سرمایه گذاری سرمایه انسانی در چین

This paper discusses human capital investment in China. China's current policies favor physical capital investment over schooling and urban human capital investment over rural human capital investment. Current migration policies discriminate against children of migrants. A more balanced investment strategy across rural and urban regions and types of capital is appropriate. Private funding for education through tuition and fees should be encouraged and can supplement government funding and make schools more financially self-sufficient. However, if this policy is enacted, capital markets for financing education need to be developed to avoid discouraging students from poor families from attending school.

In 1995, China, at all levels of government, spent about 2.5% of its GDP on investment in schooling.2 At the same time, roughly 30% of its GDP was devoted to physical investment. In the United States, those figures were 5.4% and 17%, respectively. In South Korea, they were 3.7% and 30%. See Table 1 for a comparison of China with other countries in its governmental expenditure of GDP on education. China was below average even among its peers in its expenditure on investment in people. Recent trends in governmental human capital investment are favorable, but the investment proportion is still low by world standards, rising to 3.3% in 2002 (see Table 2). More than 45% of GDP was invested in physical capital in 2002. Even the dramatic growth in private spending on education in the past 10 years, while encouraging (see Table 3 and Table 4), is not enough to fully redress the imbalance. Table 1. Public expenditures on education as a percentage of GNP in 1995 World 5.2 China 2.5 Philippines 3 Thailand 4.1 India 3.3 Malaysia 4.7 Singapore 3 Pakistan 2.8 Turkey 2.2 South Korea 3.7 Egypt 4.8 Mexico 4.9 Brazil 5.1 Argentina 3.8a United States 5.4a Japan 3.6a Canada 6.9a Germany 4.8 Russian Federation 3.5 Poland 5.2 Hungary 5.3 Source: UNESCO (1999). a Data were only available for 1994. Table options Table 2. Government appropriation for education as a percentage of GDP in 100 million Yuan Year Government appropriations for education GDP Educational expenditure as percentage of GDP 1991 618 21,618 2.9% 1992 729 26,638 2.7% 1993 868 34,634 2.5% 1994 1175 46,759 2.5% 1995 1412 58,478 2.4% 1996 1672 67,885 2.5% 1997 1863 74,463 2.5% 1998 2033 78,345 2.6% 1999 2287 82,068 2.8% 2000 2563 89,468 2.9% 2001 3057 97,315 3.1% 2002 3491 104,791 3.3% Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003. Table options Table 3. Government and total funds devoted to education in 100 million Yuan Year Total Government appropriations for education % 1991 731.5 617.8 84.5 1992 867.0 728.8 84.1 1993 1059.9 867.8 81.9 1994 1488.8 1174.7 78.9 1995 1878.0 1411.5 75.2 1996 2262.3 1671.7 73.9 1997 2531.7 1862.5 73.6 1998 2949.1 2032.5 68.9 1999 3349.0 2287.2 68.3 2000 3849.1 2562.6 66.6 2001 4637.7 3057.0 65.9 2002 5480.0 3491.4 63.7 Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003, and China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook 2003. Table options China's ratio of annual investment in physical capital to human capital is much higher than that in most countries. This imbalance might be warranted if the economic rate of return to physical capital were much greater than the economic rate of return to human capital. Below, I summarize evidence that indicates that the true rate of return to education and skill formation is very high and that the imbalance in human capital investment relative to physical capital investment is symptomatic of a serious distortion in current policy that retards economic development in China. Conventional methods for computing rates of return to human capital that are useful in less regulated labor markets, and are frequently applied to the study of the Chinese labor market, give a misleading estimate of the true social rate of return to human capital. Other methods must be used to estimate the true social return. A basic result of economics is that resources should flow to their most productive use. A policy that equalizes returns across all investment types and across all regions increases economic growth. Current Chinese policy tends to ignore this fundamental rule not only by promoting physical capital investment over human capital investment, but also by restricting the flow of resources across regions and investing in education at different rates in different regions and by investing in physical capital in an imbalanced fashion. These policies reduce the economic growth of China and promote inequality, both in the short run and in the long run. In this paper, I first present the potential benefits that flow from investment in human capital. Then, I discuss the empirical evidence on the rate of return to education in China and evidence on regional and geographic imbalances in expenditure on human capital investment. I then consider alternative policy reforms that would foster skill acquisition and enable China to harvest the benefits of investment in both physical and human capital. I make seven points. (1) The benefits of human capital investment are substantial. (2) The current level of investment in human capital in China is low compared to what is required to complement the very high investment in physical capital and the large influx of unskilled labor into urban areas. (3) At current levels, investment in human capital is inequitably and inefficiently distributed across geographical regions and rural and urban areas within the regions. (4) The imbalance in investment in human capital compared to physical capital reduces the return to physical capital and thwarts physical investment initiatives designed to foster growth in interior China and regions targeted for rejuvenation. (5) A more balanced portfolio of investment will promote economic growth and reduce inequality in the long run. (6) Open labor markets, functioning markets for loans to human capital, and fewer restrictions on the mobility of workers will foster human capital growth at little cost to governments. (7) The current growth in private sector financing of education is encouraging (see Table 3). It has substantially boosted the share of total GDP devoted to education (see Table 4). Reliance on the private sector has great potential for increasing formation of human capital without raising taxes. The percent of funds coming from private sources varies greatly across regions [see Appendix A (Table 1)]. Some of the poorest regions use fees to pay for schooling. Unless access to capital markets to finance education is improved, reliance on tuition fees to finance education will deny access to education to children from poor families. Table 4. Total expenditures on education as a percentage of GDP in 100 million Yuan Year Total education fundsa GDP % 1991 732 21,618 3.4 1992 867 26,638 3.3 1993 1060 34,634 3.1 1994 1489 46,759 3.2 1995 1878 58,478 3.2 1996 2262 67,885 3.3 1997 2532 74,463 3.4 1998 2949 78,345 3.8 1999 3349 82,068 4.1 2000 3849 89,468 4.3 2001 4638 97,315 4.8 2002 5480 104,791 5.2 Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003, and China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook 2003. a Total education funds, including government appropriation for education, organization and citizens running schools, and other funds.

The true rate of return to education in China may be as high as 30% or 40%. Our knowledge of the true return to education is currently very limited, as is our knowledge of the true rate of return to physical capital. More studies based on rigorous data are warranted. A more factually informed knowledge base will improve government decision making. If governments evaluate projects, whether they are human capital projects, or investment projects for dams, roads, bridges, or factories, they will make better investment decisions. Project evaluations play an important role in keeping good investments and promoting good projects and eliminating the bad ones. The value of factually informed cost–benefit econometrics is very high. Cost–benefit studies produce value for local governments, for provincial governments and for the central government. Research that creates and collects much richer data sets on the returns to all kinds of human and physical capital to guide policy formation will improve policymaking. Despite the weak data base on China, some policy recommendations seem justified. China's economic performance will be enhanced by producing an educated workforce. Economic performance will be enhanced by equalizing returns across all types of investments—physical and human—and by reducing regional inequalities in access to education and dependence of educational decisions on the income of parents. Human capital has a high rate of return. Its formation would be promoted by freeing up labor markets, eliminating regional disparities in wages and access to education, and by opening human capital markets to finance the formation of human capital. These policies reduce economic inequality in the long run. Policies that promote migration will reduce a major source of inequality, even in the short run. Human capital would also be promoted by expanding the government budget on education and by equalizing expenditure across regions and improving mobility. However obtained, a more educated workforce based on equality of opportunity for all will produce greater payoffs to people and capital and will produce greater national wealth.