تجزیه و تحلیل نظری و تجربی از الگوی قیمت گذاری چند دوره ای در بازار املاک و مستغلات

We examine empirically and theoretically the multiperiod pricing pattern in the real estate market. First, in a game theoretic framework, we identify conditions for determining whether potential closing prices increase or decrease and marginally increase with time on market. Then, by observing rental housing transactions, we empirically find evidence that the difference between the list price and the settlement price rises and marginally decreases with time on market. This empirical result is consistent with a perfect Nash equilibrium previously proposed in the model.

We examine empirically and theoretically the multiperiod pricing pattern in the real estate market. First, in a game theoretic framework, we identify conditions for determining whether potential closing prices increase or decrease and marginally increase with time on market.Then, by observing rental housing transactions, we empirically find evidence that the difference between the list price and the settlement price rises and marginally decreases with time on market. This empirical result is consistent with a perfect Nash equilibrium previously proposed in the model. Several models in the real estate literature refer to the optimal stategy for pricing real estate units. Stull (1978), for example, analyzes the rental housing market and concentrates on the properties of a rental probability function. He deduces that the greater the potential tenants arrival rate, the higher the probability of locating a tenant willing to pay the asked rent price, ceteris paribus, and further, that the probability of locating a renter declines faster with a rise in the rent price asked for less desirable properties. The two major results in his model are the declining sequence of asked rent prices and the associated decreasing expected waiting time. In his derivation of a declining sequence of asked prices in real estate sale transactions, Read (1988) emphasizes the seller’s imperfect information regarding

We analyze empirically and theoretically the multiperiod pricing pattern in the real estate rental market. Though we restrict our attention to the rental of real estate, our theoretical framework may also incorporate real estate sale transactions, as well as family of other types of goods and transactions where the price of the transacted good may not be perfectly determined by market forces ex ante and nor may bind future transaction prices ex post. First, we construct a simple game theoretic framework and derive perfect Nash equilibrium, under which potential closing prices might rise or decline with time on market. It turns out that the equilibrium price pattern depends on the party who plays first as well as on the model parameters: landlord’s patience and the distribution of potential renters’ willingness to pay. Specifically, the model shows the conditions under which the optimal strategy of a landlord, who is informed only about the distribution of potential renters’ willingness to pay, is to decrease (or increase) and marginally increase the price during time on market, so that his reservation price at each period is equal to the expected present value of prospective future prices. We further present empirical evidence from the rental housing market showing that the proportional difference between the list price and the transaction price indeed rises and marginally diminishes during the rental process. As shown in the model, this empirical result is consistent with the framework in which the landlord is the first mover to whose proposed price reacts the potential renter. Further empirical work, using data sets from other real estate rental markets, might shed more light on our conclusions. Another possible direction for future research is to model the change in price trends that produce a price cycle or a mean-reverting price process, which is commonly believed to prevail in real estate markets.