شخصیت، تفکر خلاف و واکنش پذیری هیجانی منفی
کد مقاله | سال انتشار | تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی |
---|---|---|
39106 | 2014 | 8 صفحه PDF |
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Psychology of Sport and Exercise, Volume 15, Issue 2, March 2014, Pages 147–154
چکیده انگلیسی
Abstract Objectives People differ substantially in their emotional responses to negative stimuli. Separate lines of research have reported that individual differences and mental simulations contribute to emotional symptoms. Here, we explore the independent and interrelated contribution of personality traits and counterfactual thoughts to the intensity, duration, and overproduction of negative emotions. Method A sample of mixed-level athletes (n = 243) completed questionnaire assessments in relation to their most recent unsuccessful competition. Results We found that personality dimensions (extraversion, neuroticism, and openness) relate to the direction and magnitude of person counterfactuals. We also found that personality dimensions (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, and agreeableness) and the direction of counterfactual thoughts (upward or downward) relate to the intensity, duration, and/or overproduction of negative emotions. Lastly, we found that personality and counterfactual thoughts had independent rather than interrelated contributions to the experience of unpleasant emotions. Conclusions These findings carry important theoretical and practical implications with regard to identifying individuals susceptible to experiencing elevated emotional symptoms in response to short-term stressors.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Results Table 1 provides descriptive data and correlations among study variables. Consistent with past observations, mean scores on extraversion appeared higher, and conscientiousness somewhat lower, than what is typically observed in normative (non-athletic) populations (Allen, Greenlees, & Jones, 2013). Also consistent with past observations (Roese, 1997) participants reported a greater occurrence of upward counterfactual thoughts (M = 4.25, SD = 1.02) than downward counterfactual thoughts (M = 2.07, SD = 1.07), t(240) = 20.40, p < .01, d = 2.09. Table 1. Descriptive data and correlations for all measured variables. M SD Skew 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Personality 1. Neuroticism 21.11 7.78 0.18 – 2. Extraversion 31.66 5.77 −0.35 −.25** – 3. Openness 23.66 5.09 0.24 −.06 −.03 – 4. Agreeableness 29.68 5.24 −0.23 −.16* .29** .07 – 5. Conscientiousness 30.99 6.04 −0.06 −.24** .17** .03 .12 – Counterfactual thoughts 6. Upward (state) counterfactuals 4.25 1.02 −1.59 −.07 .21** −.07 .13 .05 – 7. Downward (state) counterfactuals 2.07 1.07 0.81 .15* .13* −.04 .05 .05 −.26** – 8. Non-referent downward 10.31 3.10 0.20 .09 .08 −.03 .08 .03 −.03 .54** – 9. Other-referent upward 10.29 3.37 −0.08 .11 −.09 −.27** −.11 −.05 .06 −.08 .03 – 10. Self-referent upward 12.10 2.74 −0.19 .22** −.04 −.22** .00 −.16* .23** −.07 .10 .24** – 11. Non-referent upward 12.89 2.96 −0.12 .24** −.03 −.16** −.07 −.05 .36** −.17** −.03 .19** .57** – Emotions 12. Emotion overproduction 4.09 1.23 −0.12 .18** −.15* −.08 −.09 −.11 .15* −.04 −.04 .17* .32** .31** – 13. Emotion intensity 9.24 3.52 0.16 .15* −.14* −.17* −.14* −.11 .23** −.19** −.14* .20** .33** .44** .84** – 14. Emotion duration 8.10 3.27 0.44 .15* −.14* −.09 −.11 −.07 .16* −.19** −.18** .11 .30** .38** .77** .82** Note: Personality scores could range from zero to 48, state counterfactual scores could range from one to seven, trait counterfactual scores could range from four to 20, emotional overproduction could range from zero to six, and emotion intensity and duration could range from zero to 24. *p < .05, **p < .01 (two-tailed). Table options Personality and counterfactual thinking To explore the contribution of personality to counterfactual thoughts, dimensions of personality were regressed on state and trait dimensions of person counterfactuals. For state measures, there was a significant effect for extraversion (β = .18, p < .01) on upward counterfactuals (R2 = .05, p < .05), and for extraversion (β = .16, p < .05) and neuroticism (β = .20, p < .01) on downward counterfactuals (R2 = .06, p < .05). The positive regression coefficients indicate that greater levels of emotional instability were linked to a greater occurrence of thoughts about how things could have gone worse, and greater levels of extraversion were linked to a greater occurrence of thoughts about how things could have gone better or worse. A sensitivity analysis, involving the removal of two and five potential outliers (Cook's values > .05) produced a similar pattern of results. For trait measures, there was a significant effect for openness (β = −.26, p < .01) on other-referent upward counterfactuals (R2 = .09, p < .01), for openness (β = −.21, p < .01) and neuroticism (β = .20, p < .01) on self-referent upward counterfactuals (R2 = .11, p < .01), and for openness (β = −.14, p < .05) and neuroticism (β = .24, p < .01) on non-referent upward counterfactuals (R2 = .08, p < .01). The removal of two potential outliers (Cook's values > .05) also showed a significant effect for conscientiousness (β = −.15, p < .05) on self-referent upward counterfactuals, with openness and neuroticism effects remaining unchanged. The direction of the regression coefficients indicate that greater levels of emotional instability and lower levels of openness were linked to a greater occurrence of thoughts about how others, personal factors, and situational factors could have improved outcomes. Lower levels of conscientiousness also linked to a greater occurrence of thoughts about how personal factors could have improved outcomes when multivariate outliers were removed from the data set. Personality and emotions Similar regression models were used to explore the contribution of personality traits to emotion facets. When dimensions of personality were entered simultaneously, the overall regression models were significant for emotion intensity (R2 = .07, p < .01), emotion overproduction (R2 = .06, p < .05), but not emotion duration (R2 = .05, p = .076). However, observation of individual regression coefficients showed a significant effect for openness on emotion intensity only (β = −.15, p < .05). Sensitivity analyses produced a similar pattern of results. When explored independently, neuroticism correlated positively with emotion intensity (r = .15, p < .05), duration (r = .15, p < .05), and overproduction (r = .18, p < .01); extraversion correlated negatively with emotion intensity (r = −.14, p < .05), duration (r = −.14, p < .05), and overproduction (r = −.15, p < .05); and openness (r = −.17, p < .05) and agreeableness (r = −.14, p < .05) correlated negatively with emotion intensity ( Table 1). Emotions and counterfactual thinking To explore the contribution of counterfactual thinking to athlete emotions, state and trait counterfactuals were regressed (in independent analyses) on emotion facets. For state measures, there was a significant effect for both upward (β = .19, p < .01) and downward (β = −.14, p < .05) counterfactuals on emotion intensity (R2 = .07, p < .01), for downward counterfactuals (β = −.15, p < .05) on emotion duration (R2 = .05, p < .01), and for upward counterfactuals (β = .15, p < .05) on emotion overproduction (R2 = .02, p = .096). The removal of three potential outliers (Cook's values > .05) showed significant effects for both upward (β = .18, p < .01) and downward (β = −.18, p < .01) counterfactuals on emotion duration (R2 = .08, p < .01). The removal of two potential outliers (Cook's values > .05) for emotion overproduction produced a similar pattern of results, but also produced a significant overall regression model (R2 = .04, p < .05). For trait measures, there was a significant effect for both non-referent downward (β = −.13, p < .05) and non-referent upward (β = .34, p < .01) counterfactuals on emotion intensity (R2 = .23, p < .01); for non-referent downward (β = −.18, p < .01), self-referent upward (β = .16, p < .05) and non-referent upward (β = .27, p < .01) on emotion duration (R2 = .19, p < .01); and for self-referent upward (β = .22, p < .01) and non-referent upward (β = .17, p < .05) on emotion overproduction (R2 = .14, p < .01). These data patterns indicate that people who more frequently have thoughts about how personal or situational factors could have improved outcomes (and less frequently have thoughts about how situational factors could have worsened outcomes) reported more intense, longer duration, and an overproduction of negative emotions. The removal of one potential outlier in each analysis produced a similar pattern of results. Moderation To explore potential moderating effects, we computed interaction terms from standardised data (main effects) and variables were entered into regression models in sequential steps. Emotions (intensity, duration, and overproduction) were regressed on upward (state) counterfactual thoughts (Step 1), the five personality dimensions (Step 2), and the product of these terms (Step 3). For emotion intensity, significant effects were observed at Step 1 (R2 = .05, p < .01) for upward counterfactuals (β = .23, p < .01) and at Step 2 (ΔR2 = .08, p < .01) for extraversion (β = −.14, p < .05) and openness (β = −.13, p < .05) with no significant interaction effects at Step 3 (ΔR2 = .02, p = .49). For emotion duration, significant effects were again observed at Step 1 (R2 = .03, p < .05) and at Step 2 (ΔR2 = .05, p < .05) with no significant interaction effects at Step 3 (ΔR2 = .01, p = .70). For emotion overproduction, significant effects were observed at Step 1 (R2 = .02, p < .05) and at Step 2 (ΔR2 = .06, p < .05) with no significant interaction effects at Step 3 (ΔR2 = .01, p = .72). Sensitivity analyses, involving the removal of one, two and two cases respectively (Cook's values > .05) produced a similar pattern of results. These analyses were then re-run with downward (state) counterfactuals in place of upward counterfactuals. For emotion intensity, significant effects were observed at Step 1 (R2 = .04, p < .01) for downward counterfactuals (β = −.19, p < .01) and at Step 2 (ΔR2 = .08, p < .01) for openness (β = −.16, p < .05) with no significant interaction effects at Step 3 (ΔR2 = .01, p = .70). For emotion duration, significant effects were observed at Step 1 (R2 = .03, p < .01) for downward counterfactuals (β = −.19, p < .01) and at Step 2 (ΔR2 = .05, p < .05) for neuroticism (β = .14, p < .05) with no significant interaction effects at Step 3 (ΔR2 = .02, p = .44). For emotion overproduction, a significant effect was shown at Step 2 (ΔR2 = .06, p < .05) for neuroticism (β = .15, p < .05), with no significant effects at Step 1 (R2 = .00, p = .52) or Step 3 (ΔR2 = .01, p = .72). Sensitivity analyses, involving the removal of zero, four and four cases respectively (Cook's values > .05) produced a similar pattern of results. Taken together, these findings show that the relationship between counterfactual thoughts and emotions is not moderated by personality traits. Mediation Potential mediating effects were explored for personality dimensions that correlated with both state counterfactuals and emotions. Only extraversion and neuroticism dimensions satisfied these criteria. A significant correlation was observed between extraversion and emotion intensity (β = −.14, p < .05) and between extraversion and upward counterfactuals (β = .21, p < .01). In a regression model with emotion intensity set as the criterion variable and upward counterfactuals entered at Step 1 and extraversion at Step 2, we found that upward counterfactuals (the mediator) correlated with emotion intensity (β = .23, p < .01) and remained significant with the inclusion of extraversion (β = .26, p < .01). However, in this last step the relationship between extraversion and emotion intensity remained unchanged (β = −.19, p < .01) indicating no significant mediation effect. When the analysis was re-run for emotion duration and emotion overproduction a similar pattern of results was observed (no significant mediation effect). For downward (state) counterfactuals, significant correlations were observed for both extraversion (β = .13, p < .05) and neuroticism (β = .15, p < .05). In a regression model with emotion intensity set as the criterion variable and downward counterfactuals entered at Step 1 and extraversion at Step 2, we found that downward counterfactuals (the mediator) correlated with emotion intensity (β = .19, p < .01) and remained significant with the inclusion of extraversion (β = .18, p < .01). In this last step the relationship between extraversion and emotion intensity remained unchanged (β = .12, p = .06) indicating no significant mediation effect. In a similar model, with neuroticism included in place of extraversion, we found that downward counterfactuals correlated with emotion intensity (β = −.19, p < .01) and remained significant with the inclusion of neuroticism (β = −.22, p < .01). In this last step the relationship between neuroticism and emotion intensity remained unchanged (β = .18, p < .01) indicating no significant mediation effect. When these analyses were re-run for emotion duration and emotion overproduction a similar pattern of results was observed. Taken together, these findings show that the relationship between personality traits and emotional reactivity is not mediated by counterfactual thinking.