پر کردن شکاف در اقتصاد سنتی هزینه معامله :: به سوی تجزیه و تحلیل مبتنی بر منافع معامله

This paper analyzes dyadic partnership formation between asymmetric buyers and specialized suppliers. In the first part of the paper different economics of organization-based approaches are evaluated. Their basic implications concerning the rise of partnerships are derived. In the second part a dynamized transaction cost and benefit model is introduced to analyze the most critical elements of a typical partnership decision. The final part is based on insights from practice and in-depth interviews among 12 specialized suppliers and their four large incumbent partners in the Information and Telecommunications Industry.

According to the founders of transaction cost economics (TCE), Coase [1] and Williamson [2], markets and vertical integration (or hierarchies) are the two main governance structures, out of which a " rm may choose the most e $ cient one. Coase did not even mention the intermediate gover- nance structure between markets and hierar- chies, called hybrid by Williamson. We call these hybrid governance structures partnerships and interpret them as individual contracts between parties. The aim of the contract is, of course, to create the joint surplus through cooperation and share it in a way, which bene " ts both (all) the parties. Rapid changes in business environments are increasingly driving the formation of strategic part- nerships between companies in the world economy. Di ! erent types of partnerships are a logical and timely response to intense and rapid changes in economic activities, technologies, and globalization of world markets [3]. Partnerships have gained much theoretical interest in strategic literature dur- ing the last 10 years. Despite the fact that Coase skipped them altogether modern economics of organization-related approaches have managed to shed light on some factors behind the rise of partnership-based governance structures. A recent stream of resource-based view, the know- ledge-based view, [4 } 6] analyzes organizationa capabilities and knowledge as a source for competi- tive advantage. The key organizational issue is whether to develop the needed competencies, capa- bilities and knowledge internally or whether it is rational to exploit and integrate external know- ledge. Knowledge-based competition leads us to the classic questions of the modern theories of the " rm concerning the crucial role of organizational boundaries. Unfortunately, these explanations are typically static and focused primarily on cost-based comparisons. Our contribution to this discussion will be the explication of the main sources of the governance bene " ts, which can be obtained through di ! erent kinds of inter- " rm contractual arrangements.

Our study points out that partnership types of arrangements (hybrid organizations) emerge in businesses characterized by high volatile nature, high degree of uncertainty and high degree of asset speci " city. High degree of transaction frequency, mutual dependency, and a possibility to share risk and information encourage inter-organizational cooperation. It is obvious that a partnership is superior in certain conditions when compared with vertical integration or to the use of open markets. Positive net joint surplus is evident, if there are only a small number of players able to provide the needed tech- nologies, products and services. High risks inherent in technological development and the uncertain direction of technological development (e.g. which technologies will become dominant designs and later industry standards) do not favor autonomous development. In search of high complementary value addition the asymmetric partnerships with specialized or co-specialized resources have gained popularity. The evolution and management of asymmetric technology partnerships is however very challenging. Partnership is an e $ cient solu- tion only if it creates some extra value compared with markets and hierarchies. It can be concluded that partnership is not a panacea, which can be transposed into any conditions. Transaction cost economics explains why possibly disappointing outcomes can arise from a partnership agreement. There may be problems with asymmetric in- formation and potential opportunism. We believe that inter-organizational trust may act as a mechanism providing an e $ cient solution. Because of the extremely high volatility in the converg- ing telecommunications partnerships seem to have become increasingly as temporary arrangements. This volatility sets great challenges for trust build- ing. Trust-building mechanisms in this risky and turbulent business will be left for further research.