تجزیه اثرات توسعه تامین کننده بر روی منافع روابط: نقش حقوق صاحبان سهام رابطه

Buyers invest considerably in developing their suppliers, yet the performance effects of such investments are not universal. Drawing on social capital theory, this research investigates whether the relationship between supplier development and relationship benefits may be facilitated by the generation of relational capital. The authors examine mediating and moderating roles of relational capital in the relationship between two aspects of supplier development (capability development, supplier governance) and two dimensions of relationship benefits (supplier benefits, buyer benefits), using survey data collected from 185 suppliers of a large manufacturing firm. Investment in supplier development does not automatically result in benefits for the supplier or reciprocated benefits for the buyer. Rather, relational capital “bridges” supplier development and relationship benefits. Without relational capital, benefits from capability development do not accrue, and the impact of a supplier governance regime can be even detrimental. In conditions of high relational capital, capability development results in lower perceived buyer benefits. The results can help managers ensure that the benefits from their supplier development efforts fully materialize.

“To score big with suppliers, you have to win their hearts.” [–Dave Nelson, former vice president of purchasing, Honda of America3] Competition is daunting, and firms operate with increasingly volatile supply chains, in which both buyers and suppliers recognize the benefits of collaborative partnerships (Hales, Perrilliat, & Bhardwaj, 2011). With the shifting focus from transactional to collaborative relationships, buyers have grown increasingly aware of the strategic importance of developing programs to further their suppliers' knowledge, capabilities, and market insights, in combination with effective governance mechanisms for streamlining relationships (Schoenherr et al., 2012). For example, because Toyota is a top customer for most of its suppliers, the firm receives far more attention and innovative offerings from suppliers than its competitors (Marksberry, 2012). Yet mounting anecdotal evidence indicates that supply chain partners are not receiving the benefits they expected, because suppliers appear reluctant to implement improvements (Krause, Scannell, & Calantone, 2000). Supplier development activities thus do not translate into supplier performance improvement (Prahinski & Benton, 2004); some firms note that their supplier development efforts actually decrease satisfaction (Handfield, Krause, Scannell, & Monczka, 2000), perhaps due to misconceptions, misunderstandings, or mistrust in buyer–supplier partnerships (McDuffie & Helper, 1997). But supplier development represents a relation-specific investment by the buyer, which is difficult or impossible to redeploy to other relationships (Anderson & Weitz, 1992), leaving the buyer open to opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). To address some of these issues, we turn to social capital theory and specifically its insights into relational capital. Firms may seek to invest in and cultivate non-economic features of their buyer–supplier exchange if they perceive a risk of partner opportunism (Wang, Li, Ross, & Craighead, 2013). Relational capital then offers an appropriate theoretical lens, because supplier development encapsulates two building blocks of relational capital: shared knowledge and shared transaction-specific investments (Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007). We therefore consider supplier development an antecedent of relational capital. Furthermore we note emerging evidence that relational capital in turn strengthens the impact of relational investments by overcoming free-riding behavior and facilitating knowledge sharing to create mutual understanding (Chang and Gotcher, 2007 and Kohtamäki et al., 2012). Supplier development appears particularly effective in well-established relationships with high levels of trust and commitment (Wagner, 2011). However, to account for diverging returns on supplier development programs, and the complexities and challenges faced by both buyers and suppliers, we need more managerial-level insights into the nature of this asset. Without understanding the mechanism by which supplier development delivers benefits, its returns will be negligible at best and detrimental at worst, perhaps even leading to the premature abandonment of supplier development initiatives. Taking a supplier perspective, this article examines whether the relationship between supplier development and relationship benefits can be facilitated by relational capital. In turn, we seek to make three substantive theoretical contributions. First, prior research focuses on benefits such as operational or efficiency measures of buyer performance, rather than the creation of mutual value from a resource exchange (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998 and Villena et al., 2011). We examine instead the extent to which supplier development provides benefits to both the supplier and the buyer. Supplier benefits refer to direct rewards of doing business with the buyer and measure the value of the relationship from the supplier's point of view. Buyer benefits entail the preferential treatment a supplier gives to a specific buyer in exchange for its past actions or future loyalty. Granting preferential buyer benefits is a key weapon in the arsenal of relationship marketing activity ( Palmatier, Scheer, Houston, Evans, & Gopalakrishna, 2007b). In addition, we conceptually delineate capability development and supplier governance as two dimensions of supplier development and assess whether they independently translate into benefits for suppliers or buyers. Second, we explicate how supplier development leads to enhanced performance, by examining the mediating role of relational capital. We empirically test the proposition that relational capital represents a supply chain asset, in which additional resources can be invested with the expectation of reciprocation, in the form of mutual benefits for buyers and suppliers. Researchers acknowledge the importance of relational capital for supply chains (Kohtamäki et al., 2012) but offer few insights into how organizations might build this form of capital. It is suggested that relational capital can derive from relational investments, such as those inherent to supplier development activities, which should benefit both partners (Villena et al., 2011). Third, whereas previous research regarded relational capital as a mediating construct, no research considers its moderating role, specifically from the supplier side (Kohtamäki et al., 2012). We explore whether relational capital might account for heterogeneity in the relationship between supplier development and performance and thereby respond to a recent call to examine the moderating effects of contingent variables on the activities–outcome relationships (Mahapatra, Das, & Narasimhan, 2012). In this sense, we combine the transactional approach of supplier development investment with the reciprocal approach of relational capital building (Mahapatra et al., 2012). We next define and review literature on supplier development to develop our conceptual framework, which includes multiple dimensions of supplier development, relational capital, and relationship returns. To assess these intricate relationships empirically, we collected survey data from 185 suppliers of a large manufacturing firm. Although focusing on suppliers' perceptions of the benefits of supplier development is a rare approach (Ghijsen, Semeijn, & Ernstson, 2010), we consider the supplier an appropriate unit of analysis, because supplier development effectiveness depends on the suppliers' own commitment. We conclude with a discussion of our findings, which offer both theoretical and managerial implications.

Investments in supplier development do not automatically result in benefits for the supplier or reciprocated benefits for the buyer. Rather, relational capital has important mediating and moderating effects on the relationships across different dimensions of supplier development and relational benefits. The danger is that without relational capital, benefits can fail to materialize or even cause harm. However, capability development and supplier governance can effectively increase the relational capital embedded in buyer–supplier relationships. This study provides the first investigation of the interrelationship of supplier development and relational capital from the supplier's point of view. Although it thus fills a research gap, it also represents a limitation; further research might take a dyadic perspective. A particular area of interest is the extent to which the two sides' perceptions of social capital align, and the effects of any misalignment on relationship performance. Further research should consider whether effective supplier development investments require matched, relationship-specific investments by buyers and suppliers. As a second limitation, our research method created a high risk of CMB. Our analyses suggested it was not a significant problem, yet the possibility remains that the results suffered from CMB. We hope additional studies collect more objective, rather than subjective, performance data. This research also adopted a static perspective and thus did not capture causal effects. Longitudinal research could overcome this limitation and reveal how relational capital and relational benefits coevolve with supplier development investments over time. For example, how quickly can relational capital be built, and how quickly can it be transformed into supplier and buyer benefits? We call on further research to determine whether it is preferable to initiate capability development before putting a supplier governance system in place, or vice versa.