an employee's Perceived Organizational Support (POS) as well as the OCBs that employee received from others (Organ and Ryan, 1995, Moorman et al., 1998, Lambert, 2000, Moorman and Harland, 2002 and Vigoda-Gadot and Angert, 2007). The interactions and interrelationships involved in this process make the introduction of an interdependent game model necessary. Third, one basic premise of the OCB theory is that an employee will engage in OCB when he or she perceives that their employment relationship is based on social exchange (Organ, 1990 and Moorman, 1991). Another premise of OCB theory is that OCB is a reciprocate behavior (Organ, 1988, Organ, 1990, Rousseau, 1990 and Lambert, 2000). Both premises reveal that OCB is an interactive process. However, both of these two premises are unable to demonstrate the decisive mechanism of OCB mathematically, which clearly shows the interactive path from the determinants of OCB to actual OCB performance. Fortunately, game theory is a useful mathematic tool to determine the decisive path of interactive behaviors. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to highlight the major determinants of OCB. To deduce the decisive mechanism of OCB, an optimization solution of individual performance function was made with OCB to figure out how much OCB is decided by individual's dynamic game interaction.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The purpose of this study was to theoretically examine the mechanism of an employee's sending and receiving OCBs, as well as to test the effect of determinants (workload, importance of workload to performance outcome, importance of workload to performance outcome and cost of OCB) on the amount of OCBs. The study extended past research on the decisive mechanism of OCB by: (1) using a new theoretical framework of dynamic game theory to explore generating mechanisms of OCB based on the maximization principle in behavioral economics; (2) determining that employees’ workload, importance of workload, and cost of OCB were the upmost factors to predicting OCB; and, (3) using a hotel sample in mainland of China other than vast of samples from the western world or developed countries in past research. 6.1. Theoretical implications Perhaps most importantly, we found general support that OCB is in fact a kind of self-interested behavior in the form of altruistic behavior because the principal motivation of one's OCB is to maximize his or her utility as a whole. An employee sending or conducting OCB purpose is to gain long term payback from either others’ similar OCBs or mutually beneficial atmosphere around him. Based on previous logic, the mechanism of OCB could be analyzed within framework of economics especially game theory.2 Secondly, the findings support the propositions in theory and in statistics that workload has a significant and positive effect on OCB, while cost of OCB and importance of in-role task has a significant and negative effect on OCB. Bergeron (2007) found that entry and junior level employees are more likely to conduct OCB compared with senior level employees. One possible explanation is that those employees’ job performance depends more on interpersonal interaction and helping each other than senior employees (Lin et al., 2008). This is especially true in the hotel industry, where creating of quality service relies greatly on teamwork (Debbie, 2007). As a result, helping coworkers with workloads inspire employees’ OCB because it creates supportive organizational environment (Farh et al., 2004). In the long run, conducting OCB can help each other to alleviate the heavier workload in the future. Another explanation could be entry and junior level employees have higher pressure and motivation in promotion. Engaging in OCBs can help to create positive image and good impressions to coworkers and more importantly to leaders, thus, help them to get better performance reviews for promotion (Bolino and Turnley, 1999).OCB is a specific type of individual performance involving behaviors that support organizations but that are not normally found in an individual's job description (Organ, 1988). However, OCB is beneficial for an organization but may be costly to the individual (Bergeron, 2007). When the difficulty of conducting OCB (the cost of OCB) becomes higher, it is natural that one will decrease his OCBs so as not to lower his in-role job performance. In addition, according to most literature, there seems to be a pattern of results in which task performance is weighted somewhat more heavily than OCB (Podsakoff and MacKenzie, 1994 and Podsakoff and MacKenzie, 1997). The high cost of OCB takes employees’ more time and energy but benefits employees less for performance evaluation, which makes employees conducting fewer OCBs when cost is high. As a result, Proposition 2 summarizes above analysis.As suggested by Proposition 3, when an employee's in-role task is less important, then, he/she may have more time and opportunity to conduct OCBs and the OCBs are less obstruction at his/her in-role work. Alternatively, when the employee's in-role task is very important, employees may have less opportunity to conduct OCB. This is an interesting finding and it is also consistent with previous research on task performance and OCB. For example, Eatough et al. (2011) found that when stressors of in-role tasks are strong and employees perceive the in-role task as important, it will negatively influence employees’ OCB performance. The theoretical implication for this finding is that although OCBs are discretionary in nature (Organ, 1988), organizations still need to create a supportive environment for employees to engage in OCB. To be specific, organizations need to create a working environment that is of less in-role task stressors (e.g. restrictions, overload, role ambiguity) in order to encourage employees’ engagement in OCB. When these necessary conditions are not met, even if employees would like to perform OCB they are not able to. Only when a certain level of flexibility exists in in-role task can employees spend part of their time and energy to going above and beyond.Workload, cost of OCB, and importance of in-role task to performance, affect the amount of OCB as described as Propositions 1–3. In fact, the three factors are decisive variables in the generation mechanism of OCB. Considering the demographic variables, we found that gender and marriage have a significant effect on OCB – female and married employees are more likely to conduct OCBs than male and unmarried employees (see Table 4). It is possibly because they are more caring and socially oriented in nature than male employees (Iacobucci and Ostrom, 1993 and Pulkkinen, 1996), therefore, they are more likely to engage in OCB. This finding is also consistent with previous researches (e.g. Khalid et al., 2009). When looking alone, the study found that the higher the education the fewer the OCBs. One possible explanation might be supervisory and management employees generally obtained higher levels of education than frontline employees. Previous research on role definitions and OCB showed that supervisors have broader role definitions than subordinates. Therefore, certain OCBs as perceived by subordinates may be considered as in-role tasks by supervisors (Lam and Law, 1999 and Hsiung and Tsai, 2009). This may explain the finding why educational level is negatively associated with OCB. Another explanation is that the OCB measures are more task-specific while supervisors and managers’ job functions are mainly coordination, controlling and management. Therefore, they may not have as many chances as frontline employees to engage in various OCBs.The results of this study highlight the value of considering game theory in economics to deal with interactions that typically exist in conducting OCBs. One advantage of doing so is that it highlights the fact that OCB occurs within the context of a unique and reciprocal exchange relationship. Some research showed mutual interaction of OCB, such as theory of psychological contract (Morrison, 1994), but little research has considered using game theory to predict OCB. In fact, game theory is a typical method to examine reciprocal exchange relationships, which is a classical characteristic of OCB. Consequently, this perspective of game theory may lead to a better understanding of such behavior.Another advantage of considering game theory when studying OCB is that dynamic game analysis is based on player maximization of utility in determining the generating mechanism of OCB. In other words, what the essential determinants of OCB are. We proved with game theory that in an economic eye the employee's workload, cost of OCB, and importance of in-role task are the most important factors in deciding the generation and its amount of OCB. The motivation and influencing factors have been studied thoroughly by past researchers (Robinson and Morrison, 1995 and Torlak and Koc, 2007). However this paper analyzed what variables lead to the generation of OCB and decided OCB endogenously. This is an interesting, but thus far neglected topic for research. 6.2. Empirical implications The results of this study have important managerial implications for hotel management and operations. The three determinants of OCB induced from the theoretic model by game theory were used to interpret the generative and decisive mechanism of OCB. The results of this study indicate that employees’ extra-role task (such as OCB) largely depends on their in-role task (such as workload and importance of in-role task). In addition, certain demographic and job-related characteristics seem also influence employees’ OCB performance. The following practical implications are drawn based on the findings of the study.First of all, hotels need to provide a supportive environment in order to facilitate employees’ OCB. Although OCBs are discretionary in nature (Organ, 1988), the study showed that the performance of OCB is conditioned by a reasonable workload and importance of in-role tasks. When the workload is too heavy or when most of the in-role tasks are very important, employees would not be able to spare part of their energy to go above and beyond. However, hotel jobs are characterized by long working hours and heavy work load (Bohle et al., 2004), this may prevent employees from performing OCB. Therefore, hotel managers need to carefully design each hotel job and provide some flexibility in the job content to allow employees’ extra-role behaviors.Secondly, the study also reveals that frontline employees with lower education are more likely engaging in OCB than educated supervisory employees. This may due to two groups’ different definitions on in-role tasks and OCBs. According to Lam and Law (1999), supervisors generally have broader definition on in-role tasks than subordinates. Therefore, frontline employees have broader boundaries on OCB and consider more tasks as extra-role behaviors rather than in-role behaviors. This implies that managers need to provide a better job description, so that employees are clear about what behaviors are required by in-role tasks and what belong to OCBs. It should also be noted that employees of different position levels should have different in-role and extra-role job descriptions. The clear description will provide better guidance for employees to follow and help with performance appraisals, thus, benefiting the effective functioning of the hotels.Thirdly, the results also show that female employees are more likely in performing OCB. This may imply that female employees are better fit with certain hotel jobs. Therefore, managers should consider the nature of female and male employees and match them with the most suitable jobs. The study also shows that married employees are more willing to perform OCB, implicating that a good work-life balance will encourage employees to perform OCB. Therefore, managers should care about the well-being of employees and make sure they can balance their work and life well, so that they are capable and willing to go above and beyond and contribute to service excellence and the effective functioning of the organization. 6.3. Limitation and future research Despite its contributions, a few limitations of this study should be addressed. Because game theory is seldom used in hospitality literature and especially in OCB literature, we found little support for the rationale used in this study. In other words, how the literature justifies the use of game theory could be considered a limitation. Without such justification, it is very difficult to embark into using any given theory. Consequently, deductive reasoning has been used to make a case through an extension of the literature in this study. Also, although we assumed a causal direction (workload, cost of OCB, and importance of in-role task influence the generation and amount of OCB), our data did not allow us to test the causal directions. It is possible that the reverse may be true and future research should investigate the possibility of the reverse. The fact that our investigation only focused on hospitality might also be considered a limitation. An additional study of OCB within other service industries or occupational groups is needed to find out a more common mechanism of service employees’ OCB. In addition, the study collected data from three hotels with different star-ratings. Since different star-rating hotels may have different service requirements, which may influence employees’ OCB performance. Future studies may consider collecting data from hotels with the same star-rating and perform similar analysis, or comparing if different star-rating makes significant difference on hotels employees’ OCB performance. It was interested to find that education level and OCB have a negative relationship; however, the further study is needed to explore why such relationship existed.