فروش دارایی ریلی دولتی و بازگشت به بخش دولتی، در نیوزیلند و تاسمانی

The paper outlines the sale, with a track lease, in 1993 of the state owned New Zealand Railways Corporation to a consortium, TranzRail Holdings formed by the United States and New Zealand interests. It also notes increases in productivity and traffic levels to 1999 with subsequent problems leading to the New Zealand Government agreeing in 2003 to repurchase and rehabilitate the track. The paper then outlines transfer of effective ownership of the trains and related services in 2003 to an Australian company, and in 2008 back to the New Zealand Government at appreciable net cost. After a brief outline of railways in Australia, the paper notes how government rail in Tasmania, then owned and operated by the Australian National Railways Commission, was sold in 1997 with a track lease to a company related to TranzRail Holdings. The paper then notes emerging problems after initial success, and how after a change in ownership in 2004, the Tasmanian track lease was taken back by the public sector in 2007, followed by the trains in 2009. Other rail asset sales in Australia are also noted along with the high total costs of road vehicle operations in Australia and New Zealand.

In 1993, the New Zealand Government sold its rail system with a long term track lease. This was followed in 1997 by the first of many Australian rail asset sales by government. This article will primarily deal with two rail privatisations in New Zealand and Tasmania that eventually resulted in the respective governments taking back not only the track, but also the trains. At the outset, it is of note that the two rail systems of New Zealand and Tasmania have relatively small freight tasks. In 1992–93, the New Zealand rail freight task (prior to sale) was 2.5 billion net tonne kilometres (btkm), and reached 4.2 btkm in 2010–11, also since 1992 the Tasmanian rail freight task has rarely exceeded 0.5 btkm. By way of contrast, the Australian rail freight task in 2009–10 (after some 5 years of rapid growth in iron ore and coal exports) was about 259 btkm (Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics, 2012). An account of rail privatisation in Australia and New Zealand may be found in a paper for the World Bank by Williams, Greig, and Wallis (2005). However, not all people would share in these authors qualified assessment (page 57) that “Overall the rail privatisation experience in Australia and New Zealand has been positive…” Full details of all Australian rail asset sales, plus franchises and track leases, are outside the scope of this paper. Section 2 outlines the New Zealand rail system since the 1980s with the sale by government in 1993 and the taking back of the track in 2004 and the trains in 2008. Section 3 sketches Australian railways and Section 4 outlines the Tasmanian rail system since the 1970s including government taking back the track in 2007 and the trains in 2009. Section 5 briefly comments on some aspects of other Australian rail asset sales, and topics affecting rail freight competitiveness in Australia. This includes the difficult question of road pricing for heavy trucks. The conclusions are given in Section 6 whilst Section 7 addresses implications for managerial practice and public policy.

Operating a national rail system presents challenges on many fronts. These challenges include not only day to day train operations but also securing sufficient revenue for track maintenance. The ability to generate revenue from rail freight in many countries, including Australia, is often compromised by rails major competitor of road freight operating over public infrastructure with arguable low rates of road cost recovery. However, even in New Zealand, with heavy trucks paying mass distance based pricing, problems surfaced after the first seven years of operation. The New Zealand, Tasmanian and Victorian experiences with long term rail track leases by government to the private sector, like that in the United Kingdom, have not been a happy one. From a public policy perspective, although selected rail privatisation in certain situations can confer advantages, in some instances (excluding successful ‘short line’ operations), it can lend to either a complete loss of service, or, a need for subsidies from government. If privatisation is embarked on, it is necessary to give very careful attention to the conditions of sale or lease. The article suggests that certain low traffic railways may be better retained in public ownership, with conditions to ensure efficient and competitive operations. In the case of New Zealand railways, privatisation also underscored the challenge of a bidder in part connected to a consultant to the government owned railways prior to their being offered for sale. The article noted the sale price, of NZ$400 M in late 1993 being some $560 M in mid 2008 terms, being outweighed being more than offset by direct government outlays exceeding $965 M including the remaining repurchase cost of $665 M in June 2008. Further research could include an examination of the costs and benefits of the many rail privatisations in mainland Australia that occurred from 1997 to 2010. In some instances, these have provided stern lessons for both government and the private sector. A further question is whether some transport policy reform by government prior to a rail asset sale or lease would improve not only the price paid to government but also the prospect for successful privatisation with adequate returns to the new private owners. There is also the question of incentives for the new owners to invest and grow traffic in challenging areas, including that of non-bulk freight.