ظهور یک اقتصاد موسیقی فراصنعتی؟ موسیقی و هم افزایی فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات در استکهلم، سوئد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|4125||2004||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Geoforum, Volume 35, Issue 4, July 2004, Pages 425–439
Research into the music industry has for a long time been almost exclusively dominated by a focus on the production of albums and songs. In recent years, however, cities such as Stockholm have seen the growth of a profitable and varied music services industry producing everything from remixes to music marketing strategies. Standing at the forefront of this growth industry are a large number of firms attempting to combine in innovative ways music and ICT. This can take a variety of forms, for instance: selling and distributing music over the internet; web design and computerised advertising services tailored to music products; software design focused on multimedia products and virtual instruments; high-tech post-production and mixing services; and virtual centres and communities of music industry actors. The article will examine these activities within the city in attempt to measure the direction and cohesiveness of the emerging sector. The article concludes by arguing that these type of new industrial synergies tell us much about the way industrial innovations are formed in an interindustry and inter-cluster environment, and the future competitiveness and shape of the music industry. In particular, the article argues that evidence from Stockholm points to the emergence of a post-industrial musical economy. Gadget timed out while loading
The music industry is a complex and continually evolving industry which has had a long history of not only musical but also technological innovation and change. Technological development has radically effected everything from musical instruments to the creation of new musical styles. Technological change has also had a key role in the development of the industrial structure of the music industry and the commercial and distribution possibilities open to the industry (Gronow, 1983; Lopes, 1992; Burnett, 1993; Frith, 1993; Christiansen, 1995; Cusic, 1996; Peterson and Berger, 1996; McCourt and Rothenbuhler, 1997; Jones, 2002). The development of cheap and easily mass produced vinyl records radically changed the mass market possibilities open to the music industry and forced a radical restructuring of the industry itself (Wallis, 1990; Wallis and Malm, 1990). Similarly in recent years pundits and academics alike have suggested that ICT-based advances such as the internet and new audio file formats (e.g. MP3 files) are laying the road to a new era for the music industry (Haring, 2000; Cooper and Harrison, 2001; Kretschmer et al., 2001; Leyshon, 2001; Merriden, 2001; Shirky, 2001; Alderman, 2002; Alexander, 2002; Ku, 2002; Menn, 2003). Indeed, most of the current debate and literature on the new technologies supposedly forcing a restructuring of the industry are entirely focused on the distribution of music through the internet: whether it be virtual CD shops or the illegal distribution of music as compressed computer files across the internet: e.g. using technology such as Napster or Gnutella (Leyshon, 2001; Shirky, 2001; Alderman, 2002; Alexander, 2002; Leyshon, 2003). These type of activities obviously have crucial implications for the music industry’s business model, which is still one involving the mass distribution of large amounts of moulded plastic. In particular, the five global music ‘majors’ that dominate the global music industry see such developments as especially threatening not only to their ability to collect on their own copyrighted product but also their profitable and strategically useful domination of physical distribution networks. Whilst new technologies are not the only threat to sales of recorded music (the rise of DVDs and video games are increasingly competing for consumers’ spending) and it is unclear whether such technologies are a permanent threat to recorded music it is clear to see that global sales of recorded music have in recent years been steadily declining. In 2002 world sales of recorded music fell by 7% in value and by 8% in the number of units sold following similar falls in 2001, 2000 and 1999. These trends have been particularly heavy in the world’s two largest markets (that together account for 55% of global sales): in 2002 US unit sales fell 10% and Japanese sales fell by 9% (IFPI, 2003). It is against this background that this article reports on the findings of a research project into the ways in which new information and communications technologies (ICT) are being combined with music by firms based in Stockholm. The purpose of the study, and this article, was to examine the development of ICT–music activities using exploratory data from Stockholm. In particular an attempt is made to understand the parameters and dynamics of these new activities and to question their relationships to existing music and ICT industries. Underlying this was a further concern to understand how such activities fit into the likely evolution of the music industry and economy. In addition to presenting material on a relatively unstudied emerging area of the economy and music industry, the article addresses what the authors’ consider to be two pressing issues: the very limited idea that academic and popular studies of music have had of what the music industry involves; and a relative lack of empirical studies of the effects of having a leg in more than one strong cluster. If we think in terms of, for example, an industrial systems approach we can see that the production of music products involves a variety of inputs and agents (sometimes collaborative, sometimes bitterly competitive) all of which are intrinsic parts of the ‘creative’ process which must be understood as essentially rooted in an industry based commercial logic that is often highly spatialised (Frith, 1991; Leyshon et al., 1998; Negus, 1998; Scott, 1999a; Hallencreutz et al., 2000; Hallencreutz, 2002). Literature on the music industry tends to overwhelmingly focus on artiste and record company centred views of the music industry and musical products. They focus on the process of musical creation (e.g. forming a band), the manufacture of a sellable product (e.g. signing a record contract that leads to large numbers of plastic discs being produced) and the eventual consumption of the finished product by fans/consumers; a story in which centres of production (Hesmondhalgh, 1996; Scott, 1999a, Scott, 1999b and Scott, 2000) and global record companies (Wallis and Malm, 1984; Hirsch, 1992; Malm and Wallis, 1992; Shapiro et al., 1992; Choi and Hilton, 1995; Alexander, 1996; Burnett, 1996; Sadler, 1997) have always had important roles. Whilst this artiste and record company focused process is undoubtedly the core of the music industry’s activities and remaining profitability it is a focus which tends to leave out many of the related industries and activities that can be considered parts of a music industrial system. In particular, the artiste centred approach tends to treat activities such as song-writing, video production, merchandising, post-production, etc. as entirely dominated by and purely derivative of the core artiste-record company production axis. Although in many ways this is true, such a focus neglects the fact that a successful music industry in a certain place or region need not actually produce music. Such a view denigrates the important role played by related and service firms that are relatively independent of artistes and record companies in both the music industry and regional economies. The stress we place in this article on the growth of an independent musical services economy we hope will contribute to better understanding music as an industrial system with a variety of inputs and outputs. The article concludes by suggesting that such activities illustrate ongoing phenomena important to the future shape of the music industry. In particular, we argue that the music industry is rapidly moving away from a business model based on intellectual property rights contained in recorded music to one where a ‘post-industrial’ (Bell, 1974) musical economy exists: an economy where the value added and profits are to be found in information, service and related activities rather than manufacture. Secondly, despite a rush of empirical studies into industrial clusters and cluster-based policy initiatives most studies tend to limit themselves to what is happening within industrial clusters (Bathelt et al., 2002; Malmberg and Maskell, 2002; Martin and Sunley, 2003; Power and Malmberg, 2003; Malmberg and Power, forthcoming). Research has mainly focused on the issue of whether or not being within an industrial cluster has positive effects or not for firms. However, Porter, amongst others, has drawn attention to the idea that commercial innovations appear not only within industrial clusters but most often at the intersection of existing clusters and sectors (Porter, 2001): innovation is here defined in a broad sense, as the ability to come up with new and better ways of organizing the production and marketing of new and better products (Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Nonaka, 1994; Grant, 1996). Nevertheless, few empirical studies have addressed the issue of the way industrial innovations are formed in an inter-cluster environment: i.e. what is happening between two (or more) already established clusters in relation to new business activities and innovations that borrow from both. Thus this article attempts to contribute to empirical evidence on how new business innovations are effected by proximity to and relations with strong and well established clusters; using the example of emerging ICT–music synergies in Stockholm. The article concludes by suggesting that there exists strong evidence to oppose or unsettle commonly touted and held beliefs that clusters or localised industrial systems are best for innovation and emerging firms. The article starts by introducing the case and research project, and by outlining the types of activities mixing ICT and music. Following this evidence and conclusions from firms based in Stockholm is presented along four themes that emerged from research.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In conclusion, these types of new industrial synergies seemed, to us at least, to say much about the way industrial innovations are formed in an inter-industry and inter-cluster environment. The firms researched were engaged in innovative and evolving business activities but it was their relations to and self-positioning within existing clusters that had one of the most important effects on the development of their individual business models and trajectories. Proximity to or existence within the bounds of a strong competitive cluster certainly had a variety of both material and immaterial effects and though many of these can be considered positive this is not necessarily so. Positioning oneself firmly within the innovation and operational dynamics of an established cluster appeared in these cases to be the most risky strategy. In many ways it was the firms that straddled both which seemed to fare the best as this gave them some degree of isolation from the competitive maelstrom of vested interests and large market movements that existed within the clusters. Of the companies studied that could be said to truly straddle both music and ICT more than half considered that their position in between these clusters––or their double membership of them––to be beneficial (this was clearly stated in interviews). Indeed the research suggested the existence of a set of hyper-flexible firms that attempted to defy being bounded within established sectors. Many of these firms consciously engaged and disengaged across ‘cluster boundaries’ where and when it seemed strategically, commercially or financially relevant. One could indeed suggest that this case begs the question of whether innovation and adaptation of new technologies in fact occurs best in a cross- or inter-cluster context? Secondly, our suggestion that in Stockholm there has been a growth of a music service economy suggests to us much about the future workings and shape of the music industry and music centres. Whilst in many ways this set of music service firms and activities are heavily related and tied to the ‘traditional’ music industry in Stockholm they do not entirely depend upon the traditional focus on the mass production of recorded music. Indeed a number of the firms studied depend less and less on the domestic music scene and have become successful service providers to a range of global clients and consumers who are demanding everything from mixing and song-writing to samples and virtual instruments. This carries with it the possibility of both strengthening the existing music industry/cluster and indeed becoming an export oriented industry quite separate from the traditional notion of exporting domestic artistes to foreign ears. Indeed interviews with 30 executives in US record companies and distributors (carried out by one of the authors for a different project) found that for many in the US music industry Stockholm is now equally known for its role as a service provision centre as for its performers. The evolution of a music services sector in Stockholm we argue is suggestive and indicative of a deeper shift in the music industry: the development of a post-industrial (and post-MP3) musical economy where services and related products around the core music make the money and reputation for musical centres and indeed the industry as a whole. The type of activities we looked at in this project and paper support this claim; however, we are not suggesting that ring-tones and the specific firms and activities listed earlier are the epicentre for this shift. Rather we suggest they are illustrative of a wider technologically mediated set of phenomena and emerging activities that are part of a deep shift in the industry: other technologies that we did not find many examples of in Stockholm may in fact prove much more important (such as ‘music recommendation’ software or new music filtering services: see Brindley, 2000). This shift is being forced upon the industry by declining sales in CDs and an increasingly uncertain and difficult copyright environment. The music industry has always relied on two things on which to make its money: the selling of copyrighted sounds and performances; and the building of brands. In the past market conditions and people’s consumption patterns meant that the industry could be hugely profitable by concentrating on selling recorded music: i.e. intellectual property embedded in plastic/vinyl. The value of the brand aspect––for instance the global recognition stars command––was used by the industry merely as a tool to sell the plastic. Whilst record companies invested enormous sums of money into building a brand up around a performer or group it has always been the performer/group that has sold and profited from the brand: for instance by getting revenue from live performances, advertising, books, careers in film, etc. The music industry is starting to realise that these brands, which it provides the capital required to build, are increasingly much more lucrative than the music itself. Historically the music industry has been poor at exploiting brand potential: though there have been a few examples of bands that made more from T-shirts than music. Those big artists have taken many years and maybe a couple of million or in any case several hundred million [Swedish crowns] in investment before they break even. And then the artists have on the back of all this building work and investment become brands and then ‘the brand’ has gone direct to the market and not given a damn about the record company, like Madonna who had a concert in London with Microsoft MSN streamed. And she got nine million dollars for it. That won’t be allowed in the future. (Ludvig Werner, Fame Studios AB, 28 August 2002) Companies have recently started, in return for making them global stars, signing artistes to deals which include not only albums but also control over revenue from touring, publishing and merchandising: the most recent example of which was EMI’s reportedly US$100 million deal with the singer Robbie Williams in October 2002. Whilst such costly and high profile deals may eventually mean increased profits for a few of the largest record companies, generally firms in the music industry could learn much from firms working on crossing music and ICT about working in an environment where enforceable or effective intellectual property regimes cannot be counted upon. The firms we studied are pioneering and showcasing methods for building added-value to products and new product areas and distribution channels (such as ring-tones, streaming, and multimedia). Their focus on building community and added enticements onto products, new channels for distribution and new revenue sources from associated services seems key to commercial survival in a post-industrial musical economy.