مدل هزینه معامله از فناوری اطلاعات برون سپاری

This paper proposes and tests an explanatory model of information technology (IT) outsourcing behavior. Relying on transaction costs and incomplete contracts theories, the model hypothesizes that characteristics of IT operation activities—asset specificity, uncertainty, business skills, and technical skills required to perform the activities—will influence the level of their outsourcing. The model was tested using data from a survey of 335 firms. Results indicate that uncertainty is the major deterrent to outsourcing, while the level of technical skills is the most important reason to outsource. Business skills do not seem to play a significant role. Finally, asset specificity, which is always presented as a constraint to outsourcing, showed inconsistent effects.

The information technology (IT) outsourcing phenomenon has been expanding during the past decade and this growth is likely to continue [36]. Outsourcing deals are becoming larger and often involve partners, including offshore suppliers [32]. The relationships implied in outsourcing arrangements are increasingly complex. For example, while acting as client and supplier, Xerox and EDS were engaged in a legal battle on some aspects of their agreement, but they acted as business partners to collaborate on ventures, such as the State of Connecticut’s U$ 1 billion outsourcing deal [21]. Researchers have analyzed IT outsourcing from several angles. Some authors compare outsourcing to insourcing [15]. Some evaluate if and how in-house services could be reorganized to provide firms with benefits similar to those of outsourcing [12] and [17]. Others focus on the client–supplier relationship, analyzing its characteristics, its partnership quality, and the impact of these on outsourcing success [19]. Some studies analyze IT outsourcing with a political or social lens, providing alternative explanations (different from economic motives) for outsourcing decisions [16]. Finally, a number of researchers focus on the determinants of outsourcing, that is, on those variables that will influence the outsourcing decision [20] and [28]. Our study fits in this last group. As IT outsourcing continues to expand, firms have to decide which types of activities are good candidates for outsourcing and which should be kept in-house. Relying on transaction costs and incomplete contracts theories, our study examined the influence of IT operation activities characteristics—asset specificity, uncertainty, business skills, and technical skills required to perform the activities—on the level of outsourcing of these activities, in 335 firms.

The objective of the study was to test an explanatory model of IT outsourcing behavior. Based on transaction costs and incomplete contract theories, the model embedded hypotheses that constitute the foundations of these theoretical domains. The results obtained support, atleast in part, the transaction costs model. From the results, it is clear that uncertainty and measurement problems play a role in the IT outsourcing decision. Firms outsource more readily activities having low uncertainty. These results support the transaction cost hypothesis. The market is seen as less efficient to ensure the execution of transactions prone to high uncertainty or severe measurement problems. The internal governance is a more efficient alternative. The presence of technical skills was positively related to the outsourcing decision. It supports the idea from incomplete contract theory stating that activities should be under the control of the party making the critical investment for the transaction. However, the business skills did not seem to play a significant role in the decision to outsource. It may be attributed to the rather low level of business skills required to perform IT operations. Asset specificity showed conflicting results. The first survey provided a puzzling link between asset specificity and outsourcing, suggesting that more specific assets lead to more outsourcing. This contradicted the transaction cost hypothesis. Subsequent data sources, both from general respondents and experts, provided opposite results. For managers, outsourcing should be regularly reassessed as the most appropriate governance mode for their firm’s IS activities. Managers should be aware of the characteristics of their outsourcing portfolio. Uncertainty and measurement problems may prevent contracts with enforceable performance clauses. Asset specificity may lead to costly lock-in situations. Managers should evaluate the skills required to perform the activities. The activities involving a technical skills probably need more efficiently performed by outsourcers. The ones requiring business skills should be kept in-house.