چگونگی شرح نتایج معامله با قراردادها و اجرا

This study considers the influence of contracts on enforcement and the subsequent performance impact of aligned and misaligned enforcement. We define enforcement as a corrective action aimed at remedying problems occurring in the transaction. First we explain the role of contracts and show that at the component level, contracts can both increase and decrease enforcement. Building on an alignment perspective and accounting for the endogeneity of enforcement, we use these contractual components and variables related to enforcement to predict the occurrence of enforcement. We use such predictions to show that aligned enforcement results in higher performance. We also show that the performance impact of misaligned enforcement is relatively greater for transactions where enforcement is not expected. We conduct the study using a unique dataset reporting on 971 business transactions across a wide range of industries.

Enforcement is a corrective action aimed at remedying problems (Antia, Bergen, Dutta, & Fisher, 2006). Taking such corrective action requires firms to balance the benefits of enforcement against its costs. The key benefit is that it may curb or reverse violations of contractual agreements (Antia et al., 2006). Enforcement may also reduce or reverse behaviors such as suppliers not remedying product breakdowns or providing limited or inadequate service. Thus, enforcement may help suppliers resolve problems (Wuyts, 2007). On the other hand, exchange partners stung by enforcement may react through further acts, such as protracted conflicts, retaliation, or even relationship termination (Antia & Frazier, 2001). As such, firms need to understand when to enforce and the potential consequences of enforcement. The role of contracts on enforcement is little understood. One perspective is that having explicit contractual agreements ex ante can facilitate or even trigger enforcement ex post. In fact prior literature, predominantly taking an agency perspective, assumes that enforcement is automatically triggered when contracts are violated (cf. Bergen, Heide, & Dutta, 1998). Another perspective is that such explicit contractual agreements may reduce transaction problems or promote cooperation, thereby reducing the need for enforcement (Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). Recent work acknowledges the role of contracts in enforcement but has conceptualized contracts as monolithic governance devices (cf. Kashyap, Antia, & Frazier, 2012). A more fine-grained analysis of the effects of contracts on enforcement is needed to advance our understanding of whether and how contracts impact enforcement. We also know little about the performance consequences of enforcement. Recent work correlated enforcement with outcomes but found no effects (Kashyap et al., 2012). Taking a discriminating alignment position may help uncover performance consequences as enforcement is likely best used when matched to circumstances. Based on governance theories, such as transaction cost economics (TCE), the discriminating alignment view argues that governance (enforcement in our case) that is aligned (expected or called for, as based on transactional attributes) may help performance while misaligned enforcement is detrimental to performance. Such an alignment approach to enforcement has, however, not been examined conceptually and empirically. Moreover, the performance implications of misalignment are not well understood. Specifically, comparing the differential performance of aligned enforcement with misaligned enforcement provides insight into the cost of mistakes. Such analyses are rare, yet valuable, as they provide evidence of the importance of carefully choosing governance (Masten, 1993). The goal of this paper is to study the effects of contracts on enforcement, to understand the performance effects of aligned enforcement, and to understand the performance consequences of misaligned enforcement. In doing so we make three contributions. Our first contribution is to describe the role of contracts in enforcement. In this light, Bergen et al. (1998) suggest that the assumption is often made that once contracts are in place, the ex post management task is trivial. We demonstrate that enforcement is not automatic and different contractual components can both increase and decrease the use of enforcement. As such, we also show that contracts are not monolithic governance structures. To support this contribution, we argue that terms in the contract that support the parties' relationship (e.g., joint management, nondisclosure) reduce enforcement, while terms designed to protect the transaction increase enforcement. Our second contribution is to test the importance of alignment between these contractual components, transactional attributes, and enforcement. By comparing the outcomes of aligned (predicted) versus nonaligned (not predicted) enforcement, we account for the little-researched issue of the benefits of aligned governance in an enforcement context (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). We consider performance consequences in terms of satisfaction with problem resolution, which is the satisfaction of the buyer with how problems regarding the product have been resolved. Satisfaction is fundamental to understanding interfirm relationships (Geyskens & Steenkamp, 1999). A third related contribution is to provide understanding of the performance consequences of misalignment. Prior work has found interesting asymmetries regarding the circumstances under which misalignment has the most severe (negative) performance implications (Ghosh & John, 2009). Specifically, such work suggests that under greater hazards, misalignment has the most severe consequences. Addressing this issue in an enforcement context helps us understand where the risks are in making enforcement choices and helps managers make informed decisions. We conduct our investigations by using the External Management of Automation dataset, access to which is provided by the Steinmetz Archive. This unique dataset reports in detail on 971 randomly selected transactions executed between information technology (IT) buyers and suppliers. It includes a broad spectrum of firms from industries such as logistics, parts production, and wholesaling. This paper proceeds by discussing theory on enforcement in Section 2. We develop arguments on the structure of contracts and the expected effects of different contractual components on enforcement in Section 2.1. We continue by building hypotheses on why aligned enforcement results in better performance in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we argue that relative performance loss is higher when buying firms mistakenly enforce.

A dilemma for buying firms facing transaction problems is whether they should take action to remedy problems. We find that the drafted contracts set the stage for enforcement. Relational safeguards reduce the likelihood of enforcement while transaction safeguards increase it. We also suggest that enforcement, through delaying payment to the supplier, could be helpful to the buyer. However, enforcement is only useful when it aligns with the contract in place and the transaction problems that surface, and is thereby expected. Thus, enforcement is a tool that should be selectively used.