انتخاب و در میان قراردادهای اعتباری: نظریه و حوزه پژوهشی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|17997||2007||34 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Econometrics, Volume 136, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 665–698
Lenders may choose to encourage borrower side contracting using group, or co-signed, loans or discourage it using individual loans, so as to make relative performance comparisons. In this context wealth of the agents relative to outsiders, and wealth inequality among potential joint liability partners, are important factors determining the choice among loan contracts. In a related model of whether to borrow, higher covariance of returns mitigates an adverse selection effect. We test these models using relatively rich data gathered in field research in Thailand. The prevalence of joint liability contracts relative to individual contracts exhibits a U-shaped relationship with the wealth of the borrowing household and increases with the wealth dispersion. The likelihood of joint-liability borrowing increases the lower is the probability of project success, a direct affirmation of adverse selection. Higher correlation across projects makes joint liability borrowing more likely relative to all other alternatives. Strikingly, most of the results disappear if we do not condition the sample according to the dictates of the models, with selection into and across credit contracts.
Microcredit is viewed as a major tool to alleviate world poverty, but practitioners are polarized in a debate concerning the virtues of individual versus group, joint liability lending. For the most part, only one contract per lender is observed, e.g., group-based loans under the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and individual loans under BRI in Indonesia. It is thus difficult to make progress in the debate. We do not see what would happen if the alternative contract were available, not to mention all the difficulties inherent in cross country comparisons. Here we take advantage of the menu of contracts offered by a dominant rural lender in a single country and some unusual data gathered in field research to make some headway on the issue. Potential borrowers from the BAAC1 in Thailand decide whether to borrow at all, and if so, whether to borrow as individuals or in a group. That is, potential borrowers select into and across loan contracts. There is in fact much variation in these choices in the data.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The results on wealth and contract selection are interesting in several respects. Indirectly, they give plausibility to the interpretation of group lending as a way for the lender to promote side-contracting between borrowers. This has not always been the primary view of group lending, but it does appear to have some empirical validity.