مقرون به صرفه بودن استراتژی های سرمایه گذاری جایگزین برای بخش برق در هند: حساب به صورت گذشته نگر از دوره 1997-2002

This paper focuses on the profitability of investments in the power sector in India seen from a micro-economic viewpoint followed by macro-extrapolation. We will compare the profitability of various investment strategies that serve as an alternative to the simple expansion of the generating capacity. In a system where maintenance has long been neglected, these measures also turn out to be cheaper than capacity addition and should be given preference in a period of scarcity of funds. Improvement in the use of plants and reduction of technical and non-technical losses are profitable, but these measures are not implemented enough under the present public system in India. We will then briefly link up these findings with some of our earlier works to show that these inefficiencies arise because State Electricity Boards have long relied on technical and administrative procedures that were designed during a period of expansion and not on efficiently decentralised and information-based management as should be the case in the present mature phase.

Hence, to bridge the present energy gap or to match the increase in demand within the context of the remaining gap, the improvement of PLF or the reduction of technical losses prove to be preferable to new capacity addition. These are profitable in absolute terms as well, even given the present tariffs, and could provide margins for an increase of 17% in the energy level. These are useful policies that are not adopted in a sufficient measure by SEBs today. If the public sector is able to initiate public reforms, or if the private sector is given enough guarantees, there can be a vast improvement in the present power scenario in India. And all this can be done without any increase in the public budget. This is not, despite what is regularly advocated, an issue of financial strive for cash. In the situation that existed in 1997, tariff increase often was said to be politically difficult, but interesting as well as politically neutral technical strategies were available. Some of them like PLF increase have been tapped, but in very limited manner (the average value for SEBs is still very low as compared to the value for Central utilities) – while the reduction of losses has been left almost untapped. This is clearly seen in the fact that after five years, the margins remain the same (both in terms of capacity-equivalent and financial profitability). Paradoxically, direct cash flows have followed the trend that could have been set by a tariff increase. ‘Politically difficult’ measures have been undertaken (but under the sheer compulsion of equivalent cost increases) de facto, while technical solutions have remained untapped. Worse, techniques and costs are actually linked: had technical measures been implemented right from 1997, they would have ultimately comparatively lowered the average cost per unit. India is in a strange scenario where easily available margins have remained unused, while cost inefficiency has left politicians with no choice but to do what they wanted the least. The real problem then is to understand why this is not being done. One part of the answer may lie in the manner in which SEBs are operated: on the basis of instruction from political and executive bodies, the lack of focus on costs and budgets in actual decision-making and the absence of a properly designed information system (Ruet, 2002 and Ruet, 2005a).