سیاست های اقتصادی آمریکا در فیلیپین، 1902-1940: بررسی درجه تاریکی در آمار استعماری

This paper presents a detailed estimate of GDP for the Philippines from 1902 to 1940, and analyses factors accounting for changes in growth rates during that era. A crash program in agricultural modernization produced a doubling of rice and corn yields between 1910 and the late 1920s. As a result, the Philippine GDP growth rate in the first two decades outstripped all other nations in East and Southeast Asia. However fiscal constraints appeared by the late 1920s, causing this and other infrastructure projects to be curtailed. An overvalued peso emerged after 1930 and this, alongside a slowdown in productivity caused the rate of Philippine GDP growth to fall behind that of neighboring countries including Japan, Korea and Taiwan. These developments in the later years of the colonial period seriously compromised the transition to economic independence in 1946.

There are only a few economic studies of the American colonial period in the Philippines, often non-quantitative in their treatment and arriving at assessments that are mutually inconsistent (Hartendorp, 1953 and Jenkins, 1954). A major reason is the absence of a consistent quantitative data set covering the main macroeconomic variables prior to independence in 1946. This paper has three objectives. First, to present estimates of real GDP for the period 1902–1940 and link these with published estimates for the post WWarII period (1950–1990), providing a continuous series for most of this century. Second, to analyze growth during the American colonial period, and assess that performance in terms of the macroeconomic policies of the era. Finally, the paper compares GDP growth in the colonial and independence periods with emphasis on the factors accounting for differences in performance.

During the first four decades of the American colonial period real GDP increased at 4.2% per year while per capita GDP grew by 2.2%. During the first two decades of the American period, real GDP growth was much higher – at nearly 6%. Although the growth rate declined after 1930, it remained positive throughout the depression. (2) The single most important factor contributing to this favorable macroeconomic performance was the rise in agricultural productivity in the early years of the American period. Rice and corn yields doubled as a result of a government irrigation program undertaken from 1912 to 1925. Expanded agricultural output raised rural incomes that in turn stimulated growth of industries producing for the domestic market. However, in later years attention turned to other programs, and agricultural yields stagnated after the 1920s at existing levels. (3) Manufacturing grew at 7% annually during the first two decades of the American era. Growth was driven by the expansion of domestic markets based partly on the increase in rural incomes resulting from the rise in crop yields, and also by export expansion. After the 1920s domestic demand growth slowed, the manufacturing growth rate was halved, and industrial expansion shifted further toward processing of primary products for export. Throughout the American period there appears to have been little or no growth of productivity in the industrial sector. (4) A variety of infrastructure programs contributed substantially to economic growth, including construction of a national highway system, port development, railways, along with power and communication. These programs benefited exports and domestic industry, particularly the former. (5) An additional accomplishment of the American colonial administration was its investment in education and public health. The colonial administrators made a special effort to expand investment in human capital. By the close of the colonial period the Philippines had one of the highest literacy rates in Asia, a low mortality rate and a labor force of outstanding quality. (6) While colonial economic policy was successful in producing a superior GDP growth in the pre-WWarII period, it was far less successful in constructing a framework that would insure superior long-term growth. The government never completely solved its fiscal revenue problem, so that government revenues rarely exceeded 7% of GDP. For this reason the momentum of infrastructure expansion in the early years was gradually lost. A currency board arrangement that resulted in an overvalued peso added to the long-term costs of colonial economic policy. These policies, plus the extensive damage to infrastructure during WWarII, left the country in a vulnerable economic position throughout the independence period beginning in 1946. (7) Foreign trade expanded rapidly after 1910, due in part to the passage of the Payne–Aldridge Act that provided for duty-free trade between the Philippines and the U.S. However, passage of this legislation was less effective in increasing foreign trade volume then generally thought, partly because of its impact in diverting trade from Europe (especially Great Britain) and Asia to the U.S. Moreover, part of the increase in exports and the trade balance surplus at this time was due to a steady improvement in export prices and in the terms of trade, developments that have usually been overlooked. (8) Linking the peso to the dollar with a fixed exchange rate provided the Philippines with a stable currency facilitating foreign direct investment. But the fixed rate also created long-term problems. First, the rate adopted in 1902 appears to have been on the high side since the Philippine current account remained in surplus only because of improvement in the terms of trade index from 1902 to 1940. Second, after 1930 all of the other Asian currencies in the region underwent substantial currency depreciation, leaving the peso, by 1940, highly overvalued in terms of Asian currencies. This increased the colony's dependence on U.S. trade precisely at a time when plans were being drawn up to make the economy independent of America. The situation grew even worse after WWarII. The overvalued peso increasingly constrained GDP growth as well as providing implicit support for the import substitution strategy, helping to explain why the country delayed so long in shifting to an export promotion approach. (9) A number of the causes of retardation in macroeconomic growth that surfaced during the latter years of the American period carried over into the independence period that began in 1946. A shortage of infrastructure, inadequate fiscal revenues and stagnant productivity are just a few of the problems with roots in the colonial era. It is hoped that making long-term estimates of GDP available will help clarify perspectives on some of these fundamental growth issues. Had such a database been available earlier, differences on major issues could have been narrowed, better policies designed, and a higher growth rate of GDP realized.