ورود و امکان دسترسی به صلاحیت ها در خارج از کشور: شرکت های بازار نوظهور در برابر شرکت های بازار پیشرفته

This article examines the acquisition behavior of multinational companies from emerging markets (EMNCs) compared to multinational companies from advanced markets (AMNCs). Specifically, we relate the governance mode (i.e. the degree of commitment) to exogenous and endogenous uncertainty. As a result of endogenous uncertainty due to their liability of origin, EMNCs are likely to acquire less control, which is exacerbated by exogenous uncertainty when acquiring targets in high-tech sectors. Furthermore, EMNCs experience a higher propensity to control the local partner the higher the institutional distance with the host country, since they enjoy a better institutional environment when they invest in advanced countries and, hence, they are less likely to need a local partner. To test our hypotheses, we develop an econometric analysis applied to foreign acquisitions in Italy between 2001 and 2010 and we study the degree of control of AMNCs as compared to EMNCs. Our results confirm that EMNCs acquire less control than AMNCs, especially in high-tech industries, while institutional distance in trade and investment freedom effectively increase the probability to undertake full acquisition for EMNCs as opposed to AMNCs.

This article is about ownership strategies of foreign multinationals acquiring firms in advanced economies. In particular, it examines the acquisition behavior of multinational companies from emerging markets (EMNCs) compared to multinational companies from advanced markets (AMNCs) in Italy. EMNCs that acquire firms in advanced countries go against the grain of conventional wisdom about the direction in which capital, technology, and knowledge should flow in the global economy. And it represents a situation which extant international business theory fails to explain well (Mathews, 2006). EMNCs supposedly use international expansion in advanced countries as a springboard to compensate for their competitive disadvantages. In order to compete internationally, they need to overcome their own weaknesses quickly. Therefore, they aim to acquire capabilities and technologies such that they do not need to develop the same internally. Previous studies (e.g., Luo and Tung, 2007) have already shown that when investing in developed countries, EMNCs seek sophisticated technology or advanced manufacturing know-how by acquiring foreign companies. Namely, EMNCs outward investments are triggered mainly by ‘pull’ factors, such as the desire to secure critical resources, acquire advanced technology, obtain managerial expertise, and gain access to consumers in key foreign markets, so that they can overcome their latecomer disadvantages (Mathews, 2006). In general, EMNCs are eager to acquire technology and brands through internationalization to fill their resource void. Foreign firms' willingness to sell or share their technology, know-how or brands due to financial exigency or restructuring needs makes it possible for EMNCs to fulfill this need (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Although most multinationals come from advanced countries, EMNCs have made a remarkable entrance on the international scene in the last decade. Since the 1990s, in both developed and developing countries, M&A have become a more important component of inward and outward FDI. However, although EMNCs have the ambition to become global players, their pattern of international expansion is supposedly different to that of their developed world counterparts (Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009). In fact, EMNCs have been relatively more successful in penetrating other developing countries, but relatively less successful in entering developed countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). Meyer et al. (2011) attribute the relative success of EMNCs to capabilities that they have developed in order to deal with the specific conditions of their home environment. The institutional and economic environment of developing countries differs from that of developed countries. In order to be competitive at home, EMNCs develop capabilities that allow them to deal with their home market specificities (Van Assche, 2011). These abilities may then provide EMNCs with a competitive advantage when expanding into countries with similar conditions. That is why it is suggested that, ceteris paribus, EMNCs are more likely to invest in countries with similar market and institutional characteristics. That is, EMNCs generally tend to invest in other less developed countries as the investing firms can rely on their firm-specific advantages which are better adapted to the needs and institutions existing in other developing countries. In a similar, yet contradictory vein, EMNCs suffer from a disadvantage when investing in advanced economies. The liabilities of origin can make the EMNC's task of acquisition of legitimacy in the advanced host country market far more difficult (Yildiz, in press). EMNCs find themselves subjected to discrimination by competitors, consumers, and even by governments, in advanced markets due to prevailing biases against practices, products and services associated with developing and emerging economies. Crucially, this liability of origin can be particularly important when the firm has yet to build up its own reputational capital, as is usually the case with EMNCs seeking a foothold in advanced markets. EMNCs may also suffer as a result of the misgivings of host governments, whose officials may be reluctant to encourage EMNCs in their markets either due to geopolitical considerations, or simply because they lack confidence in their capabilities (Pant, 2012). The second type of disadvantage faced by EMNCs in advanced markets can be traced to the underdeveloped home country institutions. Given their institutional disadvantage in entering advanced markets, they are again likely to be affected in their strategic behavior. The distinctive challenges confronted by EMNCs in advanced country markets can shed light on how location (i.e., the country of origin) can shape the legitimacy of firms in international markets, which emerges from its ability to persuade businesses in the host country institutional environment. Therefore, in order to analyze and compare the respective acquisition behavior of EMNCs and AMNCs, we carried out an econometric analysis on foreign acquisitions in Italy during the decade 2001–2010. The availability of such a sample allows us to analyze the uniqueness of EMNCs' behavior and to compare their entry choice with AMNCs. This work is original in various respects. Although both the literature on the MNCs' entry mode and the studies focusing on EMNCs are vast, the latter's entry strategy in developed countries has not received much attention so far. Here, we focus on factors explaining the degree of ownership in local companies acquired by EMNCs. Namely, thanks to a detailed database for Italy, we compare EMNCs with AMNCs, thus addressing the crucial issue of “the unique or special features of the home country environment” influencing international entry mode (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007 and Li and Peng, 2008). Additionally, MNCs' entry mode choice has been widely investigated by international business scholars mainly focusing on determinants and patterns of the choice acquisitions vs. greenfield initiatives, or wholly owned subsidiaries vs. joint ventures (for recent reviews, see Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007 and Hennart, 2009). Instead, we focus on the level of control and the equity share in cross border acquisitions, an issue that has not received much research attention so far (for an exhaustive survey and discussion, see Chari and Chang, 2009). The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our conceptual framework and testable hypotheses. The third section presents the data and descriptive statistics, while econometric models and variables employed are reported in the fourth section. The fifth section illustrates and discusses the results, while the final section summarizes the main contributions of the paper.

This paper contributes to the literature on entry mode by focusing on the level of equity and control in cross border acquisitions, an issue that has not received much research attention. Our results show that EMNCs acquire significantly less ownership than AMNCs, especially in high-tech industries. These results can be explained by the increased levels of uncertainty that EMNCs suffer from. Our results confirm that as a result of the increased exogenous uncertainty in high-tech industries, EMNCs are more likely to pursue lighter commitment in order to remain more flexible (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002). Exogenous uncertainty is compounded by endogenous uncertainty for EMNCs. Endogenous uncertainty is the result of dissimilarities among partners which can be caused by different knowledge bases or by the lack of prior cooperation to overcome information asymmetries (van de Vrande et al., 2009). In particular, their liability of origin is leading to an increased level of endogenous uncertainty. Overcoming the liability of origin requires a two-way process of familiarization between the EMNC and businesses in the host country. This essentially involves enhancing comprehensibility about the EMNCs among host country audiences on the one hand and learning about and adapting to the distinctive aspects of the host country institutional environment on the other (Pant, 2012). As far as institutional distance is concerned, although several studies have already complemented TCE and RBV variables with institutional variables (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000, Meyer, 2001 and Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), only few have acknowledged and captured the complexity of the constructs (Meyer et al., 2009a and Zaheer et al., 2012). Our results show indeed that complex indexes of institutional distance may hinder those sources of societal difference that actually impact MNCs' entry mode choice. On the one hand, institutional distance in terms of property rights leads the acquiring firm to opt for a full rather than for a partial ownership in order to better protect its knowledge and technology. This holds not only for AMNCs but also for EMNCs, even if the score of the property right is higher for Italy than for emerging countries. This result is likely to be due to the fact that firms are very sensitive to the risk of knowledge and technology leakage, meaning they always prefer to protect knowledge through a full acquisition when the property right regime of the host country is relatively weak, regardless of the property right regime of the home country. On the other hand, institutional distance in terms of market access leads to differing investment behavior between AMNCs and EMNCs. AMNCs acquire lower ownership when the host market differs from their home country, while EMNCs acquire more control in the local partner the higher the institutional distance in terms of trade and investment freedom in the host country. In fact, as EMNCs investing in advanced countries enjoy a better institutional trade and investment environment there, they are less likely to opt for a local partner (to reduce the relevant uncertainty). As usual, the current study has a number of limitations. The major limitation stems from the paucity of data about the parent companies. Given that it is extremely difficult to obtain financial information about all these foreign firms, this limitation excludes the possibility to measure the impact of partner characteristics on the choice of focal firms. Furthermore, prior cooperation between partners might be a mediating factor in reducing uncertainty. Although we have tested the impact of different types of uncertainty on ownership mode choice, future research should also look into the possible moderating effects on uncertainty. For instance, prior cooperation might interact with the effect of different types of uncertainty on ownership mode choice. Moreover, the effect of uncertainty on ownership decisions might differently affect industry leaders than laggards.