عملکرد شرکت های موسس پیشرو: بررسی نظریه قرارداد جبران خسارت در طول افتضاح اجرایی "پیش تاریخ" گزینه های سهام

Using the executive stock option (ESO) backdating scandal as a backdrop, this paper examines whether compensation committees can effectively set executive compensation contracts in the presence of a founding CEO. Analyzing a sample of firms accused of backdating ESO grant dates and a control sample of non-backdating firms, we find evidence suggesting that managerial power influences the decision to backdate. Specifically, our analysis indicates the presence of a founder CEO increases the likelihood that ESOs are backdated by 22%. We further find that founder-led firms strongly underperform a matched sample of non-backdating firms. This finding contrasts a number of studies that document superior operating and stock return performance for founder-led firms.