هزینه های معامله، قرارداد های رابطه ای و مشارکت عمومی خصوصی: یک مطالعه موردی از دفاع UK

This paper is concerned with the economics of public private partnerships (PPPs)/private finance initiative (PFIs) and in particular the role of transaction costs and the importance of trust in relational contracting. The discussion is illustrated by reference to the UK defence sector. The paper begins by discussing the nature of PPPs/PFIs before moving on to consider how the economics of contracting literature can shed light on their strengths and weaknesses. The transaction cost literature is reviewed alongside a resource-based perspective of procurement decisions. The concepts of trust and reputation are then considered in the context of minimising procurement transaction costs. The theoretical framework developed is then applied and illustrated through a case study of UK defence contracting, in an attempt to assess whether the use of PPPs will necessarily lead to improved economic efficiency. The case study highlights both the scope of PPPs/PFIs and their potential transaction costs in defence procurement, with the normal perils in terms of contracting given information asymmetry, asset specificity and the resulting scope for opportunistic behaviour.

Public private partnerships (PPPs) are intended to harness the incentives of private markets to the public interest criteria of the state. Private capital and private sector companies finance and operate infrastructure that previously was publicly funded and managed. In recent years, PPPs have become popular in a number of countries. Governments keen to reduce government spending and borrowing and aware that private enterprise can provide services at lower cost, have introduced PPP programmes in place of or to supplement direct state investment. This paper considers the economics of public private partnerships and more specifically the roles of transaction costs, trust and relational contracting in the achievement of successful PPPs. The discussion is illustrated with reference to the UK defence sector, which has a long track record of partnerships with the private sector. PPPs including in the UK ‘private finance initiative’ (PFIs) are part of a wider policy of ‘privatisation’ based on the expectation that the private sector provides services more efficiently and more effectively than the public sector. PPPs/PFIs permit an expansion of infrastructure provision; an expansion beyond what the state on its own could achieve given budgetary constraints and a lack of project management skills (Roger, 1999). At the same time, however, concerns have been raised about their true long-term costs and therefore on their ability to provide public investments more cheaply on a life-time cost basis. The purpose of the paper is to set out a framework for assessing PPPs drawn from economics to assess the use of PPPs in the UK defence sector. The main research question is, will the use of PPPs necessarily lead to improved economic efficiency in defence procurement? The structure of the paper is as follows. First there is a general discussion of the rationale for PPPs. Then the theory of transaction costs from economics is reviewed, followed by a discussion of the roles of reputation and trust in relational contracting and joint ventures. The theoretical framework developed is then applied to UK defence contracting, where many difficult issues relating PPP deals feature. Finally, the main conclusions for defence procurement are summarised.

Organisational boundaries are becoming much more fluid, involving networking, joint ventures, strategic alliances, partnership sourcing, and the like (Van Tulder, 1999). PPPs including in the UK PFIs are part of this new ‘relational contracting’ environment aimed at reducing costs, speeding up time to market, and promoting innovation. They involve a change in the boundary of government, blurring the distinctionthe early entrants to PPP contracts in the UK ‘tendered on the basis that the political risks were high and construction costs were likely to overrunyy’ (Financial Times, 2000b, p. 28). PPP is a new policy initiative in need of economic analysis and evaluation. The paper has developed a framework for assessing PPPs drawing on transaction cost theory, supplemented by resource-based theory and an understanding of the roles of reputation and trust in contracting. The implications from this framework have been considered using a case study of the UK defence sector. The defence sector was chosen because it has been a leading user of PPP/PFI initiatives in recent years and, prima facie, involves a number of significant problems for long-term contracting given the uncertainties surrounding defence from both supply and demand perspectives. PPPs involve agreeing long-term contracts characterised by incompleteness in their specification, asset specificity and scope for opportunism because of asymmetric information. The case study has highlighted a number of major potential transaction costs in defence procurement, arising from incomplete information, asset specificity and the resulting scope for opportunistic behaviour, which cannot be obviously offset by developing trust relationships. It has particularly illustrated the tensions between competition to reduce costs, the need for contractors to generate profits, and the building of partnerships and trust. The study has also drawn attention to motivation in the public sector. PPPs can be distorted by the incentives within the Armed Forces; it does not necessarily follow that military personnel will behave efficiently. They neither share in any profits from efficient behaviour or experience losses from poor performance. Military personnel may pursue their own utility, shunning those schemes that adversely affect their own status. The conclusion of the analysis is that the use of PPPs will not necessarily lead to improved economic efficiency in defence procurement and that considerable care will need to be taken both in terms of negotiating PPPs, monitoring their performance, and in their renewal. The UK defence sector illustrates that PPPs involve significant transaction costs which must be set against any benefits in terms of economic efficiency incentives. This conclusion has significance going beyond the defence sector to other forms of PPPs sharing the same sort of uncertainties, both in the UK and internationally. The study suggests that the costs and benefits of PPPs must be carefully balanced against the costs and benefits of more traditional forms of public sector procurement. Future research could usefully focus on better quantification of PPP costs and benefits and identification of the circumstances in which information asymmetry problems can be overcome by developing true partnership relationships. between public and private provision. Not surprisingly