تنظیم مرزی برای انتشار تجارت در اروپا : رقابت و نشت کربن

Unilateral or sub-global policies to combat climate change are potentially sensitive to free-riding and carbon leakage. One way of dealing with carbon leakage and competitiveness is the imposition of border adjustment measures for competing imports, for example in the form of the obligation to importers of goods to purchase and surrender emissions allowances to the authorities when importing. In this paper, we explore some implications of border adjustment measures in the EU ETS, for sectors that might be subject to carbon leakage. We examine the implications of two variants of these measures on the competitiveness of these sectors and on the global environment with the help of a multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the global economy. Our calculations suggest that border adjustment might reduce the sectoral rate of leakage of the iron and steel industry rather forcefully, but that the reduction would be less for the mineral products sector, including cement. The reduction of the overall or macro rate of leakage would be modest. So, from an environmental point of view border tax adjustments would not be a very effective policy measure, but might mainly be justified by considerations of sectoral competitiveness.

Unilateral or sub-global policies to combat climate change are potentially sensitive to free-riding and carbon leakage. Well established in economic theory, these “international externalities” (Markusen, 1975) now figure prominently in the political debate on the design of emissions trading schemes on both sides of the Atlantic. Recent Congressional initiatives in the US for a federal cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gases included detailed border adjustment measures for carbon-intensive products from countries without “comparable” policy actions. The latest bill proposal by Representatives Waxman and Markey that was passed in the House of Representatives in June 2009 also included the future option to adopt border adjustments if other measures would fail to address competitiveness concerns (Dröge, 2009). The Commission of the European Union (EU), in the context of the preparation for the third phase of its Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), currently investigates which “energy-intensive industry sectors or sub-sectors are likely to be subject to carbon leakage”.1 Such sectors or sub-sectors could receive a higher share of gratis allowances or an “effective carbon equalization system with a view to putting [these sectors or sub-sectors at home and abroad] on a comparable footing.”1 The revised ETS Directive includes the option of border adjustments in the form of the inclusion in the scheme of importers of products from sectors that are exposed to significant risks of carbon leakage.2 Policies to mitigate carbon leakage and negative effects on competitiveness have been subject to intense academic and political debate. Much has been said on the issue of free allocation versus auctioning of allowances (e.g. European Commission, 2008; de Bruyn et al., 2008; Fischer and Fox, 2004). While in a textbook cap-and-trade system the modalities of the initial distribution of allowances should not matter for the final outcomes in terms of prices and activity levels (and therefore on competitiveness), in a real-world and imperfect system3 such as the EU ETS, the way of allocation of the allowances (free versus auctioned) might well matter to the extent that free allocation would give some relief to sectors that are particularly exposed to foreign competition.4 An alternative, and arguably more rigorous way of dealing with carbon leakage and competitiveness is the imposition of border adjustment measures for competing imports, for example in the form of the obligation to importers of goods to purchase and surrender emissions allowances to the authorities when importing. Border adjustment measures can theoretically help to mitigate carbon leakage and negative competitiveness effects for domestic firms and might act as a leverage for foreign firms (or countries) to implement CO2 reduction measures (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007). In this paper, we explore some implications of border adjustment measures in the EU ETS, for sectors that might be subject to carbon leakage. We examine the implications of two variants of these measures on the competitiveness of these sectors and on the global environment with the help of a multi-sector, multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the global economy. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews previous research on the economic and environmental effects of border adjustments in the context of unilateral climate change policies. Section 3 describes the model and data that are used for the present analysis. Section 4 outlines the policy simulations, while Section 5 presents the results. Finally, Section 6 offers some conclusions.

Different border adjustment options have different impacts on the additional costs of imported goods. They differ with respect to the average level of costs and the distribution of the costs across exporting regions. Therefore, the exact design of border adjust- ment measures is of crucial importance. The additional cost for imports also differs with respect to the price of CO 2 allowances in the EU ETS market. In the model analysis, we neglected possible volatility of carbon prices and assumed a stable ‘‘equilibrium’’ price of h 20. Obligatory purchases of allowances for importers could protect the competitiveness of EU firms when the number of allowances per unit of product would be based on emission-coefficients of the country of origin, but less so if they were based on EU coefficients. If they would be based on ‘‘foreign’’ coefficients, the resulting cost increases for importers would vary substantially across source countries. Our calculations suggest that border adjustment might reduce the sectoral rate of leakage of the steel industry rather forcefully, but that the reduction would be less for the mineral products sector. Our calculations show no offsetting increases in leakage from ‘‘downstream’’ sectors. The reduction of the overall or macro rate of leakage would be modest. So from an environmental point of view border tax adjustments are not very effective but would mainly be justified by considerations of sectoral competitiveness. Above that border tax adjustments give a carbon price signal that helps leading sectors to a low-CO 2 path. Again, the border adjustment measure based on foreign emission-coefficients would offer the largest reduction in leakage, but the more practicalmeasure that would use EU coefficients would offer less. Border adjustment measures based on best available technologies would contribute even less to global emissions reductions.