تجدید نظر داده های متضاد: پیامدهای ناخواسته دستورالعمل های صرفه جویی در انرژی چین

In China energy-saving mandates issued by the central government can trigger a trade-off between faithful implementation and kinds of strategic responses at the local level. This paper examines the biased data revision pattern of Chinese provinces under incentives created by energy-saving mandates. The data revisions conducted by provinces in the treatment group are evaluated against those carried out by their counterparts in the control group. Empirical evidence is provided that some provinces in the treatment group conducted biased data revisions by taking advantage of benchmark revisions of historical data following the 2008 Economic Census. These provinces adjusted their base-year energy consumption figure upward in seeking to reach the 2010 energy intensity reduction targets numerically. In institutional terms, strong political incentives are formed by assigning energy-saving indicators a veto power in cadre performance assessment. In a self-reported statistical regime, checks and balances are particularly weak regarding benchmark revisions of historical data. The findings of this paper suggest that the data quality of associated official statistics at the local level is undermined by energy-saving mandates. To improve the data quality of the official statistics, new checks and balances should be installed for local statistics.