توسعه اقتصادی شرق آسیا: دو سود سهام جمعیتی

Countries throughout the world are experiencing changes in their population age structure, but they are particularly rapid in East Asia. During the last part of the 20th Century the region benefited from an increased concentration of population in the working ages. Population aging is now the increasing rapidly with potentially adverse economic effects. The evidence presented here shows that population aging can lead to a second demographic dividend because population aging may lead to rapid capital accumulation. This appears to have occurred in East Asia because public support systems for the elderly are smaller and because family support systems are in decline.

In the 1960s, the populations of East Asia and the rest of the developing world were growing quite rapidly, and many viewed this population growth with alarm. The governments of China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia pursued policies designed to reduce rates of childbearing and slow population growth in the belief that to do otherwise would seriously impede development efforts. Among the countries of East and Southeast Asia, only Malaysia pursued a pro-natalist course. The view that population growth slows economic growth was greeted by considerable skepticism in academic circles (Kelley, 1988). Economists were undoubtedly influenced by the neoclassical growth model which implies that population growth has a relatively modest effect on the level of per capita income during transitions and no effect at all on the steady-state growth path (Solow, 1956). Moreover, simple empirical evidence bolstered the view that population growth was of secondary importance. In a bivariate comparison, population growth and growth in per capita income appeared to be entirely independent of one another (Kelley, 1988).

Obtaining reliable estimates of the effects of demographic variables on saving is a difficult enterprise. Cross-national panel data can be used to estimate only relatively parsimonious models. Thus, the danger that estimated effects are spurious is a serious problem. Demographic variables tend to change gradually and are highly correlated; this makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the separate effects of mortality and fertility. There are some instances where countries experience demographic shocks that could be explored. Two serious problems would have to be surmounted however. The first is that the shocks are typically accompanied by (or caused by) other changes that have their own implications. The experience of the transition economies comes to mind. The second problem is that the interest here is in long-term processes rather than short-term fluctuations. Incentives to save depend on expectations about the long-term trends in adult survival and not on short-term fluctuations in mortality, except insofar as they influence expectations in unknown ways. The consistency between the macro-based saving estimates presented here with the micro-based estimates and simulation results is reassuring, but application of the Kinugasa saving model to other developing regions of the world yields estimates that do not support the strong role of demographic factors found for the West and East Asian countries.