محتوای اطلاعاتی از توصیه های تحلیل گران در صنعت بانکی

We investigate whether analyst recommendations about banks become more valuable in periods when the information environment for banks is more uncertain. The degree of uncertainty in the information environment for banks is time-varying because of time-varying changes in information asymmetry for banks and in bank regulations. Based on a sample of 23,632 analyst recommendations of 1106 banks, we find that analyst recommendations are more informative for banks that are riskier and subject to a higher degree of information asymmetry. Furthermore, regulations that reduce the information asymmetry (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) or the risk (Dodd-Frank Act) of the banking industry also reduce the information content of analyst recommendations, while regulations that increase the risk of the banking industry (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) increase the information content of analyst recommendations. Our results suggest the role of an analyst is more valuable when the information environment is more uncertain.