قیمت گذاری و عرضه کار در بازار سوارکاری

This study proposes equilibrium models under different behavioral assumptions of labor supply in a ride-sourcing market and then investigates the performance of surge pricing. A time-expanded network is first proposed to delineate possible work schedules of drivers. Based on the proposed network, we provide formulations and algorithms for both neoclassical and income-targeting hypotheses to characterize the labor supply of ride-sourcing drivers, i.e., their choices of work hours. We then investigate the impact of surge pricing using a bi-level programing framework, with the lower-level problem capturing the equilibrium work hour choices while the upper-level one representing revenue-maximizing surge pricing. Compared to static pricing, the platform and drivers in general enjoy higher revenue while customers may be made worse off during highly surged periods. A simple regulation scheme to reduce market power is discussed.