بررسی درک مدیران راه آهن اروپا از هزینه معاملات در عملیات / زیرساخت رابط قطار

This paper discusses the effects of institutional organisation on the transactions and interactions between train operators and infrastructure managers in the three most liberalised rail systems in Europe, namely Britain, Germany and Sweden. The heart of the analysis is a major in-depth interview programme with 81 senior rail managers in 2008 followed by a survey of the same managers 4 years later (2012/2013). Our results reveal how rail managers perceive their transactions in the real world as opposed to pure transaction cost theory. For both snapshots, co-ordination and contractual aspects particularly related to timetabling and real time operations are seen as more crucial than the traditional investment hold up or lock in transaction cost economics issues. In all three systems good relationships are indicated as the most important contributor to making the system work. It does appear that having many of these issues resolved internally by members of a single group simplifies the transactions considerably. But there is a cost to this when competition is desirable, as it creates greater uncertainty and fear of discrimination on behalf of those train operators outside the group.

In the last two decades the European Commission has been very active in restructuring the European rail sector and as of December 2012 is finalising proposals for a fourth railway package to further strengthen the position of rail as an efficient mode of transport. In order to promote competition between train operating companies, current European legislation (Directives 91/440/EEC and 2001/12-14/EC) requires that main line rail systems in Europe are vertically separated at least to the extent of having separate accounts and divisions for infrastructure, passenger and freight operations. If the management of the infrastructure is not independent of train operators, then key decisions on the allocation of capacity and the setting of track access charges must be taken by a third party. This does not rule out the holding company model, in which infrastructure and train operations remain part of the same group, and following the example of Germany, several European countries (e.g. Austria and Italy) have followed this model. It appears that the advantages and drawbacks of the railway holding model approach are now much at the heart of the debate related to the preparation of the fourth rail package which has the potential to substantially change the structure of the European rail industry.

Although each of the analysed train operator/infrastructure manager relationships is unique, our transaction analysis identified important patterns which will be summarised in the following paragraphs. A first key finding is that these patterns are more or less consistent across the two snapshots of 2008 and 2012/2013. Asset specificity, which plays a central role in the literature of transaction cost economics, including most previous studies of the rail industry, did not come across as a major issue in our interviews and survey. Train operators increasingly lease rolling stock, and seek to align the length of the lease to that of franchise/transport contracts and track access agreements. Although such contracts are inevitably incomplete, there is no great concern about lock-in or hold-up issues, perhaps because of the presence of an independent regulator to whom they can appeal. The importance of good relationships is also highlighted in that context.