اپراتورهای موبایل شبکه مجازی: تجزیه و تحلیل هزینه های معامله استراتژیک از تجارب اولیه

This paper describes and analyzes critical conditions for achieving net benefit from opening the value-chain in mobile communications by introducing mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in the Scandinavian and British markets. MVNOs are radio-less network operators that outsource the radio part and some other network elements to radio-based mobile network operators. The conclusion is that MVNOs offering complex bundles of innovative value-added services will probably not be competitively sustainable as separate firms, only as more tightly integrated partners of radio-based mobile network operators.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the social and private benefit from the joint operation of regular and virtual mobile network operators through the lenses of strategic transaction cost economics ( Williamson, 1999a). Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are radio-less operators that own and control at least some part of the mobile network, while contracting out to regular radio-based mobile network operators (MNOs) the radio part along with all the remaining complementary network facilities and service applications that are necessary to provide mobile services to end users. 1 Prospective benefits are sharper upstream competition, lower supply prices and more innovative downstream service packaging, branding and marketing. These are benefits from outsourcing that seldom can be achieved without additional transaction costs in terms of time-consuming negotiations, arbitration and even litigations. Net social benefit can therefore only be accomplished to the degree transaction hazards are moderate throughout the contracting period, or to the degree contractual safeguards are sufficient to prevent transaction costs from escalating. Until recently the prevailing opinion of incumbent operators and most regulators has been that the positive effects of virtual network operation were highly uncertain, probably minimal and definitely not big high enough to justify regulatory intervention.2 The main reason for such skepticism seems to be the expected negative incentive effects that such a regulation would have on investment in future networks such as in third generation mobile network (UMTS network), combined with weaker infrastructure competition. Although these negative investment incentive and competition effects will be moderated by the positive effect that such regulation will have on service innovations and competition in service provision, skeptics (most incumbents and some regulators) expect positive effects to be outweighed by negative ones. In particular, since the radio-based network owners stand to benefit less than others, virtual operation will not appear as a viable strategy until facilitating regulation and appropriate operating conditions have been established, the associated industrial dynamics sufficiently documented, and the radio-based network operators highly convinced about their own benefit from such dynamics. The intention with this paper is to start a more open and critical discussion and evaluation of this difficult, but important question. The choice of theoretical approach for such an evaluation will be presented in Section 2. Further definition and description of the concept of virtual mobile network operators are covered in Section 3, followed by two illustrative cases in Section 4. Conclusion and discussion finalize the paper in Section 5.

This article has analyzed and exemplified mechanisms and conditions that may turn virtual network operators into profitable businesses. To profit from virtual network operation the price margin of remaining ‘‘virtual’’ operation must cover its costs. So far this has been rather difficult.Neither have radio-based operators been convinced of the positive industrial dynamics effects they would enjoy from extended virtual operations, stimulated by lower prices on roaming and interconnection. Such effects would imply that the revenue gain that radio-based operators receive from expanded virtual operations would exceed the revenue loss they suffer from offering lower roaming and interconnection prices. Since today’s price margin on call processing will not cover the MVNO’s production costs for smaller volumes (less than 200,000 average subscribers), profitability under prevailing prices depends on the successful provision of innovative value-added services that increase sales volumes and permit higher end-user prices. In addition, profitability from virtual operations would depend on whether the radio-less operator interacts with the radio-based operator across standard interfaces that limit transaction costs, or else organizes these interactions under contractual safeguards that prevent transaction costs from escalating. Achieving both higher revenue and lower transaction costs under simple market contracts may be impossible, however, since increasing sales volumes of innovative value-added services will not only increase revenue, but also require more complex and less standardized interfaces that will increase transaction costs. One solution would be to specialize on ‘‘commodity’’ voice and data services transmitted across standard interfaces under simple supply contracts and with minimal transaction costs. The other solution would be to specialize on the development and production of innovative value-added services transmitted across proprietary and complex interfaces under more exclusive and firm-like contracts that prevent transaction costs from escalating. Under these more protective-rewarding hybrid contracts, virtual operators may develop into a more efficient and creative marketing force than the corresponding units of the vertically integrated radio-based operators, thus generating extra profit not only for themselves, but also for their radio-based partner. Subsequently, this may cause MVNOs to develop competitive advantage in value-added service, specialized branding and marketing, and MNOs to develop competitive advantage in basic mobile network operations.