منابع رفتار انحرافی: توضیحات متناوب در آزمایشگاه

We explore the driving factors behind deviant behavior by contrasting three theoretical frameworks: stable preference for deviant behavior, impact from social history on pro-social behaviors, and contingent cooperation with social norms. Subjects in our experiment first play a repeated Trust Game to create social histories in the laboratory, before engaging in a Common Resource Game, to measure deviant behavior. The results suggest that social history is an important determinant. Those who experienced deterioration in the evolution of play were more likely to extract large amounts from the common resource. We also document that anticipated social norms in the Trust Game explain extraction in the Common Resource Game, independently from the observed outcomes and the anticipated norms of deviance. This suggests an under-adjustment in behavior to changes in norms. The findings do not support a stable preference for deviant behavior. Thus, our results suggest policy, intended to counteract social history and influence social norms, may be more effective than sanctions in combating deviant behavior.