تغییرات فن آوری درون زا ، توزیع درآمد و بیکاری با تضاد های بین طبقه ای

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model that incorporates endogenous technological change. The model endogenously determines the rate of capacity utilization, the rate of economic growth, income distribution, and the employment rate in addition to technological change. The paper shows that whether or not an increase in the relative bargaining power of workers raises the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate depends on which regime is realized in the long-run equilibrium. If, for example, the long-run equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth regime, a rise in the relative bargaining power of workers leads to a decline in the unemployment rate. This result is never obtained from the mainstream NAIRU model.

This paper presents a Kaleckian model of growth that incorporates endogenous technological change and investigates the rate of economic growth, income distribution, and the employment rate.1 Although a large number of attempts to endogenize technical progress have been made in mainstream growth theory, relatively less attention has been paid in the post-Keynesian tradition. In mainstream growth models, much emphasis is placed on technical progress as an engine of growth because supply-side factors determine economic growth. In contrast, because demand-side factors decide economic growth in post-Keynesian growth models, supply-side factors have not been considered so much. This is not to say that there have been no attempts to endogenize technical progress in the Kaleckian model. You (1994) introduces into a Kaleckian model a technical progress such that the growth rate of the capital–labor ratio depends on the rate of capital accumulation. In Cassetti (2003), induced technical progress known as the Kaldor–Verdoorn law (Verdoorn, 1949 and Kaldor, 1966) is incorporated into a Kaleckian growth model. Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) also use the Kaldor–Verdoorn law to build a model based on Marglin and Bhaduri’s (1990) work, and they empirically test the model for the US, UK, and France by means of a structural VAR analysis. Lima (2004) develops a Kaleckian model in which endogenous technological innovation plays a significant role. In Lima’s model, the rate of labor-saving technological innovation depends non-linearly on the wage share, which can generate limit cycles with regard to the wage share and the capital–effective labor ratio. To endogenize technological change, this paper adopts a technique such that the growth rate of labor productivity depends positively on the rate of employment. This formulation is proposed by Dutt (2006) and Bhaduri (2006).2 According to Dutt (2006), this view of technological change differs from the mainstream endogenous growth theory in that it draws attention on the demand side of the economy: technological change occurs in response to labor shortage caused by the growth of employment rather than supply side which focuses on the research and development process. Bhaduri (2006) states that this captures a view that technological change is driven by inter-class conflict over income distribution between workers and capitalists. Bhaduri’s (2006) model is not a Kaleckian one because income distribution is not determined by mark-up pricing. However, it bears similarity to the Kaleckian model in that effective demand plays a crucial role in determining output. In contrast, Dutt’s (2006) model can be said to be Kaleckian, but it does not deal with such issues as income distribution and inflation because its purpose is to present a simple growth model that integrates the roles of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Our specification of endogenous technological change has the following theoretical implication. Conventional Kaleckian growth models assume that labor supply is unlimited and that firms employ as many workers as they desire at given wages. If, however, the labor supply grows at an exogenously given rate, there is no guarantee that the endogenously determined growth rate of employment is equal to the growth rate of labor supply. Thus, if the growth of labor supply exceeds that of labor demand in the steady state, then the rate of unemployment will keep on rising, but this is unrealistic.3 In contrast, the steady state unemployment rate in our model remains constant because the two growth rates coincide in the long run. Therefore, our model overcomes the weakness of existing Kaleckian models. It is true that our paper is not an initial attempt to consider the determination of the employment rate explicitly in the Kaleckian model. Stockhammer (2004) presents an augmented Kaleckian model that incorporates equations that determine employment and income distribution, and investigates the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment).4 However, our model differs considerably from Stockhammer’s model in the determination of employment and income distribution. Stockhammer (2004) uses an employment determination equation such that a change in the unemployment rate is given by the difference between the growth rate of exogenous labor supply and the rate of capital accumulation, and an income distribution determination equation such that the profit share depends on the unemployment rate. On the other hand, we use an employment determination equation such that the growth rate of labor productivity depends positively on the employment rate, and an income distribution equation that results from the theory of conflicting-claims inflation. Furthermore, our model is different from Stockhammer’s model in that what variables are used in the investment function and whether technological progress is exogenous or endogenous. With these differences, we obtain different results from those obtained by Stockhammer. In Stockhammer’s model, the rate of capital accumulation (and accordingly, the rate of capacity utilization) and the profit share are adjusted in the short run, while the unemployment rate is adjusted in the long run. However, employment (and accordingly, unemployment) necessarily changes with changes in the rate of capacity utilization. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that these three variables – the rate of capacity utilization, the profit share, and the employment rate – are adjusted at the same time. Therefore, we simultaneously analyze the adjustment process of these three variables. The basic framework of our model is based on a series of Mario Cassetti’s studies Cassetti, 2002, Cassetti, 2003 and Cassetti, 2006. In standard Kaleckian models, the level of money wage and mark-up are fixed and given exogenously, and accordingly, the price level is constant. Cassetti, 2002, Cassetti, 2003 and Cassetti, 2006 combines a Kaleckian growth model and the theory of conflicting-claims inflation, in which the rate of inflation is determined by negotiations between workers and capitalists (Rowthorn, 1977).5 Kaleckian models with the theory of conflicting-claims inflation consider the effect of class conflict between workers and capitalist on income distribution, but do not consider its effect on employment. It is interesting to investigate how changes in the bargaining power of both classes affect employment. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework of our model. Section 3 analyzes the existence and the stability of the long-run equilibrium. Section 4 presents numerical examples to show that the long-run equilibrium actually exists under plausible parameter settings and that each variable in the model converges to its long-run equilibrium value from an arbitrary initial value. Section 5 offers results of comparative statics analysis in the long-run equilibrium. Section 6 concludes the paper.

This paper has developed a Kaleckian growth model in which the rate of technological change and the employment rate are endogenously determined. The model is based on the Kaleckian model with the theory of conflicting-claims inflation, and extended to incorporate endogenous technological change. Our model responds to the criticism that in the usual Kaleckian model, technological change is not considered and the long-run employment rate is not constant. Using the model, we have analyzed how the relative bargaining power of workers and firms affects the long-run equilibrium rate of employment. The relationship between the bargaining power and the employment rate differs depending on the regime in which the long-run equilibrium lies. If the long-run equilibrium is characterized as the wage-led growth regime, a rise in the relative bargaining power of firms increases the unemployment rate. If, on the other hand, the long-run equilibrium is characterized as the profit-led growth regime, a rise in the relative bargaining power of workers increases the unemployment rate. The latter result is also obtained in the mainstream NAIRU model, but the former result is never obtained in the mainstream model. Note, however, that in the wage-led growth regime, a fall in the firms’ bargaining power, that is, a rise in the workers’ bargaining power leads to higher employment, but it simultaneously leads to lower profit share: workers’ interests interfere with firms’ interests. For this reason, it may be difficult to implement an economic policy intended to adjust the bargaining power of both classes. Even in this case, nonetheless, demand stimulation policy is effective. As discussed in the text, stimulation of effective demand brings about higher employment and accordingly lower unemployment. This policy implication is never obtainable from the mainstream NAIRU theory. Which regime is obtained in the long-run equilibrium is independent of bargaining power because of the structure of the model and depends only on the sizes of the elasticities of the investment function. In reality, however, demand-oriented policies are likely to affect the bargaining power of both classes. For example, less progressive income tax increases the bargaining power of capitalists, which can lead the economy to a profit-led growth. For this reason, it is important to investigate how demand-oriented policies affect bargaining power and the resultant change in the bargaining power affects economic regimes. This will be future research. Our way of introduction of technological change is very simple. Rowthorn (1981) states that technical progress influences an economy in two ways. First, technical progress makes existing equipment obsolete, and thus, it will affect the rate of depreciation. Second, technical progress stimulates firms that undertake innovations to invest more by bringing extra profits to them, and thus, the form of investment function will be modified. In Cassetti (2003), these effects are taken into account, while in the present paper, these issues are not dealt with for the purpose of emphasizing the role of endogenous technological change in the Kaleckian model of growth. For the same purpose, target rates of workers and firms are not endogenized. It is evident that technological change influences the target rates if these are endogenized. Taking these into account will also be future research.