توسعه اقتصادی اندونزی: سراب یا معجزه؟

This paper focuses on a few major developments that took place during the three decades from the late 1960s to the Asian financial crisis. The study finds, in retrospect, that many of the Indonesian economy’s weaknesses—now so glaringly apparent—were there all the time. The paper concludes that the Indonesian banking crisis was primarily domestic in nature, more so than the crises in Korea and Thailand. The extent of the failure was much more widespread and probably resulted from a chain of bank runs and bank closings, reinforced by uncertainty and lack of faith in the government’s commitment to the IMF program and IMF fumbling.

In the beginning of 1967, Indonesia embarked on a period of rapid economic growth that raised living standards, reduced poverty and transformed the country from a poor economy, primarily dependent on agriculture, to a major producer of industrial products in Southeast Asia. From 1967 to 1995, income per capita rose more than fourfold; the incidence of poverty fell from 64.3% in 1975 to 11.4% in 1995 (using a US$1/day poverty level); domestic investment as a share of GDP increased from less than 10% in the 1960s to over 30% in the 1990s; and agriculture’s share of GDP fell from over 50% in the 1960s to less than 20% by 1997. Indonesia went from being a basket case in the 1960s, a country that noted development economist Benjamin Higgins had dubbed the “number one failure among the major underdeveloped countries,”1 to become the darling of the World Bank in the late 1980s and early 1990s. When asked to name the number one example of the success of development policies in the era following the second oil shock (1979–1981), the World Bank invariably pointed to Indonesia. This paper focuses on a few major developments that took place during the three decades from the late 1960s to the Asian financial crisis rather than on the complete details of the development process. The study finds, in retrospect, that many of the Indonesian economy’s weaknesses—now so glaringly apparent—were there all the time, but they were glossed over by most development economists who were anxious to believe that the macroeconomic policies recommended by the economics profession and implemented in large measure by the Indonesian government were indeed bearing fruit.

The sources of the financial crisis for Indonesia were not significantly different from those in the other crisis countries; that is, unhedged borrowing from overseas, a property and stock market bubble, and poor financial supervision combined with weak fundamentals and shady lending practices. The extent of the financial blowout was, however, more extensive, as up to 80% of bank loans were questionable in Indonesia (Sharma, 2003). Compared to other crisis countries, the Indonesian government meddled more often in and showed less commitment to the recovery efforts. Suharto persistently acted to subvert the IMF program and to protect his CCs, while the IMF struggled to find appropriate policies for Indonesia. The result was that by the time IBRA was finally in place and beginning its work, the economy was in such shambles that the road back to solid growth had become much more difficult than it was for the other crisis economies. This can be seen by reviewing the progress made in financial restructuring.