Abstract
The present analysis reveals the social comparison bias – a bias that emerges from the social comparison process and taints recommendations. We hypothesize that people who have high standing on a relevant dimension (e.g., quantity of publications) begin to protect their social comparison context by making recommendations that prevent others, who might surpass them on the relevant dimension, from entering their comparison context. Studies 1 and 2 instantiate this effect in both hypothetical and real decision situations, showing that people tend not to recommend individuals who surpass them on the relevant dimension on which they have high standing. Finally, Study 3, in a sample of real employees, links the effect to one’s concern for protecting self-esteem. Theoretical and organizational implications are discussed.
Introduction
Seasoned scholars who tend to publish in top tier journals will tend to think that such an achievement is the mark of academic distinction. Of course, seasoned scholars who are especially prolific may well think that the total number of publications is the mark of academic distinction – whether their work is in top tier outlets or not. One interesting consequence, however, is that people who have high standing on a particular dimension begin to make recommendations that prevent a potential counterpart with similar qualities from entering their comparison context. Thus, for example, high quality scholars in a particular field will tend to prefer a job candidate with a higher level of publication quantity relative to a candidate with a higher level of publication quality than themselves. Drawing upon findings from the social comparison ( Festinger, 1954, Garcia et al., 2006, Pillutla and Ronson, 2005, Tesser, 1988 and Tesser et al., 1984) and self-esteem literatures ( Crocker, 2002 and Tesser, 1988), the present analysis introduces the social comparison bias: people’s tendency to make recommendations that prevent similar others from surpassing them on relevant dimensions on which they have high standing.
In addition to highlighting a new and important phenomenon in organizational life, the theoretical contribution of the present analysis brings social comparison processes to the conflict of interest literature (e.g., Bazerman and Watkins, 2004, Cain et al., 2005 and Davis and Stark, 2005). Indeed, the social comparison bias, which we all arguably recognize, can affect our abilities to offer impartial recommendations, potentially undermining greater organizational goals. At the same time, the present analysis contributes to the social comparison literature by instantiating an important and remarkably surreptitious way that individuals make self-interested recommendations in order to protect their comparison contexts. Moreover, because the comparison context is so often embedded within a group setting, decisions tainted by the social comparison bias resemble social dilemmas (e.g., Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004) to the extent that an individual group member might benefit at a cost to the large group.
Conclusion
In sum, the social comparison bias is a broad phenomenon that permeates many different aspects of our organizational and social lives. If we have high standing on one dimension, and if someone threatens to surpass us on that dimension, we become more likely to offer recommendations that are tainted by the social comparison process to prevent that person from besting us in our comparison context. While it is natural to shape these contexts to protect our self-esteem, we must also consider the benefits of overcoming the social comparison bias in these social and organizational settings. In some cases, rising above the social comparison bias might actually lead to a stronger network of social capital and greater opportunity in the long run.