تجزیه و تحلیل ظرفیت ها و خطاهای قیمت برای بازار برق انتاریو با استفاده از تعادل ناس پویای تحت عدم اطمینان

This paper studies investments in the Ontario Electricity Market which is currently being restructured. Our methodology is based on the concept of S-adapted open-loop Nash equilibrium. We examine the evolution of capital investments and pricing behavior of suppliers as uncertain electricity demand evolves over time (in Ontario). This study is particularly interesting since we compare the implications of two policies: (i) the current setting in which Ontario Power Generation (OPG) retains its generation units; (ii) the policy (set up in 2003) that required the divestiture of the largest supplier, OPG, and aimed to increase the number of independent suppliers in Ontario. We mainly focus on the independent generators like Bruce Nuclear. We use the tools of Stochastic Programming to compute the S-adapted open-loop Nash equilibrium market outcomes. We find that in the three-player market total capacity installation and market prices are higher than the ones in the five-player market. That is higher capacity may not necessarily alleviate exercise of market power. We also confirm the prediction by the National Energy Board that in a market with five major players, OPG's market share may reduce to a percentage between 35% and 40%.