حق تعیین سرنوشت و عواقب ناشی از مقایسه اجتماعی

Abstract The present research examined the consequences of social comparison as a function of individual differences in self-determination. Competing hypotheses were made regarding whether the effects of social comparison would be determined more by the tendency toward pressure and ego-defensiveness (higher controlled orientation), by the absence of choice and unconditional positive self-regard (lower autonomy orientation), or both. A forced comparison was created in which 79 college students completed a word finding task and received feedback about their performance along with that of a better or worse performing confederate. Autonomy orientation moderated comparison consequences such that less autonomous individuals experienced increased negative changes in affect and decreased self-esteem when paired with a better performing other. This was especially true, for affect, when participants had been told that the task was related to intelligence. Results provide preliminary support for integration of self-determination and social comparison theories.

1. Introduction Both self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985b, Deci and Ryan, 1987, Deci and Ryan, 1991 and Deci and Ryan, 2000) and social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) address how one’s performance, in combination with feedback from one’s environment, impacts the self. Given the amount of attention that has been devoted to each of these theories, it is somewhat surprising that previous empirical work has not directly addressed the conceptual overlap between these theoretical traditions. The present research represents an initial step toward this objective by examining the consequences of social comparison as a function of individual differences in self-determination. Self-determination theory focuses on motivations and intentions for engaging in behavior and assumes that individuals have innate psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci and Ryan, 1985b and Deci and Ryan, 2000). From this perspective, motivation is viewed as multifaceted rather than as a unidimensional quality. For example, while one individual may be motivated to engage in an activity out of interest or because the activity is personally valued, another individual may be equally motivated to engage in the same activity to procure a reward, avoid punishment or rejection, or as an attempt to live up to perceived expectations. Individual differences in self-determination are thought to emerge over time as a function of individual predispositions combined with exposure to factors in the environment that serve to either control behavior or support autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1985b). Environmental factors that typically result in positive emotional consequences and more self-determined motivation include provision of choice (Swann & Pittman, 1977; Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, & Deci, 1978), and support of autonomy (Deci, Nezlek, & Sheinman, 1981a; Deci, Schwartz, Sheinman, & Ryan, 1981b). In contrast, controlling factors such as rewards (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999), threats and deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 1976), surveillance (Lepper & Greene, 1975; Plant & Ryan, 1985), and evaluation (Benware & Deci, 1984; Harackiewicz, Manderlink, & Sansone, 1984) typically result in reduced self-determination. Ryan (1982), for example, found that manipulating the salience of evaluative implications for task performance by telling some students that the task was related to intelligence subsequently reduced their intrinsic motivation for the task. 1.1. Causality orientations Individual differences in self-determination have frequently been examined by assessing causality orientations (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Causality orientations have been described as three general motivational orientations: autonomy orientation, controlled orientation,1 and impersonal orientation. The autonomy and controlled orientations are both positively associated with level of motivation. Being higher on either of these indicates more motivation, although they differ distinctly in quality. The impersonal orientation focuses on a relative absence or lack of motivation and was not of interest in the present study. While autonomy and controlled orientations each address independent aspects of self-determination, autonomy can generally be thought of as a positive indicator of self-determination whereas controlled orientation can be thought of as a negative indicator of self-determination. The autonomy orientation involves the experience of choice and is theoretically associated with a more integrated, non-contingency-based sense of self. Thus, more autonomous individuals are thought to perceive performance feedback as useful information rather than as a potentially ego-threatening indicator of self-worth (Deci and Ryan, 1987 and Deci and Ryan, 1991; Koestner & Zuckerman, 1994). Autonomy-oriented individuals are assumed to seek out behaviors based on the awareness of needs and goals consistent with the integrated self-concept and to seek situations that allow behavioral choices. Autonomy is associated with more openness to information (Hodgins & Knee, 2002) and has been associated with less self-derogation (Deci & Ryan, 1985a), better emotional health, vitality, and well being (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Rosco, & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). The autonomy orientation has been found to be positively related to self-actualization, supporting autonomy in children, private self-consciousness, ego-development, interest, and self-esteem; and negatively related to self-derogation, hostility, guilt (Deci & Ryan, 1985a), and boredom proneness (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). Thus, autonomous individuals tend to be growth-oriented and maintain stable, favorable, and non-contingent self-views. At the same time, these individuals are more supportive in fostering these traits in others. In contrast, the controlled orientation is associated with experiencing a lack of true choice and with regulating behaviors based on pressures and contingencies either in the environment or within the individual (Deci and Ryan, 1985a, Deci and Ryan, 1985b, Deci and Ryan, 1987 and Deci and Ryan, 1991). Environmental controls include contingencies (e.g., rewards or punishments for specific behaviors), rigid direction of behavior, and salient evaluative contexts. Internal controls are experienced as internal pressures to behave in a particular way (e.g., feeling that one should, ought, or must behave in a certain way based on feelings of guilt, obligation, or perceived expectations). Controlled individuals chronically perceive pressures from the environment and tend to react in an ego-defensive manner (Hodgins & Knee, 2002). Thus, individuals who are more autonomous tend to regulate their behaviors according to interests, values, and choice. Individuals who are more controlled tend to regulate their behaviors according to pressures, contingencies, and perceived expectations. As discussed by Deci and Ryan, 1985b and Deci and Ryan, 1991 these constructs are distinct from seemingly related constructs such as locus of control (Rotter, 1966) and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). The autonomy orientation is distinct from self-efficacy, which refers to the degree to which individuals believe they can obtain some outcome (Deci & Ryan, 1991). A student may be high in self-efficacy, believing that he or she can achieve good grades, while being low in autonomy orientation, to the extent that his/her desire for good grades is motivated by factors other than interest, enjoyment, or self-improvement. Similarly, a student may be high in self-efficacy and high in controlled orientation, to the extent that a desire for good grades is driven by controlling factors like monetary rewards or social approval. Locus of control refers to perceived behavior-outcome dependence. Internals believe that their behavior is reliably associated with outcomes whereas externals believe that outcomes are relatively independent of behavior. External locus of control is moderately correlated with controlled orientation (r=.29, Deci & Ryan, 1985a) but these constructs are far from equivalent. The moderate relationship is probably due in part to a greater tendency for controlled individuals to defensively attribute negative outcomes to external causes ( Knee & Zuckerman, 1996). Extending the example above, a student who attributes good grades to internal causes (e.g., effort and/or ability) might be motivated to obtain them either by autonomous (e.g., interest) or controlling (e.g., perceived expectations of parents) factors. 1.2. Causality orientations and esteem-maintenance processes Research has shown that individual differences in self-determination moderate many esteem-related social processes including impression management (Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996b), defensiveness in social interactions (Hodgins, Koestner, & Duncan, 1996a), peer pressure (Knee & Neighbors, 2002), self-serving bias (Knee & Zuckerman, 1996), defensive coping and self-handicapping (Knee & Zuckerman, 1998), and ego-defensive and aggressive reactions in driving situations (Knee, Neighbors, & Vietor, 2001; Neighbors, Vietor, & Knee, 2002). In examining the relationship between self-determination and impression management, Hodgins et al. (1996b) focused on the extent to which individuals would choose between defending their own face, or social identity, versus helping to repair another person’s face. Participants who were higher in controlled orientation were more likely to choose the ego-defensive route by repairing their own face. Autonomous participants, on the other hand, focused more on helping to repair damage to another person’s face versus repairing their own. In addition, controlled individuals told more lies in response to face threat than did autonomy-oriented individuals. Elsewhere, autonomy has been associated with honesty and openness in social interactions, whereas controlled orientation has been associated with defensiveness in social interactions (Hodgins et al., 1996a). With regard to specific esteem-maintenance strategies, causality orientations have been found to moderate self-serving bias (Knee & Zuckerman, 1996), defensive coping, and self-handicapping (Knee & Zuckerman, 1998). Knee and Zuckerman (1996) found that individuals who were both higher in autonomy and lower in controlled orientation (self-determined) did not make self-serving attributions as a function of their performance. These self-determined individuals made similar attributions after success and failure. In contrast, all other individuals took more responsibility for success than failure, thus engaging in self-serving bias. Consistent with these findings, Knee and Zuckerman (1998) found that individuals who were both higher in autonomy and lower in controlled orientation exhibited lower levels of defensive coping, especially denial, compared to all other individuals. In addition, these same individuals exhibited lower levels of self-handicapping than all other participants. The latter finding is consistent with earlier research which showed that controlled orientation was positively related to ratings of importance for achievement on a task but negatively related to reported effort on the task (Deci & Ryan, 1985b). Further evidence of the relation between esteem-maintenance and motivational orientations comes from Koestner and Zuckerman’s (1994) examination of the relationship between motivational orientations and Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) social cognitive theory of achievement. Autonomous students tended to adopt learning goals whereas controlled students were more likely to adopt performance goals. In addition, performance on an achievement task was unrelated to persistence among autonomous individuals. In contrast, controlled individuals showed increased persistence following failure feedback. Presumably, controlled participants perceived the failure feedback as a threat to self-esteem and responded with persistence in hopes of repairing their self-image. In contrast, participants who were high in autonomy orientation felt no threat to self-esteem and no subsequent need to persist in response to failure feedback. Thus, research has shown that both autonomy and controlled orientations influence how individuals perceive, interpret, and react to potentially ego-threatening information. However, no research has yet explicitly examined this in the context of social comparison. One of the central features in social comparison research has been the distinction between comparisons with others who are of higher standing on some dimension (upward comparison) versus comparisons with others who are worse off in some way (downward comparison). The traditional (“neo-classic”) assumption suggested a negative relationship between comparison direction and affect, with downward comparisons resulting in positive consequences to the self and upward comparisons resulting in negative consequences (Suls & Wheeler, 2002). Accordingly, comparing oneself with a person of lower standing can be ego-bolstering, whereas comparison with a higher standing other is presumably ego-threatening. In recent years, researchers have revealed that the consequences of social comparison cannot be inferred from direction alone and in fact “either direction has its ups and downs” (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990; Collins, 1996). These researchers and others have argued that the direction of comparison may be less important than the underlying motivation for the comparison (e.g., self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and self-improvement) and the way in which the information is construed. 1.3. Overview and hypotheses The present study was designed to examine the relationships among self-determination and social comparison processes in a controlled laboratory setting. This study focused on the affective and esteem-related consequences of social comparison. Of specific interest were the influence of one’s own performance and the influence of a comparison target’s performance (relative to one’s own) on affect and state self-esteem. We expected, consistent with the traditional view, that a comparison target’s performance, relative to one’s own, would be negatively related to changes in subjective well being. Thus, we predicted that better performances by comparison targets would lead to decrements in self-esteem and increased negative affect whereas worse performances by comparison targets would lead to positive changes in subjective well-being. We also predicted that one’s own performance would have an independent effect on subjective well being. Individuals performing better on a task were expected to feel better about themselves than those doing poorly, regardless of the comparison target’s performance. In predicting the impact of causality orientations on the relationship between a comparison target’s performance and subjective well-being, we held competing hypotheses, given that autonomy and controlled orientations are independent (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Because controlled orientation is associated with pressure and defensiveness, one might expect that being higher in controlled orientation would accentuate the effects of doing relatively better or worse than a comparison target. One might alternatively expect, because autonomy is associated with choice and unconditional positive regard, that being lower in autonomy would accentuate the effects of social comparison. The resulting question was whether the effects of social comparison are determined more by the tendency toward pressure and ego-defensiveness (controlled orientation), by the absence of choices and unconditional positive regard (autonomy orientation), or both. We were also interested in examining whether manipulating ego-involvement by varying the evaluative implications of the task would impact the relationship between self-determination and social comparison consequences. Specifically, we expected that the differential impact of a comparison target’s performance on subjective well-being as a function of autonomy and/or controlled orientations would be more extreme when evaluative implications of task performance were salient. Finally, we wished to provide discriminant validity. Self-determination shares conceptual overlap with other constructs that are presumably relevant to social comparison. The most obvious of these is trait self-esteem which is associated with greater autonomy (Deci and Ryan, 1985a and Deci and Ryan, 1985b; Knee & Neighbors, 2002) and has been discussed and examined in relation to social comparison far more than any other individual difference (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Wheeler, 2002; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wills, 1991). In addition, self-esteem has been viewed by some as a key moderator of ego-involvement (e.g., Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). It is therefore important to demonstrate that consequences of social comparison related to self-determination are not duplicated and/or accounted for by trait self-esteem. In addition, social anxiety is associated with motivation, construal, and evaluation in social interactions (Schlenker & Leary, 1982) and was also considered in evaluating discriminant validity.

3. Results 3.1. Preliminary analyses Table 1 presents means and standard deviations of pre- and post-affect and performance state self-esteem scores by comparison condition. Overall, outperforming the confederate was associated with increased positive affect and state self-esteem whereas being outperformed had no overall impact on affect or state self-esteem. Table 1. Changes in affect and performance state self-esteem Baseline Post-comparison Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Affect Upward comparison group 5.66 (.87) 5.71 (.80) Downward comparison group 5.67 (.87) 5.91 (.80)*** Performance state self-esteem Upward comparison group 3.77 (.73) 3.78 (.62) Downward comparison group 3.89 (.73) 4.09 (.62)*** Note. Affect was coded such that higher scores represent more positive affect.***p<.001. Between group differences were apparent only for post-comparison state self-esteem, t(77)=2.16, p<.05. Table options 3.1.1. Perceptions of performance Recall that after the task was completed but before feedback was delivered, participants were asked the extent to which they believed the task was indicative of intelligence and how well they thought they had done on the task. We regressed each of these items, which were uncorrelated, on performance implication condition (1=task described as intelligence related), task score, autonomy orientation, and controlled orientation. With regard to the first item, there was a main effect of autonomy such that individuals who were lower in autonomy orientation were more likely to perceive the task as indicative of intelligence, t(74)=−3.46, p<.001. However, there was no main effect for the ego-involvement manipulation. Thus, participants who were told the task was indicative of intelligence were not significantly more likely to believe that the task was indicative of intelligence, t(74)=1.38, p=.17. Regarding performance perceptions, participants’ scores were positively associated with believing they had done well on the task, t(74)=2.63, p=.01, suggesting that, independent of the confederate’s performance, those who did well on the task believed they had done well. 3.2. Primary analysis We examined social comparison consequences using residual change hierarchical multiple regressions separately for affect and performance state self-esteem. In each analysis the criterion was the post-score on the relevant variable. The pre-score on the relevant variable was entered at step 1 as a baseline to translate the criterion into an analysis of residual or conditional change. Autonomy orientation, controlled orientation, participant score, confederate score, and performance implication salience were entered simultaneously. Ego-involvement was coded as a dummy variable (1=task defined as indicative of intelligence). Two-way products were entered and interpreted at step 2 and three-way products were entered and interpreted at step 3. 3.2.1. Affective consequences Results from step 1 revealed a main effect of confederate score, β=−.22, t(72)=2.03, p<.05, revealing that lower confederate scores were associated with more positive changes in affect. Neither ego-involvement nor motivational orientations had a direct impact on post-comparison affect. Step 2 results revealed that the impact associated with confederate scores was moderated by autonomy orientation, t(62)=2.01, p<.05, but not controlled orientation. Specifically, among participants who were lower in autonomy, higher confederate scores had an adverse impact. Fig. 1 presents predicted post-comparison affect (controlling for pre-comparison affect), derived from the regression equation with low and high values on autonomy and confederate score defined as one SD below and above the mean respectively ( Aiken & West, 1991). A synergistic contrast revealed that less autonomous participants paired with higher scoring confederates felt worse than anyone else, t(76)=−2.21, p<.05. The interaction between autonomy and the confederate’s score was in turn moderated by ego-involvement, t(52)=2.65, p=.01. Simple effects revealed that the two-way interaction between autonomy and the confederate’s score was more prominent when the task had been described as indicative of intelligence, t(28)=3.27, p<.01, but not when only background information had been provided, t(29)<1. Post-comparison affect as a function of autonomy and confederate’s performance. ... Fig. 1. Post-comparison affect as a function of autonomy and confederate’s performance. Analyses controlled for pre-comparison affect. Figure options To establish discriminant validity we conducted a series of analyses to determine whether the moderation effects observed for autonomy were duplicated by trait self-esteem or social anxiety. Neither variable interacted with confederate score in predicting changes in affect, nor did either of the three-way interactions with ego-involvement approach significance. In addition, we repeated the primary analyses simultaneously controlling for both of these variables. Results were essentially unchanged. Affect change associated with higher confederate scores was still moderated (marginally) by autonomy orientation, t(59)=1.96, p<.06 and the three-way interaction of autonomy, confederate score, and ego-involvement remained significant, t(49)=3.09, p<.01. 3.2.2. State self-esteem In examining changes in performance state self-esteem, step 1 revealed a main effect for confederate score, with higher confederate scores resulting in decreased performance state self-esteem, β=−.32, t(72)=−2.98, p<.01. In addition, a main effect of participant score revealed that scoring higher on the task resulted in increased performance state self-esteem independent of the confederate score, β=.27, t(72)=2.39, p<.05. Step 2 again revealed that the effect of confederate scores depended on autonomy orientation, t(62)=2.03, p<.05, but not controlled orientation. Fig. 2 presents predicted post-comparison performance state self-esteem (controlling for pre-comparison state-self esteem) derived from the regression equation. The resulting pattern reveals that the negative impact of being paired with higher scoring confederates was only apparent among less autonomous individuals. Consistent with this interpretation, a synergistic contrast revealed that less autonomous individuals paired with higher scoring confederates had lower post-comparison performance state self-esteem than all other participants, t(76)=−2.73, p<.01. The interaction between participant and confederate score was also significant, t(62)=−2.06, p<.05, revealing that confederate scores had a larger impact on state self-esteem among higher scoring participants. Ego-involvement had no impact with regard to performance state self-esteem. Post-comparison performance state self-esteem as a function of autonomy and ... Fig. 2. Post-comparison performance state self-esteem as a function of autonomy and confederate’s performance. Analyses controlled for pre-comparison state self-esteem. Figure options To establish discriminant validity, we again examined whether the moderation effect observed for autonomy was duplicated by trait self-esteem or social anxiety. Neither variable interacted with confederate score in predicting changes in performance self-esteem. When we repeated the primary analyses simultaneously controlling for trait self-esteem and social anxiety, the interaction between autonomy and confederate score was somewhat reduced, t(59)=1.84, p=.07. However, the synergistic contrast remained significant revealing that less autonomous participants who were outperformed experienced reduced state self-esteem relative to all others, even when controlling for trait self-esteem and social anxiety, t(73)=−2.40, p<.01.