بازارهای سرمایه بین المللی و تثبیت نرخ ارز در کشورهای مستقل مشترک المنافع
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|14765||2005||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Comparative Economics, Volume 33, Issue 3, September 2005, Pages 425–440
In this paper, we examine the rationale for dollar and euro pegging in Russia and the CIS. We consider macroeconomic stabilization and transaction costs for international trade as rationales for pegging to the euro. Dollarization of international assets and liabilities are examined as determinants of exchange rate stabilization against the dollar. The impact of network externalities from a common anchor for all CIS countries is explored. Tests on de facto exchange rate stabilization reveal that dollar pegging has been pervasive in the CIS. Journal of Comparative Economics33 (3) (2005) 425–440.
The rising US twin deficit and the sustained fall of the US dollar have triggered significant increases of foreign reserves and the money supply in countries pegging their exchange rates to the dollar. Reflecting the dynamics of increasing international imbalances involving the US currency, the Central Bank of Russia announced plans to give a higher weight to the euro in its daily exchange rate operations in early 2005. The chances of the euro becoming an anchor currency for the Russian ruble seem realistic from the perspective of macroeconomic stabilization and transactions costs for international trade. Since the euro has evolved into an international currency, it may qualify as a credible anchor for Russian monetary policy. Because the EU25 is Russia's most important trading partner, transaction costs for Russian trade would decline. However, exchange rate stabilization against the dollar has persisted in Russia up to late 2004. Several papers elaborate the rationale for dollar or euro pegging in Russia and the CIS. Rautava (2004) examines the role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia's economy using a vector autoregression framework and finds that Russian economic performance is influenced strongly by both factors. From this perspective large inflows of petro dollars may explain dollar pegging. Keller and Richardson (2003) identify the dollarization of Russia's international and domestic assets and liabilities as the motivation for stabilizing exchange rates against the dollar. If the CIS economies remain highly dollarized, reducing exchange rate volatility against the dollar is equivalent to enhancing financial stability. Taking the increasing importance of international capital flows for exchange rate stabilization into account, we test for de facto exchange rate stability of the CIS currencies against the dollar and euro. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the rationale for exchange rate stabilization in the CIS countries and identifies the euro as a candidate for the nominal anchor. Although exchange rate policy in these countries has followed dollar pegging for most of the period, de-dollarization pressures are identified. Section 3 considers the network externalities of using an informal common anchor for the CIS countries. Section 4 establishes the de facto exchange rate stability of the currencies in these countries before and after the Russian crisis. Section 5 concludes with some observations about the possibility of shifting from a dollar peg to a euro-based anchor.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper, we investigate the role of macroeconomic stabilization, international trade, and underdeveloped capital markets in determining exchange rate policy in the CIS countries. We find a strong rationale for dollar pegging of the CIS currencies originating in capital markets and strong intra-regional trade linkages, which is confirmed by tests for de facto exchange rate stability. Nevertheless, as dollar pegs have contributed to higher inflationary pressure recently, the Central Bank of Russia has announced a revision of its exchange rate strategy. Due to underdeveloped capital markets, a freely floating ruble is not a feasible policy option. Although the Russian economy is large and closed enough to provide an anchor currency for the smaller CIS economies, fear of floating is likely to persist because Russian capital markets will remain relatively underdeveloped in the near future. Theoretically, the euro qualifies as an alternative anchor for the CIS countries due to strengthening trade relations with the EU25. The ongoing process of de-dollarization in these economies will facilitate a shift toward the euro. To this end, Russia may adopt a currency basket with a considerable weight placed on the euro. Once this process has proven to be sustainable, the smaller CIS countries are likely to follow this policy to maintain intra-regional trade relations and macroeconomic stability. How smoothly the transformation of the exchange rate systems toward more exchange rate stability against the euro will proceed may hinge on Russia's oil and raw material exports. Since dollar invoicing of these primary products is prevalent, the incentive remains to sustain exchange rate stability against the dollar.