تجزیه و تحلیل اثرات مالیات ترکیبی کربن و انتشار تجارت در بخش های مختلف صنعت

Application of price mechanisms has been the important instrument for carbon reduction, among which the carbon tax has been frequently advocated as a cost-effective economic tool. However, blanket taxes applied to all industries in a country might not always be fair or successful. It should therefore be implemented together with other economic tools, such as emission trading, for CO2 reduction. This study aims to analyze the impacts of combining a carbon tax and emission trading on different industry sectors. Results indicate that the “grandfathering rule (RCE2000)” is the more feasible approach in allocating the emission permit to each industry sector. Results also find that the accumulated GDP loss of the petrochemical industry by the carbon tax during the period 2011–2020 is 5.7%. However, the accumulated value of GDP will drop by only 4.7% if carbon taxation is implemented together with emission trading. Besides, among petrochemical-related industry sectors, up-stream sectors earn profit from emission trading, while down-stream sectors have to purchase additional emission permits due to failure to achieve their emission targets.

The Kyoto Protocol went into effect on February 16, 2005. In the post-Kyoto phase, Taiwan, as a newly industrialized country, needs to draft feasible strategies with lower economic impact for the coming CO2 reduction. Application of price mechanisms has been the important instrument for carbon reduction, among which the carbon tax (CT) has been frequently advocated as a cost-effective economic tool. Some countries in Europe, such as Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway, have implemented CTs for over 10 years, while Italy, Germany, and UK also began to levy CTs since 1999–2001. Also, emission trading (ET) has been recommended as one of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way. The EU has introduced a carbon-trading system in the beginning of 2005 as a means for achieving its CO2 reduction target. In the first phase of the system, 2005–2007, power plants and some energy-intensive industries are included (Kara et al., 2006). It is therefore essential to simulate and to compare the impacts of various carbon reduction tool combinations on industry sectors. The effectiveness of carbon taxation has been discussed in many relevant researches. A study by Baranzini et al. (2000) showed that CTs may be an interesting policy option and that their main negative impacts may be compensated through the design of the tax and the use of the generated fiscal revenues. Nakata and Lamont (2001) applied a partial equilibrium model to evaluate the impacts of CTs on energy systems in Japan. Their results suggest that CTs decrease CO2 emission according to a proposed target, but also cause a shift in fuel use from coal to gas. In New Zealand, a computable general equilibrium model is used to assess the relative effectiveness of CTs on the economy, and results show that carbon taxation would adversely affect GDP (Scrimgeour et al., 2005). However, blanket taxes applied to all industries in a country might not always be fair or successful. Norway's high CT since 1991 contributed to only 2% reduction in CO2 emissions because of widespread tax exemptions and inelastic demand of various sectors affected by this tax (Bruvoll and Larsen, 2004). As in the case of Norway's relatively high CT since 1991 and its resulting low CO2 reduction, Gerlagh and Lise (2005) developed an economic partial equilibrium model to demonstrate that CTs have a modest effect on emissions. Johansson (2006) theoretically evaluated the possibility of different policy instruments to contribute to reductions in industrial CO2 emissions while preserving the competitiveness of the industry. However, blanket taxes for CO2 reduction applied to all industries in a country might not always be fair or successful (Lee et al., 2007). The authors constructed a fuzzy goal programming model to assess the effects of CTs on different industries (Lee et al., 2007). The results indicated that some industries show improved CO2 reduction while others fail to achieve their stabilization targets. The results also suggested that the CTs should be implemented together with other economic tools, such as carbon trading. Thus, industries that show significant carbon abatement may sell their surplus emission allowances to industries that need additional permits, and then the industrial GDP losses induced by CO2 reduction can be compensated. The impacts of ET on the industries have been studied in the literature. Szabó et al. (2006) present a global simulation model to quantitatively analyze the impacts of three carbon ET schemes on the cement sector. In Finland, the impacts of the EU CO2 ET on power plant operators, energy-intensive industries, and other consumer groups were analyzed by Kara et al. (2006). Their results found that large windfall profits were estimated to incur to electricity producers in the Nordic electricity market, while the metal industry and private consumers were estimated to be most affected by the electricity market price increases. Among various energy-intensive industries, the pulp and paper industry may actually be a net beneficiary of the EU ET. Lund (2007) investigated the cost impacts of the European Emission System (ETS) on energy-intensive manufacturing industries. Their results indicate that the ETS affects the industry sectors quite differently. The cost impacts of the steel and cement industries are 3–4-fold compared with the least-affected pulp and paper and oil refining. They therefore suggest that some correcting mechanisms may be worth considering in securing the operation of some industry sectors. This study compares the impacts between only a CT and a CT combined with ET on different industry sectors in Taiwan. A fuzzy goal programming model that was originally constructed in the author's previous paper (Lee et al., 2007) is adopted to simulate the CO2 reduction potential and the accompanying economic impacts of a CT on five petrochemical-related industry sectors: petrochemical materials (PMs), plastic materials (PLs), artificial fibers (AFs), plastic products (PPs), and rubber products (RPs). Based on the results from carbon taxation, we further quantify the effects of implementing ET on financial flows among different industry sectors. The CO2 reduction target is set as “returning the emission amount to year 2000 level by 2020”, and the carbon ET is assumed to be implemented together with a CT scenario since 2011. The paper is structured as follows. The applied methods are presented in Section 2. The model for assessing the impacts of a CT is briefly described. Then the methods about ET used in this paper are introduced. Section 3 presents the outcomes from the model. The results for the base scenario and the CT scenario are shown and discussed. In Section 4, we discuss the results of emission permit allocation firstly, and then compare the impacts between only a CT and a CT combined with ET on different industry sectors. Finally, some conclusions are given in Section 5.

Although Taiwan is not a member of Annex 1 in the Kyoto Protocol, it has been classified as a newly industrialized economy due to its significant progress ineconomic development during the past decades. It is possible that Taiwan would be asked by the international community to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions in the near future. Therefore, it is necessary to assess and compare the impacts of various CO 2 reduction instruments on different industries in Taiwan. This study aims to compare the impacts between only a carbon tax and a carbon tax combined with emission trading on different industry sectors in Taiwan. The results of permits allocation show that the ‘‘grand- fathering rule’’, namely allocating the permits by sectoral emission proportions in 2000 (RCE2000), is a more feasible approach in allocating the emission permit to each industry sector. The reason is that an industry sector with an outstanding CO 2 reduction usually incurs a greater impact on its production value as well. Allocating the emission allowance according to the proportion of historical emission would ensure the industry sector, which shows good carbon abatement, to have surplus permit for selling, and thus its GDP loss resulting from carbon reduction could be relatively compensated. In this study, the allocated results by the RCE2000 regime indicate that the plastic materials and artificial fibers sectors are always the permit sellers and plastic products is the permit buyer during the 2011–2020 emission trading period. The results of this paper also reveal that emission trading influences the GDP values of various industry sectors quite differently. The plastic materials and artificial fibers sectors both gain benefit from emission trading over the period 2011–2020, and their annual GDP losses resulting from carbon taxation may therefore decrease. Plastic products that are at the down-stream of the petrochemical industry needs to buy insufficient permits during the trading period 2011–2020, and this magnifies its annual GDP loss. Petrochemical materials and rubber products show a similar trend in changes of GDP loss. Both these sectors are permit sellers during more thanhalf of the trading period, but they become permit buyers by 2018. For the whole petrochemical industry, the accumulated GDP value over the period 2011–2020 will decline by 5.7% when only a carbon tax is levied. However, the GDP value will drop by only 4.7% if carbon taxation is implemented together with emission trading. Among five sectors, petrochemical materials, plastic materials, artificial fibers, and rubber products all gain benefits from emission trading in the period 2011–2020, and their GDP losses are consequently lessened in different degrees by the revenues. Sectors of plastic materials and artificial fibers are the industry sectors that show more significant effect in mitigating GDP loss. Although petrochemical materials also gains some profit from emission trading, its accumu- lated GDP loss is still very high. The accumulated GDP loss of plastic products is enlarged by 198% when emission trading is implemented together with carbon taxation, because the industrial sector is unable to reduce its carbon emission by the carbon tax. Due to diversity of industrial fuel structures, the CO 2 reduction results and the induced GDP losses by the carbon tax in various industry sectors are fundamentally different. In this study, our results show that a high carbon-contained fuel structure brings an improved CO 2 reduction, but also leads to a higher energy cost resulting in a GPD loss. The sectors with lower carbon-containing fuel structures, in turn, usually show relatively unobvious influences on both industrial GDP and CO 2 reduction. For the industry sectors with outstanding carbon reduc- tion, the carbon tax would therefore bring significant impacts on their international competitiveness. If emission trading is implemented simultaneously with the carbon tax, the impacts on international competitiveness of some industry sectors, such as plastic materials and artificial fibers, can be lessened. However, some industry sectors (such as plastic products) are likely to experience the production cost rises that would have negative impacts on their international competitiveness. The EU has introduced a carbon trading system (ETS) in the beginning of 2005 as a means for achieving its CO 2 reduction target. Under the ETS, each member country assigned emission allowances to their power generators and emission-intensive industries. However, most countries have over-allocated emission permits to the companies, allowing them to emit at the same or even higher levels than before ( McGiffen, 2007 ). There are some implications from the results of our study given for the ETS. Firstly, a gradually decreasing carbon permit allocation is vital for achieving the CO 2 abatement target with emission trading. The incentive to cut carbon emission would be weakened when the companies are too easy or too flexible to obtain their emission permits. Besides, the rules for permits allocation would influence the feasibility and effectiveness of an ETS greatly. Our study results indicate that the plastic products sector is a failure in cutting its CO 2 emission by the carbon tax, but is also unobvious in itsGDP loss. In addition, the emission permits are allocated according to the historical CO 2 emission in our emission trading scenario. Although this makes the plastic products sector to be the net buyer of carbon permits, it would further increase its GDP loss. However, other sectors with greater GDP losses by the carbon tax may increase their incomes through selling the additional permits.