This paper aims at highlighting the importance for learning of one of the facets of metacognition, namely metacognitive experiences (ME) that comprise feelings, judgments or estimates, and online task-specific knowledge. The emphasis is on the affective character of ME, which has received little attention in the past. Unlike online task-specific knowledge, which is conscious and analytic, the other ME are products of nonconscious, nonanalytic inferential processes. Because of their nature, ME can trigger either rapid, nonconscious control decisions or conscious analytic ones. However, ME can make use of both the affective and the cognitive regulatory loops, and this has a series of implications for learning. Evidence is presented regarding the relations of ME with affect and cognition, and the implications of the lack of accuracy of ME for the self-regulation of learning. Particular emphasis is given on judgment of learning, feeling of difficulty, and feeling of confidence. The challenges for future research on metacognition are underscored.
The title of this article refers to two distinct categories of psychological phenomena, namely metacognition and affect, and their effect on the learning process. The term “metacognition” is used to denote cognition of cognition ( Flavell, 1979), whereas “affect” is a generic term for emotions and other mental states that have the quality of pleasant-unpleasant, such as feelings, mood, motives, or aspects of the self, e.g., self-esteem ( Forgas, 1994). The relation of metacognition with learning was first posited by Flavell (1979) and, since then, there is growing research evidence that qualifies this relationship. Affect is also related to learning, as extant research on emotions has shown ( Efklides & Volet, 2005; Pekrun, Goetz, Titz, & Perry, 2002). However, most of the studies focus either on metacognition or on affect, independently from each other.
The emphasis of this article is different. It is on one of the facets of metacognition, namely, on metacognitive experiences (ME; Efklides, 2001 and Flavell, 1979), which have received little attention as regards their implications for the learning process—that is, from the moment the person comes across a learning task to its end. What I shall try to show is that ME and, especially, metacognitive feelings ( Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2000), have a dual character, that is, a cognitive and an affective one. This dual character gives them access to the respective regulatory loops that involve different processes for the self-regulation of behavior. Also, this dual character renders ME different from other facets of metacognition or from affect and, therefore, their study can lighten learning behaviors that were difficult to explain up to now.
In what follows I shall refer, first, to metacognition and its various facets; second, to metacognitive experiences and their conceptualization; third, to the relations of metacognitive experiences with affect, and fourth, to the implications of the functioning of ME for learning.
As we mentioned in the introductory section, the aim of this article was to bring to the fore ME, particularly metacognitive feelings, which have a distinct characteristic, namely the connection with both the cognitive and affective regulatory loops. The affective nature of ME has not been widely recognized up to now, but a growing body of research evidence in neuropsychology of metacognition and in self-regulation supports such a notion (Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, 1998). Thus, metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments are products of nonconscious, nonanalytic inferential processes and lead to nonconscious rapid control decisions (Reder & Schunn, 1996) that can be mediated by affective processes, or to conscious, explicit decisions (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2000) based on analytical processes. Also, ME are transitory and highly sensitive to person, task, situation and context effects, rendering them highly variable. As a consequence, the information they convey is not always accurate, or may go unnoticed or, even, be misinterpreted. This implies that one has to ‘learn’ the meaning of his/her ME and understand the conditions that give rise to them if s/he is to be in charge of his/her cognition. This assumption does not mean that the use of the affective or the cognitive regulatory mode, in exclusion of the other, leads to better learning outcomes than the use of both. Both regulatory modes have positive and negative implications for learning. It is evident that more research is needed in this regard.
A key concept in ME research that may help our understanding of their functioning is calibration. It seems that increased knowledge and expertise in a domain lead to better calibration of the ME. We should bear in mind, however, that personality factors as well as social factors, in the form of extrinsic feedback, collaborative interaction, or even simple exposure to information about other people's performance and affect (de Carvalho Filho & Yuzawa, 2001) influence the calibration process.
Finally, we should be aware of the benefits or pitfalls of metacognition. As Paris (2002) pointed out, metacognition can be helpful, benign, or debilitating. Research on ME supports this contention and provides evidence on the mechanism responsible, at least, for some of these effects. However, more research is needed in this direction and, particularly, on the role of instruction and of others in the regulation of the person's ME and behavior. Shared-metacognition as well as social processes involved in metacognition are of paramount importance in this respect.
