مدل چند معیاره فازی برای استراتژی های معامله برنامه همکاری صنعتی: مورد در تایوان

In international trade offset practices (in Taiwan known as industrial cooperation program, ICP) have received increased attention over the past 20 years. In the coming 10 years, the Taiwanese government may expend roughly US$16 billion for purchasing Patriot-III missiles, P-3 long-range anti-submarine planes, and diesel-engine submarines from the United States through foreign military sale, and can achieve US$8 billion ICP credit the largest in Taiwanese history. Offsets or ICP can be regarded as fuzzy multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) problems, therefore, the fuzziness and uncertainty of subjective perception should be considered. This paper provides an alternative approach, the non-additive fuzzy integral, to deal with the fuzzy MCDM problems especially when there is dependence among considered criteria. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss with Taiwan’s ICP Optimal Offset Transaction Policy and propose a framework of drawing on ICP credit in future. This paper considers the four aspects of policy, ability, economy, and environment, to establish a set of fuzzy AHP multiple criteria decision mode to identify the evaluative criteria variables and project item’s order for ICP project. This decision mode was identified as a workable method.

The definition of offsets includes a broad range of complex compensatory terms by foreign trade partners as a condition of sale, particularly for military and aerospace products. Offset agreements are very flexible, and they allow many combinations of different contracts at the same time. Now, times and circumstances have changed, but offsets remain. The concept of offset is a relatively new development for most defense companies and governments that are now involved in it. Although some of the basics are old such as barter, its modern sophistication is new and dynamic. Buyers’ governments and firms ask for offsets that require industry and commercial compensation as a condition for the purchase of military exports. Offsets arose in the late 1950s and early 1960s in response to the legitimate need to rebuild the industrial base for defense in Western Europe and Japan. At that time, offset agreements may have been justifiable for reducing the impact of military equipment purchases on the budgets and trade accounts of these countries. Neuman (1985) said offsets have contributed to rationalization, standardization, interoperability (RSI) modernized the arms inventories of the alliance, and strengthened transatlantic defense ties in NATO countries. Office of Management and Budget (1987) believed that offsets also contributed to commerce with the Eastern Bloc due to the impossibility of exchanging their currencies with the Western market. The concept of offsets is a leading-edge marketing tool for most defense companies and governments that are now involved in it. Foreign governments and firms ask for offsets that require industrial and commercial compensation as a condition for the purchase of military exports. Kremer and Sain (1992) said the offset agreement may be part of a government-to-government agreement or commercial sale of defense articles or services. Since 1975, many countries purchasing major equipment have required offset agreements to boost their industrial economies. Waller (2003) believed that the world’s defense environment has been significantly changed in the world after the Cold War and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. Within this new environment of mega-defense suppliers chasing fewer customers, offset packages play a more critical role in global defense procurement competitions. Originally, offsets were provided only by the US and former Soviet Union but, today, they can be provided by European countries (UK, France, Germany, and Italy), Japan, Israel, and South Korea. So, offsets have already become competitive tools for in the defense market. If a seller wants to triumph over other competitors in the worldwide defense market but does not offer an offset, it has no chance to win. If a country asks for a technical capability upgrade using an advanced technology transfer from a seller country, this request becomes one of the main conditions for offset. The basic philosophy behind a countertrade or offset agreement is to structure the commitment so that the seller, who will fulfill a contract, rewards the buyer. Palia and Liesch (1997) thought countertrade has many benefits and many latent motives. Radasch and Kwak (1998) found that the motivating factors may be the potential for economic or social growth, advanced technology or increased sales for other domestic goods in exchange for the buyer’s purchase. This paper is organized as follows. Taiwan’s background and environment about ICP transaction strategies are presented in Section 2. Section 3 introduce theoretical framework including setting up a hierarchy frame for ICP transaction strategies, determining the fuzzy criteria weights, performance matrix, and the fuzzy synthetic utility values. The empirical results and interpretations are presented in Section 4. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.

Generally offsets agreement have been important for government procurement in all of the newly industrialized countries. According to industrial development conditions, different countries request different ICP contents. However, each country hopes that using optimal ICP policies will upgrade civil technology and increase the national economy through huge budget purchases. In this paper, we propose a fuzzy hierarchical analytic process, which is an effective fuzzy method to derive the weight of considered criteria, the final synthetic utility values, and then rank the importance of the criteria as well as the optimal ICP transaction strategies. The contributions of this practical research are beneficial for government decision makers to develop an optimal strategy. For our study, one of the most significant finding is that Taiwanese government can follow the priority of research results (S2, S1, S4, S3, S6, and S5) to distribute ICP credits in future government procurements. The ICP main players (local industries, military and R&D organization) in Taiwan can pursue government policy to prepare the essential R&D manpower, facility, core competence which can efficiently perform ICP credits. Furthermore, according to the composite ranking, we can find the top five criteria (C12, C13, C11, C15, and C14) they are fully centralized in D1 (policy aspect). It reveals that the D1 (policy aspect) is the real critical factor to determine whether ICP will be successful or not in Taiwan. This result can explicitly show us ICP policy holding the critical position, and therefore Taiwanese government needs pay more attention to draw up the ICP policy.