دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 97125
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

نگرش های خطر و ناهمگونی در مسابقات همزمان و پی در پی

عنوان انگلیسی
Risk attitudes and heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential contests
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
97125 2017 16 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 138, June 2017, Pages 69-84

پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  نگرش های خطر و ناهمگونی در مسابقات همزمان و پی در پی

We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in rent-seeking contests in which players are heterogeneous in both risk preferences and production technology. Given identical linear production technology, if the number of risk-loving players is large enough, the aggregate investment in equilibrium will exceed the rent and all risk-neutral and risk-averse players will exit the contest. In simultaneous and sequential contests with two players, we can identify the favorite and underdog based on both players’ preference parameters. Our theoretical results suggest that subjects in some recent contest experiments behaved as if they were risk-loving.