اصلاحات در حقوق بازنشستگی پارامتریک با سن بازنشستگی بالاتری: یک تحقیق محاسباتی از گزینه های دیگر برای نظام بازنشستگی مبتنی بر عنوان پرداختی به شما

This paper discusses parametric reform options to control losses generated by a publicly managed pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system under alternative deficit reduction (reform) strategies involving changes in contribution and replacement rates and statutory retirement ages. Two different problems corresponding to different pension reform strategies are considered using computational techniques. The techniques are illustrated through exercises employing data for the financially troubled pension system in Turkey.

Publicly managed pension systems providing old-age or pension insurance coverage, face financial difficulties in many countries across the world. Most of these systems are run as pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes requiring pension payments to current retirees to be financed out of contributions collected from currently active workers and their employers. The primary reason these systems face financial difficulties is the increasing ratio of retirees to workers (the dependency ratio), most typically caused by the natural aging of population. Following from increasing life expectancies and declining fertility rates over time, population aging is essentially a demographic phenomenon and cannot be controlled by pension authorities or policy makers. Unless the resulting increases in dependency ratios can somehow be checked, pension balances will continue to deteriorate, eventually causing sizable deficits.1 Avoiding such deficits requires controlling dependency ratios through changes in statutory entitlement ages (or minimum retirement ages) and/or adjustments in the values of contribution and replacement rates.2 A parametric pension policy reform, as it is sometimes called (Chand and Jaeger, 1996), involves changing the existing values of pension program parameters within politically and demographically acceptable limits so as to prevent the size of pension deficit from exceeding tolerable levels determined by governments. Such a reform may involve once-and-for-all as well as gradual changes in the values of contribution and replacement rates. However, the statutory retirement age is typically increased gradually through a predetermined time path. Regardless of the way they are introduced, new parameter values are expected to be compatible with the targeted level of deficit and to allow for demographically realistic contribution and retirement periods. Because the new parameters would be picked by policy makers, the political feasibility of reform would also require avoiding configurations which might radically undermine the living standards of working and retiree populations.3 So, for policy makers to make informed choices, alternative configurations meeting these restrictions must be identified. The purpose of this paper is to identify a set of parametric reform options to rehabilitate the publicly run, PAYG pension system in Turkey under alternative strategies involving once-and-for-all, and gradual changes in pension parameters. The Turkish example is particularly interesting because the state pension system in Turkey already faces a severe financial crisis despite a relatively young population/workforce (Kenc and Sayan, 2000). Unlike other countries where similar pension systems face financial difficulties largely due to population aging, the crisis of the Turkish system stems from the retirement ages that are exceptionally low by international standards.4 The evident need to increase minimum contribution periods/retirement ages distinguishes pension reform efforts in Turkey from the experience of other countries, where policy makers had relatively little room to adjust retirement ages along with other two parameters (Sayan and Kiraci, 2000). The numerical results reported in the paper make it possible to compare the magnitude of required increases in the retirement ages under each reform strategy considered. The paper is organized in such a way that the explanation of each strategy is followed by a description of the relevant algorithm used to generate numerical results based on Turkish data. Section 2 describes the numerical optimization exercises carried out to identify parametric reform options for Turkish pension system under two different reform strategies, discusses the implementation of algorithms employed and reports results. Section 3 concludes the paper by summarizing policy implications and lessons that can be drawn from the computational analysis.

This paper discussed the identification of parametric reform options to control losses generated by a publicly managed, PAYG pension system under alternative deficit reduction (reform) strategies including one time jumps, as well as gradual changes in contribution/replacement rates and statutory retirement ages. For this purpose, two different problems each corresponding to a different pension reform strategy were analyzed using different computational techniques applied to the Turkish pension system. The first problem involved identification of alternative pension parameters compatible with a given target for revenue-expenditure balances of a pension system. The solution of the problem, obtained through a numerical search algorithm was shown to be non-unique unless additional constraints are imposed to reflect the priorities of policy makers. It was argued that replacing the existing pension parameters at once rather than gradually over time could be particularly problematic if the new configuration calls for higher retirement ages for everyone including workers who plan to retire soon. Given the difficulties in convincing such workers to postpone their retirement plans, an alternative reform strategy involving gradual increases in retirement age was considered by solving a constrained optimization problem in which the pension deficit is minimized subject to a dynamic retirement age path and a one time change in replacement rates. The results indicated that retaining current values of replacement and contribution rates while trying to eliminate Turkish pension deficit over 1995–2060 period would require a substantial one-time increase in the minimum retirement age. If a gradual increase in the minimum retirement age is chosen instead, on the other hand, some generations will be allowed to retire at a lower age than the minimum age implied by the one-time jump scenario, but later generations will be required to stay in the workforce beyond this age.