مداخله تنظیم مقررات در اقتصاد پویا گاز اروپا بازار نئوکلاسیک و یا اقتصاد هزینه معامله؟
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|18870||2009||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 37, Issue 8, August 2009, Pages 3250–3258
Shifts at the international gas market indicate that the transaction cost perspective provides better underpinnings for European gas regulation than the current neoclassical perspective. Three implications are that policymakers should: (1) allow alternative coordination measures to complement market exchange; (2) recognize that less than perfect competition outcomes may be optimal and (3) be more reticent in prescribing interventionist measures. Finally, the analysis provides the foundations for the empirical research required to complement this paper's theoretical approach.
The European gas market is in a state of flux. Structural and regulatory reform measures are introduced to facilitate competition in gas markets traditionally managed by governments and incumbent operators (cf. Stern, 1998). Competition is introduced to better secure the public service obligations—supply security, competitiveness and sustainability. This liberalization approach is not working as hoped and anticipated, as indicated by several benchmarking reports published by the European Commission (cf. EC, 2004 and EC, 2005) and DG Competition's Energy Sector Inquiry (EC, 2007b). The benchmark reports signal a disappointing progress of competition, predominantly due to insufficient implementation of the Gas Directives as well as a lack of integration and coordination between Member States. The Sector Inquiry into the competition on gas and electricity markets corroborates the benchmark results by concluding that the second Directive has been implemented incompletely. It furthermore concludes that this Directive fails to address all structural issues. These problems are still relevant today, as indicated in the 2007 progress report on the internal market (EC, 2008). These problems induce discussion regarding the appropriateness of the regulatory regime currently in place for the European gas market. This paper examines this issue in light of the dynamic nature of the European gas market. Specifically, it examines the suitability of current gas regulation given the changes that have recently taken place at the international gas market. This paper is structured as follows. 2 and 3 describe the shifting contexts for gas regulation. Section 2 argues that current gas regulation is built on neoclassical guiding principles and points out that the market context at the time current gas regulation was developed has facilitated the neoclassical emphasis on liberalization and (perfect) competition. Section 3 argues that a number of structural market shifts have created a new context for regulation. In this new regulatory context, investments, uncertainty and risks are important elements of a proper regulatory regime. Section 3 concludes that these elements are not explicitly recognized in current regulation. Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been built around these criteria, which is why the remainder of the paper examines whether TCE provides a more appropriate theoretical perspective to underpin European gas regulation. After concisely setting out TCE's analytical framework in Section 4, Section 5 combines the neoclassical and TCE perspectives into a comprehensive framework that determines when to use which theoretical perspective. Section 6 applies this framework to the European gas market by examining its transactional characteristics. It shows that all TCE criteria apply to European gas. Hence, TCE provides the lens through which the European gas market should be analyzed. Accordingly, the main message of this paper is that current European gas regulation will not result in the market behavior that is required in the new context. Consequently, European gas regulation needs to move away from its neoclassical underpinnings. Section 7 provides three important lessons for policymakers in order to better align European gas regulation with the TCE perspective. Section 8 concludes and provides the foundations for the empirical research required to complement this paper's theoretical analysis.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper has examined whether we can expect current European gas regulation to be adequate in light of the dynamic nature of the European gas market. A number of fundamental market shifts have changed the context for regulation. This paper analyzes whether the transaction cost perspective towards gas regulation is superior to the current neoclassical perspective in this context. This is examined by specifying a theoretical framework that combines the neoclassical and transaction cost perspectives. The framework shows that in order to judge whether the TCE perspective is better suited to a market than the neoclassical perspective, the following three questions must be answered affirmatively: 1. Are assets specific? 2. Are contracts in complete? 3. Is there a risk of regulatory opportunism? This paper analyzes whether European gas regulation should be embedded in the TCE perspective by testing whether these questions can indeed be answered affirmatively for the European gas market. The paper shows that on the European gas market in its new context assets are specific, contracts incomplete and policy credibility likely low, which makes transaction cost perspective the proper theoretical base for gas regulation. The main message of this paper is that current European gas regulation will not result in the market behavior that is required in the new context. Consequently, European gas regulation needs to move away from its neoclassical underpinnings. To this end, policymakers should: (1) allow alternative coordination measures to complement market exchange; (2) recognize that a less than perfect competition outcome may be the best solution and (3) be more reticent in prescribing interventionist measures.