معضلات دانش در درون سازمان ها: راه حل هایی از نظریه ی بازی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|7641||2013||14 صفحه PDF||44 صفحه WORD|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Knowledge-Based Systems, Volume 45, June 2013, Pages 100–113
2. جریان های دانش درون سازمان ها
2.1. سیلوهای دانش
2.2. تراژدی مشترکات دانش
3.2. سایش دانش
4.2. سمیت دانش
3. مرور مختصر کارهای پیشین
4. مدل دهی معضلات دانش
1.4. رویکرد پژوهشی
2.4. چارچوبی برای تحلیل
3.4. سناریوهای پیشنهادی برای مدل سازی
1.3.4. سناریوی الف – فقدان اقدام جمعی و بهره وری بی هزینه از طرح های دانش
126.96.36.199. موقعیت راهبردی (مدل بازی)
188.8.131.52. عناصر بازی.
184.108.40.206. پیامدهای راهبرد دانش
2.3.4. سناریو ب – عدم تقارن مخازن دانش بین واحدهای سازمانی
220.127.116.11. موقعیت راهبردی (مدل بازی).
18.104.22.168. عناصر بازی
22.214.171.124. پیامدهای راهبرد دانش
3.3.4. سناریوی ج – عدم تقارن اطلاعات در جریان های دانش درون اکوسیستم
126.96.36.199. موقعیت راهبردی (مدل بازی).
188.8.131.52. عناصر بازی
184.108.40.206. پیامدهای راهبرد دانش
4.3.4. سناریوی د – عدم قبول دانش سازمانی
220.127.116.11. موقعیت راهبردی (مدل بازی).
18.104.22.168. عناصر بازی.
22.214.171.124.4. مورد 1
126.96.36.199.4. مورد 2
188.8.131.52.4. مورد 2الف
184.108.40.206.4. مورد 2ب
220.127.116.11. پیامدهای راهبرد دانش
5.3.4. سناریوی ه – استفاده ی نامناسب از دانش (یا سوءاستفاده از دانش)
18.104.22.168. موقعیت راهبردی (مدل بازی).
22.214.171.124. عناصر بازی.
126.96.36.199. پیامدهای راهبرد دانش.
5. اظهارات نهایی
پیوست الف. ماده ی مکمل
جدول 1. چهار معضل دانش کلیدی
جدول 2. خلاصه ی چارچوب PARTS.
جدول 3. نقشه پردازی سناریوهای دارای معضل برای مدل سازی بازی
جدول 4. ابعاد سیاست دانش سازمانی.
شکل 1. بازی چند نفره ی معضل زندانیان. منبع: دیکسیت و اسکیت (30).
شکل 2. بازی چند نفره ی ترسوها. منبع: دیکسیت و اسکیت (30).
شکل 3. بازی چند نفره ی هماهنگی. منبع: دیکسیت و اسکیت (30).
شکل 4. درخت بازی با بازده های مدیر و کارمند.
شکل 5. ماتریس بازده برای بازیکن X
شکل 6. چارچوب سیاستی دانش سازمانی تجویزی.
The knowledge management literature suggests that an organization’s knowledge ecosystem is comprised of strategic situations in which the individual behaviors of its knowledge workers show potential conflicts with what would be optimal for the organization. This paper aims to explore how such behaviors in terms of knowledge flows may be modeled and analyzed using a game theoretic approach. While prior research has investigated some use of game theory in knowledge management, a comprehensive understanding of the organizational eco-system remains unexplored. Hence, a qualitative inductive approach was adopted in order to pursue the exploratory nature of the research question. Critical reviews of key literature in both knowledge management and organization theory identified four organizational knowledge dilemmas – “silos of knowledge”, “tragedy of the knowledge commons”, “knowledge friction” and “knowledge toxicity”. These dilemmas were used in various combinations to generate five commonly occurring scenarios in organizations. A game theoretic analysis of these scenarios using the PARTS framework provided a useful understanding of knowledge flows within organizational eco-systems. More specifically, the analysis led to key insights and prescriptive guiding principles in formulating knowledge strategies and policies to combat the major knowledge dilemmas that inhibit effective knowledge flows within organizations.
In today’s complex and globalised market economy, organizations view knowledge as one of the most valuable and strategic resource and strive to manage it in order to derive competitive advantage , , , , ,  and . Knowledge sharing thus becomes a key differentiator of success. As Boer et al.  state: “It is a key process in creating new products and services, in leveraging organizational knowledge assets and in achieving collective outcomes.” Hence, over the last two decades, knowledge management (KM) has drawn considerable interest as a discipline of study in the academic arena and practice in organizations. Despite the successful inroad of KM into leading organizations, numerous scholars have noted the various challenges associated with effective knowledge exploitation (c.f. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  and ). There is also considerable agreement in the literature that while organizations make significant investments on technology and tools to promote knowledge sharing, this is neither necessary nor sufficient as behavioral, cultural and structural aspects are the primary determinants of success. Indeed the findings of a major study of 431 US and European organizations conducted by a consulting firm (and cited by Ruggles ), reveal that the most challenging task of KM is to change behaviors relating to knowledge creation and consumption. As some have argued, knowledge sharing is often held as “unnatural” . More specifically, a review of the KM literature suggests that the organizational knowledge transactions are ridden with tensions between the perceived self-interest of an individual and the cooperative gain for the group or community ,  and . Organizations that ignore such tensions in knowledge flows would be ineffective in achieving their KM objectives . Knowledge flows refer to the links between creation and consumption and occur at two levels – the intra-organizational flows confined to the boundaries of the organization and inter-organizational knowledge flows that extend beyond the enterprise and involve external entities such as suppliers, alliances, business partners, competitors and industry regulators. The nature of relationships, strategic motivations, situations of usage in inter-organizational and intra organizational knowledge flows are distinct and therefore, study of these two knowledge ecosystems entails different considerations. In order to manage the scope of paper, this study is limited to the intra-organizational flows and future research with an inter-organizational knowledge flow perspective is highly recommended. In this paper, we address the issue of tensions in knowledge flows within organizations. Specifically, we identify some typical knowledge dilemmas and attempt to resolve them using the analytic lens of game theory. The next section introduces the notion of knowledge flows in organizations and a description of four major knowledge dilemmas. Section Three is a background review of game theory and its application to KM. In Section Four, five typical organizational scenarios, made up of a combination of dilemmas, are introduced and resolved using game theory. The paper concludes with the key findings and implications of the study in prescribing some design rules for organizational knowledge management strategy in Section Five.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper began with and the investigation of how common dilemmas which endanger the knowledge ecosystem of an organization may be analyzed and interpreted using a game theoretic approach. After a critical review of literature on both knowledge management and game theory, four key knowledge dilemmas were identified as useful for modeling. The analysis of five different scenarios in the preceding section has revealed some useful design rules for knowledge strategies. Though some may argue that the goal of game theoretic reasoning should be primarily “predictive”, the strategic insights derived from the game modeling and analysis can be leveraged in answering our research question. Drawing on the discussions from game theoretic modeling, a prescriptive knowledge policy framework may be developed as shown in Fig. 6. The framework suggests six categories of organization strategic focus areas in formulating its knowledge strategy and accompanying policies. While these areas are a generalization of the findings derived from the game theoretic analysis performed on the five scenarios (and sub-cases) in the previous paper, they are by no means claimed as comprehensive.At a granular level, each category comprises of several strategy and policy dimensions. The major finding of our modeling approach to resolving knowledge dilemmas is that knowledge strategies and policies may be formulated to promote equilibria in the organizational knowledge eco-system. Table 4 highlights some of the key knowledge dimensions suggested in the research literature. While not entirely similar in scope nor approach to the empirical findings (cited in Table 4) of numerous scholars on the specific factors that contribute to knowledge flows within an organization, the analysis of game situations made in this paper provide us with some insights into how organizational interventions and incentives could promote more effective outcome of knowledge initiatives. In short, Table 4 may be viewed as the areas of application of game theoretic reasoning in managing the knowledge ecosystem.The relevance of game theoretic reasoning has been questioned with the view that the theory is grounded on a simplistic assumption on human predictability in terms of being perfectly rational and risk neutral; whereas in reality, human decisions are guided by bounded rationality and risk considerations. Additionally, analytic game theory does not consider the existence of the “soft” factors like emotions, altruism, fairness, randomness into human decision making. Hence, instead of a pure analytic approach backed by mathematical calculations, the perspective from behavioral game theory and lessons from practical game experiments have been introduced. Behavioral game theory has complemented the rationality driven analytic approach of game theory, by extending human aspects into analytic consideration . Contemporary views on the role of learning, social, cultural and psychological aspects that expands the concept of Nash equilibrium are taken into consideration. It may also be noted that though there have been modifications, generalization and refinements of the Nash equilibrium but the study of the basic equilibrium still remains the place to begin an analysis of strategic interactions . It is hoped that the game theoretic reasoning presented in this paper, would benefit knowledge strategists and policy-makers with a better understanding and interpretation of conflict situations in their organizations. At this point, some limitations of the current research need to be acknowledged. The scope of the research is limited to studying intra-organizational knowledge flows. In today’s complex business environment, organizations simultaneously compete and cooperate in a “value net”, a phenomenon branded as “co-opetition” . Further research can extend the boundary of the organizational knowledge ecosystem to include such value net and bring additional game theoretic modeling perspectives for the identified dilemma situations. Additionally, for reasons outlined earlier we could not perform empirical experiments and obtain field measurements. However, a retrospective management analysis of key decisions, policies and outcomes, perhaps as part of a formal After Action Review (AAR), could possibly strengthen the understanding of the links between human behavior in form of best responses and knowledge strategies that produce equilibrium outcomes. This paper concludes with the considered view that solving real-life conflict situations demands combining the rigor of science powering game theory with the art of playing the game. Game theoretic reasoning of strategic dilemmas can be instrumental as a guide for the organizations in applying effective strategies and achieving their desired outcome. We therefore find resonance with Polak’s  assertion that game theory should not seek to predict phenomena of interest but give a perspective of the possibilities so that decisions may be so framed.