بانک های مرکزی و ثبات مالی : یک بررسی

This study examines which financial stability responsibilities have been delegated to central banks (CBs), how these responsibilities are executed, and whether democratic accountability arrangements are in place. The results of our survey among all CBs in the OECD area suggest that there is no unambiguous definition of financial stability or systemic risk, and that, generally, the responsibility for financial stability is not explicitly formulated in laws. Moreover, there is considerable heterogeneity in the way CBs pursue the financial stability objective. Our results also suggest that the democratic accountability of the financial stability function of central banks is often poorly arranged.

Modern central banks (CBs) have two core functions: (i) maintaining monetary stability, and (ii) maintaining financial stability. While the monetary function of CBs has been discussed extensively in literature, the financial stability function has been relatively unexposed. The aim of this study is therefore to get a better understanding of which financial stability responsibilities have been delegated to CBs, how these responsibilities are executed, and whether accountability measures are in place.1 For this purpose, we designed a questionnaire (see Oosterloo and de Haan, 2003) and sent it to all CBs in the OECD area.2 We received answers from 28 out of the 30 OECD CBs.3 The answers refer to the situation in 2002. The literature does not provide an unambiguous definition of financial stability.4 To quote Duisenberg (2001, p. 38): “monetary stability is defined as stability in the general level of prices, or as an absence of inflation or deflation. Financial stability does not have as easy or universally accepted a definition. Nevertheless, there seems to be a broad consensus that financial stability refers to the smooth functioning of the key elements that make up the financial system.”5 We distinguish five different elements that make up a framework for the financial stability function: (i) the objective of maintaining financial stability, (ii) the assessment of risk to financial stability, (iii) the instruments that can be used in case of a misalignment between the assessment and the objective, (iv) the decision-making process, and (v) the accountability of the institution that is responsible for maintaining financial stability. Both the design of our questionnaire and the set-up of this paper are based on this framework. Where financial stability arrangements are formalized, individual CBs are identified in this paper, otherwise references are general. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first examines the role of CBs in maintaining financial stability. Section 3 discusses the financial stability objective of the CB and its legal basis. Section 4 deals with the assessment by CBs of financial stability risks. Section 5 discusses the instruments available to maintain financial stability, while Section 6 addresses the decision-making process between the different authorities involved in safeguarding financial stability. Section 7 reviews the accountability measures in place. Finally, Section 8 offers our conclusions.

Although maintaining financial stability is one of the main functions of a CB, our survey has shown that there is a considerable heterogeneity in the way CBs execute this function. One of the main reasons for this heterogeneity seems to be the fact that generally the role of the CB has not been specified in law or in some other official document (for example, a MoU). Furthermore, the formalization of the co-operation process, which explains how the CB, the supervisory authority and the MoF will work together to maintain financial stability, varies considerably across countries. According to the literature on accountability a CB should have clearly defined objectives that describe its basic functions. The less a CB is bound to specific objectives, the more difficult it becomes to evaluate the bank's performance, since a suitable yardstick is missing. Although maintaining financial stability is generally seen as one of the main functions of a CB, our survey shows that most CBs lack a clear legal basis that describes their powers and functions. Many CBs have some general reference to financial stability in their Banking Act or in some other official document, but this is insufficient to be considered as a clear legal basis. Concepts like ‘promoting’ or ‘contributing to’ financial stability are rather vague. Does this mean that the CB is responsible for the overall stability of the financial system, or does this refer to the CB contributing to financial stability by, for example, ensuring safe and efficient payment and settlement systems? In other cases, the mission to promote the smooth operation of payment systems is interpreted as a mandate to maintain financial stability. However, the responsibility for the overall stability of the financial system cannot be derived from the bank's mission to promote a safe and efficient payment system, because this is just one of many tasks that relates to the overall financial stability function. By publishing a Financial Stability Review, CBs can enhance the transparency of its financial stability function and strengthen the co-operation on financial stability issues between the various relevant authorities. Furthermore, the review can be used as an instrument to contribute to the overall stability of the financial system. Still, 18 CBs out of our sample of 28 CBs currently do not publish a (stand alone) periodic review of financial stability. Generally, the information on the stability of the financial system is a part of a broader publication, for example, the CB's Bulletin or its Annual Report. A major disadvantage of this approach is that the information on financial stability is concealed amidst all other CB information. Moreover, these publications are less extensive and the approach less structured. Crisis management involves the CB, the supervisory authority and the MoF. A key point for safeguarding financial stability effectively is the co-operation and exchange of information between the various institutions involved in financial stability functions on different stages and levels. Therefore, all parties involved need to keep each other (fully) informed on the relevant issues concerning financial stability. Our survey shows that there are substantial differences in information-sharing arrangements. Overall, the results indicate that arrangements between CBs and the supervisory authorities have been formalized to a larger extent than is the case for the interchange of information between the CB and the MoF. As for the financial stability instruments, a distinction can be made between preventative and reactive instruments. Formalization of these instruments especially applies to preventative instruments, with the exception of moral suasion, which according to several CBs is an important, but often-overlooked, preventative instrument. For reactive instruments the formalization seems to be less extensive. This could be explained by the fact that experience suggests that no two crises are exactly alike and opinions differ as to what particular approach is ‘best’ for resolving them (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002). Therefore, to obtain a certain degree of flexibility in achieving the objective of financial stability, the instruments have not been laid down in law explicitly. Moreover, when an approach is too clearly formalized, it could give rise to moral hazard. The survey indicates that it is the government that takes decisions on the use of long-term public money. While most CBs argue that they take decisions on short-term lender of last resort operations, it seems that in large-scale, systemic cases the government (because of potential budgetary effects) will ultimately decide how the crisis is handled and who bears the losses. Finally, our survey shows that, by and large, there are few if any accountability measures regarding the objective of financial stability. Accountability mostly refers to monetary policy, and there is generally no direct reference to financial stability.