مدل تئوری بازی یک مشکل به اشتراک گذاری منبع تولید: مطالعه تقلب های احتمالی

Sharing resources could be an interesting and strategic choice for enterprises owing to their benefits. If the benefit of renting or trading are the forms of sharing that may affect enterprises of different sizes, the joint purchase and joint use can be a form of sharing interesting for SMEs which may have difficulties to buy individually production resources. However, this production resource sharing may induce possible cheatings by one of the SMEs. These cheatings, commonly deviations from the initial share’s contract, are disadvantageous for the other company. The study of these possible deviations and the level of investment held by the company for the detection of deviations are then necessary. That’s why, we propose in this paper to model the production resource sharing between two small enterprises and possible cheatings to evaluate them and their impact on the collaboration. The chosen model is a non-cooperative game since it allows individual profits description. Then, we compare the strategies of the game and all possible cases of cheating for each SME on the horizon of the game