ارزیابی روابط سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی بین چین، ژاپن و ایالات متحده
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|9525||2009||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Asian Economics, Volume 20, Issue 6, November 2009, Pages 611–625
China has received enormous inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years, including significant flows from Japan and the US. We examine these investment flows in detail to gain perspectives on their relative importance for the three countries involved. We also analyze the industrial composition of FDI flows over time. American FDI flows to China have been less concentrated in manufacturing than average for investors in China while Japan's FDI flows have been much more concentrated in manufacturing, particularly in transport, electrical and machinery industries in recent years. Using survey data from American and Japanese affiliates, we compare the employment patterns and sales destinations of American and Japanese affiliates in China. We find a much higher degree of export-orientation for Japanese affiliates than American affiliates, with the latter tending to make the vast majority of their sales in the Chinese market. Over time, however, we find a tendency towards convergence in the sales destinations of Japanese and American affiliates.
China's economic reforms, begun in the late 1970s and progressing through its entry into the WTO in 2001, have allowed it to participate more fully in international commerce and to benefit from economic growth. China's rapid economic growth has been outpaced only by its even more rapid increases in international trade participation and receipt of foreign direct investment (FDI). As Fig. 1 shows, China's FDI inflows relative to GDP have grown from 0.2% in 1982 to a high of 6.3% in 1993, then back down to 4.3% in 2007. The accumulated stock of FDI from 1982 rises particularly rapidly relative to GDP from the early 1990s to early 2000s, rising from only 8% in 1992 to hit a peak of almost 30% in 2002 before dropping modestly to 25.8% in 2007. Similarly dramatic growth has occurred in exports and imports relative to GDP, with the export share rising from 12.3% to 41.9% and the import share from 10.1% to 32.3% between 1982 and 2007. The rapid growth in China's GDP, trade and FDI made it the fourth largest economy, the third largest trading country, and the largest FDI recipient in the world in 2007.1 China's rapid economic growth and international integration have captured a lot of media attention and cocktail-party theorizing as to the causal relationships within China, as well as the possible impacts on China's major trade and investment partners, such as Japan and the United States. In this paper, we jump on this bandwagon, but with a sobering examination of the available data from all three countries. We assess the FDI relationships between China, Japan, and the US by analyzing data on FDI stocks and flows across the three countries along with data on the operations of American and Japanese affiliates in China. We attempt to weigh the importance of these bilateral FDI relationships relative to other bilateral relationships for each country, and we analyze the industrial composition of the investment relationships. Although this analysis serves to remind observers that the direct investment relationship between Japan and the US is still much larger than that between either country and China, the growth in the China investments and popular interest therein prompts our further investigation into the China-hosted investments. We look for similarities and differences between Japanese and American multinationals in their approaches to investment in China by examining operating data from their affiliates. We find evidence that Japanese affiliates in China are more concentrated in manufacturing industries and are more export-oriented than their American counterparts, but the latter difference is shrinking over time.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
We have analyzed the FDI relationships between China, Japan, and the United States with available statistics from all three countries. At the country-level, Japanese and American investments in China have grown very rapidly in recent years, but from low initial levels, so these investments in China still represent less than 10% of outstanding FDI stocks for Japan and less than 3% for the US, even with Hong Kong investments included. Bilateral investment linkages between the Japan and the US are stronger, with the US holding about 32% of Japan's FDI stocks and Japan holding almost 4% of US FDI stocks. From China's perspective, the US and Japan fall behind only Hong Kong as single-country sources of FDI inflows, with Hong Kong contributing almost 30%, while the US and Japan contribute about 9% and 7%, respectively, but these statistics are suspect due to “creative accounting” practices mentioned previously. At the industry level, American FDI flows to China have been less concentrated in manufacturing than average for investors in China while Japan's FDI flows have been much more concentrated in manufacturing, particularly in transport, electrical, and machinery industries in the most recent years. American investments have included significant contributions from wholesale trade industries and other service industries in recent years, along with large FDI flows in both the computers and electronic products and chemicals industries. This difference in the industry distribution of FDI flows matches fairly well with the industry distribution of affiliate employment. American affiliates in other non-manufacturing industries and in computers and electronic products industries together employed half of the total workforce of American affiliates in China in 2005, while Japanese affiliates in the computers and electronic products and transportation equipment industries together employed almost half of their workforce total in China. The differences in industry distribution of affiliates help to explain the observed differences in sales destinations of American and Japanese affiliates in China at the aggregate level. American affiliates made the vast majority of their sales (73%) in the Chinese market while Japanese affiliates made just over half of their sales (56%) locally in 2005. The gap narrows if we focus on only manufacturing industries: 67% local sales for US affiliates versus 54% local sales for Japanese affiliates in 2005. We also observe a trend towards convergence as US manufacturing affiliates have moved from a local sales share of 88% in 1989 towards more export sales, and their Japanese counterparts have moved from a local sales share of only 47% towards more local sales. Some of the recent trends in the fragmentation of production and the possible differences between American and Japanese affiliates in their participation therein, as described in Dean et al. (in press), may help in interpreting these sales trends. Lower trade costs associated with closer proximity may prompt Japan's multinationals to locate processing plants in China. These plants use imported intermediate inputs from Japan to produce final manufactures primarily for export. Higher trade costs may lead American multinationals to invest in China as a substitute for exporting to China, with affiliates’ sales primarily targeted at the local market. These different strategies for FDI in China based on proximity differences may become less important over time as China's economic growth, market development, and continuing trade liberalization become more important factors driving the behavior of all foreign affiliates located in China. Testing this hypothesis more fully would require foreign affiliates’ data from more than just Japan and the US, which we leave for future research.