دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 13476
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

بازار ثانویه برای معاملات طیفی : ارتقای نقدینگی بازار

عنوان انگلیسی
A secondary market for the trading of spectrum: promoting market liquidity
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
13476 2003 9 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Telecommunications Policy, Volume 27, Issue 7, August 2003, Pages 533–541

ترجمه کلمات کلیدی
مدیریت طیف - تجارت طیف - نقدینگی بازار - گزینه تماس -
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی
Spectrum management,Spectrum trading,Market liquidity,Call option,
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  بازار ثانویه برای معاملات طیفی : ارتقای نقدینگی بازار

چکیده انگلیسی

The development of a successful secondary market for the trading of spectrum is not a foregone conclusion. The multi-dimensional nature of radio spectrum, which requires that a bid to buy and an offer to sell conform across the multiple dimensions, suggests that the market may be very “thin.” In addition, existing commercial users of spectrum have little incentive to sell excess spectrum if such spectrum will be employed by the buyer to provide a service that competes with the service provider by the seller. This paper discusses several steps to enhance market liquidity. One approach involves obtaining participation from federal spectrum users. Another step involves developing a market that both enhances market liquidity and provides participants the opportunity to incorporate a call option in the traded asset.

مقدمه انگلیسی

The ability of government authorities to successfully auction radio spectrum has led some governments to consider the desirability of promoting the development of a secondary market for the trading of radio spectrum.1 In broad terms, by transferring spectrum from a lower to a higher value user, a secondary market may enhance the efficiency with which spectrum is assigned.2 If conducted through a transparent process, spectrum trading may impose a clear, market-based opportunity cost upon current users, thereby providing them with the correct incentive to conserve spectrum. Such a market may also assist the debt and equity markets in valuing a firm's spectrum assets. Despite its theoretical appeal, the development of a market for the trading of spectrum is not a foregone conclusion. Spectrum is multi-dimensional in that it is defined in terms of frequency, geographic location, and time. For a trade to occur, the needs of the buyer and seller must coincide across all three dimensions. In addition, existing commercial users of spectrum have very little incentive to sell excess or unused spectrum if the buyer will use its acquired spectrum to provide a service that is currently provided by the seller.3 Consequently, the number of participants in a spectrum market may be very low. Such market “thinness” decreases the likelihood that a trade will take place. If a trade is conducted, it may occur at a price that is substantially higher (lower) than the buyer (seller) desired. Both outcomes create a “liquidity risk” for market participants. High liquidity risk may discourage market participation and, in so doing, may reinforce a market's illiquidity. A “thin” spectrum market may prevent current and prospective spectrum users from receiving the price signals they need in order to make decisions on how best to allocate their resources. However, policymakers can increase market liquidity by adopting policies that create the opportunity for and enhance the willingness of spectrum users to conduct a trade. In addition, market mechanisms vary in their ability to minimize problems associated with market thinness. The adoption of the wrong mechanism may make the development of a liquid secondary market for the trading of radio spectrum problematic.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

The development of a successful secondary market for the trading of spectrum is not a foregone conclusion. The multi-dimensional nature of radio spectrum, which requires that a bid to buy and an offer to sell conform across the multiple dimensions, suggests that the market may be very ‘‘thin.’’ In addition, existing commercial spectrum users have little incentive to sell excess spectrum if such spectrum will be employed by the buyer to provide a service that competes with the service provider by the seller. The paper discusses several steps to enhance market liquidity. One approach involves obtaining participation from federal spectrum users. Such participation would reduce the incentive they have under existing spectrum management procedures to misrepresent their spectrum needs and requirements. Another important step involves developing a market that both enhances market liquidity and provides participants with the opportunity to incorporate a call option in the traded asset. An electronic call market can enhance market liquidity and can be designed to incorporate a call option.