تحقیق در اثرات تعادل عمومی از MERCOSUR-مدل جهانی موقتی

A multiregion dynamic computable general equilibrium model is constructed to analyze effects of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) on the member countries as well as third-party nonmember countries. The model is based on intertemporal optimization behaviors of consumers and firms with eight endogenously specified regions. By taking into account dynamic general equilibrium adjustments, we observe significant shifts of trade diversion away from the nonmember trading partners to the member countries. We also find that, following the MERCOSUR's common external tariffication, growth of intraregional trade would likely be accompanied by increases in trade between MERCOSUR and other countries. In this case, not only MERCOSUR member countries gain more, but also the nonmember countries are better off in terms of their production, consumption, and consumer welfare.

There is a growing interest on the economics of formation of customs unions and trade blocs, given the second wave of regional integrations with the emergence of NAFTA, AFTA,1 EU-EFTA,2 MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market including four South American countries), and negotiation on APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Association) in the recent years. Most studies to assess the effects of these regional integration agreement (RIAs) on trade and welfare have generally focused on the participated member countries. Examples are Francois and Shiells (1994) on NAFTA, Mercenier (1995) on EU, Adams and Park (1995) on ASEAN, and Behar (1995) on MERCOSUR. The formation of regional trading blocs, however, will not solely affect trade flows and welfare of the member countries, it will likely substantiate significant trade diversion from the nonmember trading partners and affect nonmember countries' welfare. In this paper, we study such third party spillover effects in the context of a newly created commodity trade bloc, the Southern Common Market, and its previous major trading partners. MERCOSUR was launched by the Treaty of Asuncion signed in March 1991, with the purpose of creating a free trade area and a custom union among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Before that in 1960, countries in South America established the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the largest and most ambitious integration scheme. The failure of LAFTA to attain its main objective, namely, the complete elimination of trade barriers among the member countries, led to its reorganization into a more flexible scheme, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980. The LAIA agreements included provisions for negotiating reductions in tariffs on intraregional trade on a global basis, the regional preferential tariff, but at the same time, they allowed the liberalization of tariff barriers among members on a bilateral basis. An example of the bilateral basis of trade liberalization is provided by the 1988 economic cooperation agreement between the two largest South American countries, Argentina and Brazil, which stipulated the elimination of all barriers to reciprocal trade over a 10-year period. The advancements in economic integration made by these two countries, as well as the importance they have for the entire region compelled Uruguay and Paraguay to join the Argentine–Brazilian trade agreement in March 1991. The new cooperation treaty, the Treaty of Asuncion, was signed by the four countries, and the time schedule for achieving tariff-free trade established by Brazil and Argentina was maintained. At the same time, the countries committed themselves to initiating a process of tariff alignment. The objectives include to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers for trade among member countries and to converge toward a low common external tariff (CET) between zero and 20 percent for third-country imports with some exceptions. The agreement of MERCOSUR represents the nature of the recent RIAs, which is different from earlier wave of postwar RIAs, as it is “more defensive than integrationist in nature, with smaller countries seeking “safe-haven” trade agreement with larger countries” (Srinivasan et al., 1993, p. 52). The newly formed MERCOSUR comprises 200 million people, who generated a GDP of US$670 billion in 1996 and accounted for about 50 percent of Latin American industrial output and total exports. In the period of 1990–94, the value of intra regional trade nearly tripled, from US$4.1 billion to US$10.7 billion. This growth partly reflects the progress made under the trade liberalization program, as well as the gradual elimination of non-tariff restraints on reciprocal trade. As the second largest trading bloc in the western hemisphere after NAFTA, MERCOSUR will not only affect its member countries' economies, but also nonmember countries that have high trade shares with it. Discussion of welfare and trade effects of custom unions has been one of the staples of trade theorists over the postwar years.3 The seminal contribution to the literature on the effects of RIAs is that of Viner (1950). He distinguishes between the effects of trade creation in which trade between partner countries expands in accordance with international comparative advantage, and trade diversion in which trade between countries expands as a result of the preferential treatment given to imports from within the region as compared to those from the rest of world. While this categorization is a useful description of the effects of customs–union formation, it is inappropriate as a basis for measuring the welfare effects of a RIA. In this paper we employ a global model to analyze both trade effects and welfare effects of MERCOSUR on the member countries, and on the nonmember trading regions alike. The welfare effects are not only measured by changes in trade, but also by other macroeconomic indicators. Previous CGE modeling work on regional integration and trade reform has been generally done within a static framework. Gains from trade in static models stem from the increased efficiency of resource allocation and improved consumption possibilities. However, such traditional CGE analysis fails to account for the positive relationship between trade, investment, and growth, a linkage that is fairly well established empirically and theoretically. On the later, neoclassical growth theory suggests the potential for a medium-run growth or accumulation effect through induced changes in savings and investment patterns. But, the incorporation of saving and investment decisions by way of “fixed” parameters and ad hoc “closure” roles in the traditional CGE approaches often led to nonrobust policy results with arbitrary dependence on modeling specification Devarajan and Go 1995 and Srinivasan 1982. In the current model, we incorporate explicit intertemporal optimizing behavior on the part of rational agents and explore the interaction between trade policy and capital accumulation in a multisector, miltiregion setting. As expected, we are able to investigate dynamic gains or losses in production or welfare. Our model draws in many ways upon the recent contributions of dynamic CGE modeling by Ho (1989), McKibbin (1993), Mercenier and Sampaı̈o de Souza (1994), Mercenier (1995), and Go (1994). We utilize the model to simulate both the short-run (upon impact) and the medium-run, interregional transitional dynamic effects of trade reforms in the context of a global economy. We base our simulation experiments on the recent version of the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP).4 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the structure of the model. In Section 3, we analyze the dynamic effects of alternative MERCOSUR tariff reform scenarios on MERCOSUR member countries, and as well as on the third-party trading partners. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the conclusions.

In this paper we employ a dynamic global general equilibrium model to analyze trade effects and welfare effects of MERCOSUR on both its member countries and as well as on the nonmember trading regions. The model is global in the sense that all regions, including the rest of world, are fully endogenous. The model is characterized by the nature of dynamics in the sense that we incorporate explicit intertemporal optimizing behavior of consumption, savings, and investment for the agents in each region. The simulation results indicate that the regional trade agreement raises MERCOSUR member countries' welfare by stimulating their investment, production, and consumption. While trade opportunities of the member countries increase, growth of intraregional trade is much faster than that of the total trade for the member countries. Furthermore, lowering MERCOSUR common external tariff for third-country import allows MERCOSUR member countries to benefit more from their trade agreement than that if they only eliminated their internal tariffs. In this case, the member countries' real GDP grows more and their welfare gains more. Also the total exports increases more, and the fast growth of their intra regional trade is accompanied by the increases in trade with their major third-country trading partners. The negative spillover effects on the third-country trading partners are observed in terms of third-country's investment, consumer welfare, and national products, when MERCOSUR only carries out internal trade reforms. However, as trade with MERCOSUR has a relative small share with respect to the large third-region's total trade, such negative effects are small. If trade agreements only involve trade liberalization among the member countries, for a large trade bloc, such as NAFTA or EU, we would expect relatively greater negative spillover effects on the third party. Furthermore, the perspectives of emerging large trade blocs or regional integration agreements, such as APEC or WHFTA, makes the results obtained in this study from MERCOSUR internal zero-tariff policy simulation relatively important for policy analysis. Third-countries benefit when MERCOSUR reduces its common external tariff rates. Production, consumption, and trade opportunities rise, and consumer welfare improves in the nonmember countries. If MERCOSUR countries can further reduce their external trade protection rates, both member and nonmember trading partners would be expected to benefit more. However, MERCOSUR's further trade policy reform calls for a reciprocal action between MERCOSUR and nonmember trading partners. Hence, if regional integration can stimulate further international cooperation and multilateral trade liberalization, then a more conducive economic environment for all countries can be anticipated. Brooke Kendrick Meeraus 198812