مقایسه برنامه های تشویقی بهره وری انرژی : تخفیف ها و گواهینامه های سفید

With increased interest in energy efficiency in recent years, energy efficiency portfolio standards (EEPS) have gained popularity in state policymaking. This analysis employed New Jersey specific data to compare two incentive based approaches to EEPS implementation: rebates and white certificates. Quantitative modeling suggests that white certificate approaches that depend on market-clearing prices generate much larger upfront incentive outlays than rebate programs. They do not however increase societal burden. Both programs overcome high upfront efficiency measure costs and both recoup the expenses over the long run. Administration costs and participation rates can affect this dynamic however and require additional research to determine which approaches are most cost effective for various energy efficiency measures.

Energy efficiency, when properly designed and implemented, can reduce harmful emissions, lessen consumer energy bills, decrease wholesale electricity costs, and stimulate the economy by reducing energy consumption and congestion costs and/or delaying or foregoing transmission and distribution costs. Energy efficient technologies often come at increased cost compared to their traditional counterparts however, and consumers are often either unwilling or unable to pay the premium for efficiency despite its long-term benefits. Energy efficiency programs attempt to overcome these barriers to spur efficiency installation and reap its public benefits. In addition, well designed programs transform energy efficiency markets to generate organic efficiency adoption and decrease the need for additional efficiency advancing policies. Energy efficiency portfolio standards (EEPS), also known as energy efficiency resource standards (EERS) and an analog of renewable portfolio standards (RPS), stipulate how energy efficiency must meet some portion of energy demand or how much efficiency potential must be installed. EEPS have gained increasing interest from policymakers and as of October 2008 twenty-one states had instituted some form of EEPS (US EPA, 2009). The following paper employs quantitative models and theoretical analyses to compare two generic incentive approaches in achieving EEPS energy efficiency goals: rebates and white certificates. In both cases, we assume that each program sets a quantity level, as opposed to a price level, although the implications of setting price versus quantity under uncertainty are important (Weitzman, 1974). Rebate programs have existed for some time and generally involve a refund or discount payment to consumers of qualifying products. Used commercially to spur sales, rebates are often employed in government programs to encourage technologies or behaviors. Rebate payments typically occur as single, predetermined transactions at the time of sale (instant rebate) or as a post-sale claim (mail-in rebate). Rebates are popular incentives because they require relatively straightforward implementation, rely on simple economic principles, and when structured properly transform target markets to eliminate future rebate needs. Consider the instant rebate approach; the consumer receives the rebate immediately at the time of sale and the payment is deducted from a rebate fund account. Very few, if any, additional staff or resources would be required beyond the rebate fund itself. If the rebates are claimed via a mail-in arrangement, the program implementer can contract with a rebate clearinghouse or other private party to handle claim processing and minimize administration requirements. The rebate payments reduce a good's apparent price and, in accordance with consumer theory, stimulate product demand. In the EEPS case, rebate payments cover incremental cost differences between efficient and inefficiency measures, removing incentives to purchase traditional technologies and stimulating demand for efficient ones. Note however that rebate programs are subjected to leakage; customers from states without rebates can purchase goods in states with rebates, taking advantage of the incentives without providing the associated in-state energy savings. In contrast, white certificates, also known as energy efficiency certificates or credits, energy savings credits, and white tags, represent a new approach and embody the energy efficiency analog to renewable energy credits (RECs) when traded or sold in a certificate market (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2006). REC policies are themselves analogous to sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emission cap-and-trade policies that many conclude have been extremely cost effective in achieving emission reduction objectives. Rather than government agencies choosing which technologies to support with pre-set rebates, a white certificate program establishes a marketplace to allow retail customers or their representatives to determine the most cost effective way to achieve energy efficiency enhancements. White certificates are generated through efficiency measure use and accrue to the entity owning the measures. Policymakers can design the program to either issue the white certificates upfront, accounting for a measure's lifetime energy savings or they can issue certificates representing annual savings in a multi-payment approach. Entities meeting required EEPS targets can do so either by installing energy efficiency measures or by purchasing white certificates from entities producing surplus certificates. Those implementing inexpensive measures can generate white certificates in excess of their EEPS requirements and sell to entities with higher costs and fewer efficiency opportunities. This provides a profit maximizing, cost minimizing dynamic that in conjunction with demand and supply feedback loops continuously approximates efficient incentive levels and lowers the cost of achieving the EEPS efficiency targets. Originally developed in Europe, Connecticut was the first state to implement white certificate trading with Pennsylvania and Nevada following shortly afterward (WRI, 2009).

When designing incentive programs for the increasingly popular energy efficiency portfolio standards, policymakers must choose between institutional and market incentive-setting mechanisms and between single and multiple-payment incentive distribution. While these distinctions are not unique to either rebate or white certificate programs, typically rebate programs involved single, institutionally priced incentive payments while certificate systems employ multiple, market priced payments. Neither program meets all needs however; policymakers and program administrators must identify their circumstance's principal features and select the set of design characteristics that best address these issues. When implementing EEPS incentive programs, program costs and bill savings depend heavily on the chosen targets and the available energy savings potential. This is especially true for white certificate approaches since market-clearing prices rise dramatically as expensive measures are needed. If market approaches and their benefits are desired but high incentive outlays are prohibitive, lower energy savings targets are recommended. It is essential therefore, that policymakers have access to reliable information concerning energy efficiency potential as they draft EEPS targets and choose incentive programs. Program ramp-up can improve compliance when annual target increases fall within measure turnover limits and if high program costs threaten certificate programs, requirements for lifetime purchase agreements can reduce costs without sacrificing market benefits. Ultimately, while white certificate programs require significantly larger upfront cost outlays compared to a rebate approach (which may make white certificate programs politically unattractive), their burden to society is no greater; from a long-term societal and financial perspective, the incentive method is immaterial. Both programs allow consumers to overcome high upfront costs for efficient measures and both recoup the expenses in the long run. Administration costs and participation rates can affect this dynamic however and require additional research.