دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 138355
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

ریسک ایدئوسنکراتیک و مدیر

عنوان انگلیسی
Idiosyncratic risk and the manager
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
138355 2017 59 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 126, Issue 2, November 2017, Pages 320-341

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پیش نمایش مقاله  ریسک ایدئوسنکراتیک و مدیر

چکیده انگلیسی

We develop a model to characterize and quantify the effects of stock, option, and fixed compensation on a manager’s risk-taking incentive and investment choice. We find the average chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation contract incentivizes overinvestment by 1.3 percentage points per year, with significant variation across firms and over time. We estimate a value of CEO effort implied by compensation contracts and find it to be strongly related to firm intangibility. Finally, we assess the effects on investment of FAS 123R and a hypothetical ban on option grants and find heterogeneous responses that depend on firm volatility and the prior structure of compensation.