استراتژی های توسعه نوآورانه از حوزه های قضایی جزیره غیر حکومتی؟بررسی جهانی از سیاست های اقتصادی و شیوه های حکومت

The world’s sub-national, island (or mainly island) jurisdictions constitute a timely, valid, and valuable category of political and economic analysis. On the basis of a global, largely inductive, and discriminant analysis, five economic and four political capacities are suggested as being characteristic of the innovative development strategies practised today by various island “autonomies.” Extant “mainland–island relations” can provide insights to other smaller, non-island as well as larger players, beyond the strictures of both economic vulnerability and sovereignty.

“Linked to self-determination, [autonomy] achieves that without the disruption or break up of sovereignty. It defuses political conflict by providing alternative sites of power and patronage. It helps to accommodate sub-national identities, within a national identity, providing a basis for protection of regional cultures and languages. It can lay the foundations for a more pluralistic and democratic order, the development of regional political parties, and a new set of checks and balances. It provides a framework for inter-ethnic bargaining and so converts conflicts into disputes that are susceptible to formal processes. In some ways, it gives political weight to a community which it would not otherwise enjoy… Autonomy is both a way to recognize diversity and to involve all groups in the central state mechanism…[I]t is an extremely flexible instrument, capable of responding to different configurations of ethnic relations.” (Ghai, 2002, pp. 44–45) “Sovereignty rules can be violated in inventive ways.” (Krasner, 2001) The “development” agenda of small island states continues to be gripped by a paradigm of vulnerability, though a recognition of resilience now seems to be sneaking in (e.g., Briguglio and Cordina, 2004 and Briguglio and Kisanga, 2004). Such disarming discourse vindicates the concerns of many observers and scholars about the presumed non-viability of small island polities and economies, expressed both before and after the wave of small state sovereignty took off in the 1960s (Cyprus-1960; Samoa-1962; Malta-1964; Maldives-1965), also propelled by the collapse of the West Indies Federation (starting with the independence of Jamaica in 1962). Independence for the small island territory was deemed extravagant or dangerous (Commonwealth Consultative Group, 1985, Diggines, 1985, Guillebaud, 1976, Harden, 1985, Plischke, 1977 and Wainhouse, 1966) and, more recently, even a recipe for a “failed state” (Kabutaulaka, 2004) or a “security threat” (OAS, 2002). An “aid with dignity” scenario (after Connell, 1988a) has gained ascendancy in the literature, perhaps best represented by the MIRAB acronym—standing for a reactive, sluggish economy totally dependent on four sources of in/direct income: MIgration, which fuels Remittances; and Aid, which maintains a relatively large Bureaucracy ( Bertram, 2006 and Bertram and Watters, 1985). Meanwhile, key players in (usually large) federal states debate nervously why and to what extent obvious differences (or asymmetry) in the size, geography, economic wealth, cultural fabric, or population of their constituent units (regions, states, and provinces) should be translated into asymmetric power, in practice or at law (e.g., in the case of Canada: Dunn, 2005 and Milne, 2005; see Anckar, 2003 for very small federal jurisdictions). Treating the constituent members of the same state differently is often heralded as an incentive for spiraling devolution, fuelling secession, and catalyzing the eventual implosion of the state. Is not this a main explanation behind the heavy handed measures of states which see themselves thus threatened, like Indonesia, Russia or Spain today, or the USA in the early 1860s (e.g., Anderson, 2004, pp. 101–104)? In any case, any resorts to “autonomy,” often by small communities, were looked upon as “…anomalous, annoying or even amusing exceptions” to the sovereignty rule (Stevens, 1977, p. 178). There is, however, a different story to tell, although it has not been as well publicized as the previous two. When wealth is defined in GNP or GDP (at PPP) standards, and in spite of how such statistical tools badly serve islands (EurIsles, 2000), a number of small island territories score exceptionally well. In their analytic critiques, Armstrong et al., 1998, Easterly and Kraay, 2000 and Armstrong and Read, 2002 agree that small (and mainly island) jurisdictions actually perform economically better than larger (mainly continental) states. Comparative research has shown that, on average, non-sovereign island territories tend to be richer per capita than sovereign ones ( Bertram, 2004 and Poirine, 1998). The island citizens of Aruba, Bermuda, French Polynesia and Iceland have been counted amongst the world’s top 10 richest people ( The Economist, 2003). Notably, three of the above four territories are non-sovereign island jurisdictions. Other sub-national island jurisdictions like Åland, Falklands, Jersey, and the Isle of Man seem to be doing equally well. Moreover, most such territories partake of some form of stable asymmetrical federalism (after Stevens, 1977) with(in) a typically larger state. Is the (unexpectedly above average) economic performance of such territories related to their jurisdictional status?

Various, typically large, states are finding it convenient to develop a creative use for usually small, far-flung and remote, island jurisdictions within their orbit, facilitating activities that could be anathema on home ground. The rationale is not uni-directional, however: there are also various plausible reasons for small island territories to aspire to an “arms’ length,” customized relationship with a larger, benevolent, “mainland” patron. Thus, various sub-national island jurisdictions partake of some form of asymmetrical federalism with(in) a larger state. A recognition of the rights of distinct and indigenous people to a level of self-determination also acts to spawn such sub-national, decision-making capacities. This article has only scanned the surface of the comparative analysis of the creative competitiveness strategies and governance practices of sub-national island jurisdictions. Its goal has been primarily to demonstrate the benefits of such a comparison, and to invite others to take the project forward. The article’s rather optimistic and over-sanguine tone also calls for some qualification. Autonomy can have its limits. Managing a steady stream of resources from overseas is not always within the grasp of small island polities. The trans-national dynamics of tourism, finance, or natural resource demands can foster a new, often neo-colonial dependency (De Kadt, 1979 and Hampton, 2004). Jurisdictional power can be, and has been, abused, particularly given the towering role that key individuals play in small polities where role multiplicity (and hence role conflict) is normal, gossip is rife, accusations of nepotism are difficult to avoid, and “everyone knows everyone else” (e.g., Baldacchino, 1997, Crocombe, 1979, Richards, 1982 and Singham, 1968). Betermier (2004, p. 64) has suggested that metropolitan powers actively “choose to retain” territories in line with strategic self-interest. The Ilois, island citizens of the British Indian Ocean Territory, have been summarily removed from their homeland when their presence clashed with superpower strategic interests, a situation unchanged in spite of a decision by a London high court (Harwood, 2002, Pilger, 2004 and Winchester, 2003). St Helena should get an international airport by 2010 (SARTMA, 2005), but this initiative has been pending for almost 25 years. To sum up, claiming that islands are: “… too small, too weak, too defenceless to manage in the modern world” (Royle, 2001, p. 158) and merely “places without power” (Royle, 2001, p. 57) is a tempting assertion … but, I would protest, an incorrect and sweeping one. The evidence is mixed, power is not unilateral, and a case can certainly be made for the creative solutions to difficult economic challenges that some (and not necessarily all) non-sovereign island territories have developed, often as a direct outcome of utilizing the resourcefulness that their jurisdictional status and capacities permit. To echo Lindström (1999), one can today safely speak of a post-sovereign political landscape, where sovereignty is split or divisible. Is it not increasingly relevant to address and acknowledge territories where there is a shared exercise of power (Lindström, 1997, p. 249), and where “sub-nationalism” is not a contradiction in terms but a recipe for political stability, a dignifying compromise between separate statehood/secession and a unitary state (Baldacchino, 2004 and Ghai, 2002)? The practice of asymmetric federalism merits further analysis and recognition by economists and political scientists (Congleton et al., 1999, p. 2). Islands, with their disposition toward administrative independence, and with their proneness toward unique recognition through the geographical coupling of location and small relative size, predominate as “autonomies” within bilateral, “small unit–large unit” relationships. In a future world order, as the explosion of governance outwards, downwards, and sideways gains momentum, island autonomies may perhaps prove no longer to be the quirks and the exceptions of the system but the rule. They will no longer be seen as anomalies, paradoxes of history (e.g., Anderson, 2004) or “inherently problematic” (Aldrich & Connell, 1998, p. 1); but, rather, normalized within an architecture of comfortably overlapping lines of power and authority, parts of a nexus of multiple regional centers of executive capacities (Joenniemi, 2004). Moreover, while the analysis of the category of small island developing states (SIDS) still remains driven by vulnerability considerations, an analysis of the category of sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs) suggests a markedly different set of endowments: when McElroy and Sanborn (2005) compared 16 dependent (read SNIJs) and 19 independent (read SIDS) from the Caribbean and the Pacific, the difference in the results was statistically significant (to 0.025 or 0.001 levels) on no less than 17 out of 25 distinct socio-economic and demographic variables. This warrants the authors to daringly claim that “the dependents … have come to represent a new, successful, insular development case” ( McElroy & Sanborn, 2005, p. 11). The key objective of this article has been to similarly suggest that there is potential in investigating the intricacies of “[d]ecolonizing without disengaging” (Houbert, 1986). Constant’s observation (1992, p. 51) remains valid: “… [T]his strange phenomenon remains little known and is still under-researched ... and it has not yet been adequately theorized.” Analyzing the creative (and in their own way often sustainable) development strategies deployed by, and on, sub-national island jurisdictions could pave the way to such a timely investigation.