سرمایه گذاری ریسک پذیر شرکت های بزرگ و تعادل ریسک ها و پاداش ها برای شرکت های پرتفولیو

This paper contributes to the literature on corporate venture capital (CVC) by examining the management of CVC investments from the perspective of the investee firm. We focus on the trade-off between social interactions and relationship safeguards and examine their effects on the twin relationship outcomes of learning benefits and risks. The model is tested using data collected from CEOs of U.S. technology-based new firms receiving CVC funding. Complementarities between the investee firm and its CVC investor are positively related to the level of social interaction and negatively related to the use of different types of relationship safeguards by the investee firm. The use of safeguards is further negatively related to both realized relationship risks and social interaction. Social interaction is positively related to realized learning benefits. These findings highlight the fine balance that the investee firm has to strike between openness and self protection in a CVC relationship. Implications for future research and current practice are discussed.

The tension between the simultaneous needs for both cooperation and control is inherent in most collaborative relationships between firms (Das and Teng, 2000, Kale et al., 2000, Khanna et al., 1998 and White, 2005). This tension is particularly characteristic of knowledge-intensive relationships, where the reciprocal and staged nature of knowledge disclosures creates considerable scope for free-riding (Dyer and Singh, 1998 and Human and Provan, 1997). Open and frequent interactions are required in inter-firm relationships so as to facilitate the integration of valuable resources (Inkpen and Tsang, 2004). However, misplaced or naïve openness may result in the misappropriation of valuable knowledge and resources by an opportunistic partner (Das and Teng, 1998 and Katila et al., 2008). The overt use of safeguards will not necessarily help as such precautions can send a signal of mistrust which may prompt the withholding of resources and closer social interaction (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996 and Lui and Ngo, 2004). At worst, the use of safeguards may set off a ‘learning race’ in which only one partner can win (Khanna et al., 1998 and Larsson et al., 1998). The above dilemma is particularly pertinent for growth oriented, technology-based new firms (TBNFs) whose rapid growth is often dependent on access to external resources (Jarillo, 1989 and Stinchcombe, 1965) including venture capital (Hellmann and Puri, 2002 and Sapienza, 1992). However, this risk capital option is not always sufficient as the resource needs of TBNFs typically extend beyond early-stage financing and managerial expertise. An alternative, complementary source of resources is provided by industrial corporations, which have become important VC investors in their own right (Gompers and Lerner, 1998 and Maula and Murray, 2002). In addition to finance, corporate investors are often able to provide access to valuable strategic resources (Dushnitsky, 2004, Gompers and Lerner, 1998, Hellmann, 2002, Maula et al., 2005 and Maula and Murray, 2002). However, such benefits are not without costs and risks. Unlike VC firms, CVCs may have actual or potentially competing business interests in the domain of the portfolio firm. The relationship with a CVC investor is therefore a ‘double-edged sword,’ which brings both potential advantages and disadvantages to the young investee firms (Hellmann, 2002 and Maula and Murray, 2002). At worst, the young firm's collaboration may help educate a powerful future competitor. Despite its importance, the causes, manifestations and consequences of this tension between collaboration and control are insufficiently explored in the VC literature (Katila et al., 2008). Studies of CVC have emphasized the benefits and value-adding mechanisms of corporate investors while ignoring the risks. There is little rigorous empirical research to provide a balanced overview of the actual risks and benefits that CVC investments entail for entrepreneurs ( Maula and Murray, 2002). This imbalance is a result of the predominantly corporate perspective of much of the strategic literature. The interests of the investee firm in the CVC relationship has been almost completely ignored by the received literature ( Katila et al., 2008). Consequently, there is little research to guide TBNFs on how to manage the trade-off between collaboration and control in CVC relationships. In this paper, we take the perspective of technology-based new firms (Yli-Renko et al., 2001 and Zahra et al., 2000). They are the primary focus of much of CVC activity given the corporation's interests in continued innovation (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008 and Maula, 2007). We have three reasons for this choice of focus. First, we provide a rare empirical examination of management of CVC relationships from the venture perspective thereby counterbalancing the corporate bias of extant CVC literature (Dushnitsky, 2006, Katila et al., 2008 and Maula, 2007). Second, while research has examined when ties are formed between entrepreneurial ventures and corporate investors (Dushnitsky, 2004 and Katila et al., 2008), the subtlety and complexity of managing such relationships has been largely overlooked. Third, because of our focus on the dynamic tension between collaboration and competition, we extend the common ‘static’ view of social capital as an exogenous (given) asset in inter-firm relationships ( Ariño et al., 2008 and Maula et al., 2003). Building on both the learning literature and agency theory, we develop a model predicting the impact of complementarities between the investee firm and the parent company of the CVC investor on both their social interaction and the use of various safeguards by the investee firm. Complementarities are defined as existing between the CVC investor and its portfolio firm when the deployment of the resources of one party enhances the marginal effectiveness of the resources of the other party (Bendersky, 2003 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Complementarity is central to the CVC logic in that it improves asset productivity. In contrast, relatedness defines the relative similarity of the two businesses. Thus, we do not see the two complementarity and relatedness as opposite ends of a continuum of overlap/similarity (e.g. Kale et al., 2000) and prefer the conceptualization of complementarities of Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Bendersky (2003) focusing on the productivity implications. We propose that in the presence of high complementarities, social interaction will be increased and the use of safeguards will diminish because mutual specialization enables the parties to focus on knowledge access rather than competing in a learning race (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004 and Larsson et al., 1998). Relatedness assumes no such consequences. Social interaction between the focal firm and the corporate investor is here defined as a dimension of social capital (Larson, 1992, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Ring and Vandeven, 1994 and Yli-Renko et al., 2001). The model importantly allows predictions concerning the impact of safeguards on the risks of misappropriation, as well as the influence of social interaction on the receipt of learning benefits from the corporate investor. The model developed in the paper is tested using data collected from CEOs of CVC funded, U.S. start-ups. The hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling. The model and the associated hypotheses received good support from the empirical data. Complementarities between the investee firm and its CVC investor are positively related to the social interaction between them and negatively related to the use of different types of relationship safeguards by the venture. The use of safeguards is negatively related to both realized relationship risks and social interaction. Social interaction is positively related to realized learning benefits. Given these subtle trade-offs, the findings have relevance for entrepreneurs, CVCs and VC firms alike when seeking new partners or wishing to manage existing relationships for maximum commercial benefit. Given disparities in size and thus relative vulnerabilities, we would argue that this information on the management of relationships is particularly important to the investee firm.

This empirical study of the CVC–investee firm dyad seeks to understand the nature of the process of value added stemming from complementarities. Unlike the majority of strategic literature dealing with CVC activity, it takes as its primary perspective the interests of the technology based new firm collaborator. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to develop and empirically validate a model of how entrepreneurial young firms manage the risk and rewards from CVC investments. An understanding of the differing implications of complementarity and relatedness is central to our analysis. It places greater salience on the risks incurred by the entrepreneurial young firm and the trade-offs than need to be managed in order to realize the potential benefits of complementarity than has commonly been acknowledged by researchers. Social interaction positively mediates the realization of learning benefits arising from complementarities. Safeguards reduce realized risk but at the cost of lower social interaction and thus realized benefits. The process is both more complex and more nuanced that previous researchers have indicated. We hope the paper will inspire further research into the structuring and management of investor relationships by owners and managers of entrepreneurial ventures. Given the many demanding and as yet unresolved organizational challenges of CVC, such research will have material and immediate value in both commercial and academic application.