Three experiments examined generation, recognition, and response bias in the original encoding-specificity paradigm using the type 2 signal-detection analysis advocated by Higham (2002). Experiments 1 (pure-list design) and 2 (mixed-list design) indicated that some guidance regarding the strength of the associative relationship between the test cue and target greatly improved strong-cue target production relative to no guidance, and that this effect was attributable to improved generation, as well as recognition. Problems with generating candidates for response during standard cued recall was further shown in Experiment 3, where despite having the opportunity to provide multiple responses for each cue, participants’ ability to produce the targets remained poor. The results are discussed in terms of traditional and modern generate-recognize theory, metacognition, and dual-route models of recall.
Since Tulving and colleagues introduced the encoding specificity principle in the early 1970s (e.g., Thomson & Tulving, 1970; Tulving & Thomson, 1973), most students of memory have viewed generate-recognize theory as a straw man. It is considered by many to be an old-fashioned theory, with a particular failing when it comes to explaining context reinstatement effects in cued recall. In this paper, we revisit both generate-recognize theory and the classic cued-recall paradigm that provided the initial support for the encoding-specificity principle. However, let us be clear at the outset that we are not attempting to resurrect traditional generate-recognize theory. Indeed, as will become apparent, the data from the experiments that we report are quite inconsistent with those early models, and, if anything, they support many aspects of Tulving’s message. On the other hand, we will argue that a more modern generate-recognize model of cued recall that maintains the crucial distinction between memory access (generation) and metacognitive monitoring (recognition) processes is still a useful framework for cued-recall performance, and performance on many other tasks as well. In this way, our message is similar to that of other metacognitive researchers who have promoted two-stage models involving separate stages of access and memory monitoring (e.g., Barnes, Nelson, Dunlosky, Mazzoni, & Narens, 1999; Goldsmith, Koriat, & Weinberg-Eliezer, 2002; Higham, 2002; Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003; Klatzky & Erdelyi, 1985; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Before describing our unique method of analyzing the underlying generation and recognition processes, we will first review the traditional generate-recognize models, and some of their variants.
