تاثیر رقابت فرودگاه ها بر کارآمدی فنی: اِعمال تحلیل مرزی تصادفی به فرودگاه های ایتالیا
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|4580||2012||7 صفحه PDF||23 صفحه WORD|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Air Transport Management, Volume 22, July 2012, Pages 9–15
2. سیستم فرودگاه های ایتالیا
3.1. مدل اقتصاد سنجی تابع فاصله تصادفی
3.2. شاخص رقابت فرودگاه ها
شکل 1. مثالی از رقابت بین فرودگاه ها.
4. داده ها
جدول 1. آماره های توصیفی متغیرهای ورودی (I) و خروجی (O).
جدول 2. همبستگی های پیرسون متغیرهای ورودی (I) و خروجی (O).
جدول 3. توزیع شاخص رقابت فرودگاه به عنوان تابعی از T.
شکل 2. پراکندگی رقابت فرودگاه به عنوان تابعی از T.
جدول 4. نتایج.
جدول 5. نتایج رگرسیون.
جدول 6. نمرات کارآمدی فنی فرودگاه ها.
6. نتیجه گیری
We investigate how the intensity of competition among airports affects their technical efficiency by computing airports’ markets on the basis of a potential demand approach. We find that the intensity of competition has a negative impact on airports’ efficiency in Italy from 2005 to 2008. This implies that airports belonging to a local air transportation system where competition is strong exploit their inputs less intensively than do airports with local monopoly power. Further, we find that public airports are more efficient than private and mixed ones. Hence, policy makers should provide incentives to implement airports’ specialization in local systems where competition is strong and monitor the inputs’ utilization rate even when private investors are involved.
One effect of the liberalization process in the EU air transportation market has been the growth in the European network. European airlines can now provide intra-European connections (i.e., flights having an origin and a destination in airports within the EU 25) without restrictions provided there is slot availability. As a result, if we consider all the 460 airports of the 18 countries that belonged to the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA1) in 1997, the total number of connections among these airports rose from 3410 in 1997 to 4612 in 2008. This implies a compounded annual growth rate of 2.78%, with the number of connecting flights increasing from 4,102,484 to 5,228,688. The network expansion has increased the intensity of competition between airports, as they compete both directly for airlines and indirectly for passengers and freights, and as airline new business models have emerged, notably low cost carries (LCC). Further, travelers may now choose their travel suppliers from different airlines at the same airport (direct competition) or from ones operating at nearby ones (indirect competition). Here we investigate the impact of competition between airports and ownership on their technical efficiency. The latter impacts on both airport charges and services provided to passengers (e.g., shorter waiting times). For our empirical analysis we develop a potential demand approach and a multi-output stochastic frontier model. They are applied to 38 Italian airports between 2005 and 2008.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper has investigated the impact of airport competition on the efficiency of 38 Italian airports by applying a stochastic distance function model with time-dependent inefficiency components to a panel data set covering 2005–2008. We find that airports confronted with more competition are less efficient than those benefiting from local monopoly power. Further, we show that public airports are more efficient, while private airports are even less efficient than those with mixed ownership. These results suggest, first, that there are two ways to deal with the negative relationship between airport indirect competition and technical efficiency: one is to induce airport specialization within the same territorial system (e.g., one airport may focus on LCCs and another on cargo). Since passengers living in these areas can choose among alternative airports, a further extreme possibility is to close down the highly inefficient airports. This option may be adopted when these airports persistently produce losses, that in Italy have been covered by public local taxation. Second, regulation should also monitor the efficient assets’ utilization even when private capitals are in control of the airport’s management. This may require adopting mechanisms providing incentives to improve the degree of technical efficiency, e.g., price cap regulation. This contribution has not considered airport cost efficiency, which may lead to different ownership rankings. Further, we did not take into account some negative effects in airport activities, such as noise and pollution produced in the surrounding area, which may overturn our results. These issues are left for future research.